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This thesis argues that pragmatic, neorealist interests—reducing Iran's
international isolation, opening avenues for economic cooperation and commercial
exchange, restoring religious and cultural links, and safeguarding the mutually
advantageous relationships with influential powers in the region—are the true foundations
of Iranian national security and foreign policy decisionmaking. Iran's imperative has
been—and still is—focused on the pragmatic national security interests of the nation-state
model vice the ideological potential for spreading its brand of Islamic revolution abroad.
The causes of these Islamic revolutionary groups, no matter how noble in the Iranian
leaderships' eye, do not outweigh the more classic nation-state decisionmaking process
that the Iranian government undergoes when it determines the best course of action on an
issue of foreign policy and/or national security—or realpolitik. It is the neorealist
approach which always wins out in national security matters of a state. Presented are four
case studies of Iranian relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and four Persian Gulf
States (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). What each reveals
is an Islamic Iran whose policy decisions and actions compelled by the rational, state
model of neorealism and not ideology.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The break-up of the Soviet Union confronted Iran with a set of challenges and
opportunities. On the one hand the long-standing threat presented by the USSR receded
and the door opened for much closer contact with Central Asia and the Transcaucasus,
now divided among eight independent states, six of them with at least nominally Muslim
majority populations. On the other hand, Iran's security was threatened by both a United
States no longer balanced by a Soviet superpower and the volatility and instability of the
new states created in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. How should this sudden and
unforeseen situation be handled? Should the Islamic Republic of Iran exploit the
weakness of the new states to export radical Islamic ideology and stamp its authority as a
major regional power, or should it follow a more neighborly and cooperative path?
In this paper it is argued that pragmatic, neorealist interests—reducing Iran's
international isolation, opening avenues for economic cooperation and commercial
exchange, restoring religious and cultural links, and safeguarding the mutually
advantageous relationships with influential powers in the region—are the true
foundations of Iranian national security and foreign policy decisionmaking. Important to
US policy makers and analysts is understanding the basis for Iranian decisionmaking.
Several experts still cling to the 1980s and 1990s notion that Iran's decisionmaking stems
from its naive early policy of exporting the Islamic revolution throughout the Middle
East. But, is this the true basis of today's Iranian decionmaking regarding national
security policies? Was it really the basis for decisionmaking in the 1980s and 1990s?
Does Iran make its foreign policy decisions based upon the expansion of Khomeini's
brand of revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism abroad or does it make its decisions based
upon national security interests of the state? In short, my answer is "no." If we penetrate
this veneer, we find evidence of a far more pragmatic Iran. Although the Iranians
certainly allowed emotion to reign during the honeymoon years of the 1979 revolution,
this euphoria quickly disappeared with the onslaught of the war with Iraq and Iran's
international isolation due to its overt support of terrorism and irredentist groups among
its Arab neighbors.
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Iran's imperative has been—and I contend still is—focused upon those national
security interests of the nation-state model vice the ideological potential for spreading its
brand of Islamic revolution abroad. No matter how noble in the Iranian leaderships eyes
it cannot outweigh the more classic nation-state decisionmaking process that the Iranian
government undergoes in deciding the best course of action on an issue of foreign policy
and/or national security. It all comes down to what Germany's Otto von Bismarck called
realpolitik. I submit that these forces are always in interplay with one another within a
state. But it is the realpolitik—or neorealist—approach which always wins out in
national security matters of a state. This includes Iran.
Presented are four case studies of Iranian relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey,
Israel, and some of the Persian Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia. What each reveals is
an Islamic Iran whose policy decisions and actions compelled by the rational state model
of neorealism and not ideology.
The first of these case studies deals with Iran-Azerbaijan relations. When
presented with a decision to support one over the other, Iran considers the issues of
territorial integrity and state survival more important than the Islamic revolutionary
objectives of regional fundamentalist groups. During the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict of
the early 1990s, Iran lent both financial and physical support to the Christian factions
over the Islamic fundamentalist Shi'i'te factions in Azerbaijan. Tehran's actions here
mirrored similar policies taken in regard to Islamic fundamentalist factions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. This occurs because the Iranian government perceives the rise to
power of zealous, unpredictable Islamist powers along its own borders—outside of
Tehran's control—as a danger to its national security.
The second case study on Iranian-Turkish relations likewise illustrates Tehran's
neorealist core in policymaking. Turkey, as a Muslim and secular nation, should have
been an anathema to the new Islamic state created by Khomeini but was not. Due to the
survival need of the new regime during the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini and his
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revolutionary followers sought to keep Turkey, if not as an ally then at least as a neutral
state, during the war. In later years, Iran used its leverage with several ethnic groups
(like the Kurds, Alevi, and Armenians) to balance against what it perceived as a potential
security threat posed by Turkey in northern Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. Tehran's
actions here mirrored similar policies taken in regard to Islamic fundamentalist factions
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, fears of Pan-Turanism are of significant concern to
Tehran. The nation has suffered severe economic wounds due to U.S. economic
sanctions and Washington's containment policy. In this respect, the aftermath of the
1979 revolution has not drastically changed the nation-state decision-making process of
Iranian officials as many US experts think. Iran will continue to favor policies, which
enhance the stability of nations on their borders and rid the region of the greatest
potential perceived threat to Iran's sovereignty and national security—namely the United
States.
The third case study involves relations between Iran and Israel. In this case,
Tehran's rhetoric and actions appear both conflicting and paradoxical; however, the
common thread running throughout is Iran's perception of threats to its territorial
integrity and a strong desire to balance power against these threats through both
conventional and unconventional means. Conventional means include military
modernization, weapons procurement, and the forging of regional alliances to counter
threats. Unconventional means include the support and influence of terrorist groups and
investments in weapons of mass destruction. Iranian policy has consistently focused on
balancing and countering against Israel; a country cast by Tehran as an extension of US
hegemonic penetration of the Middle East.
The last case study examines relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf States:
specifically the nations of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi
Arabia. It is important to note that Iran's relations with the Arab Gulf countries operate
on two tracks: on the one hand there is a decided need to cultivate friends, escape
regional isolation, and continue important trade relations; on the other hand, Iran nurtures
a desire to assert an independent and forceful foreign policy. However, Iran's leaders
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have not balanced these divergent policies well. Indeed, relations between Iran and its
Arab neighbors have been strained for decades, especially since the revolution. Between
Arab support of Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian occupation of the disputed
UAE islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs', and links of Iranian
support of Shi'a uprisings in Bahrain, have all worked to create an apprehensive
atmosphere.
Iran does have serious national security concerns throughout the region of the
Persian Gulf. Tehran has sought, in recent years, to improve upon its relations with its
Arab neighbors to alleviate tensions stemming from its perceived threats to the
foundations of Iranian sovereignty and the Islamic revolution. In this regard, Iran's
decisionmaking is anchored in neorealist behavior. True threats to the very fabric of the
Iranian Islamic state are swiftly addressed through pragmatic, realpolitik. It is through
this prism that Iran's policy dealings must be viewed. This same behavior is also evident
when analyzing Tehran's dealings with Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Naturally, the
process of improving relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors has not hindered
Tehran's efforts to enhance its defense capability. This is Iran's pragmatism. Unlike
Iraq, the Islamic Republic's attempt to modernize its armed forces has been under less
scrutiny by the international community for most of the 1990s. All of these case studies
have one common theme. They demonstrate that neorealism is the determinant of Iran's
national security policy decisionmaking. When taken together these case studies
demonstrate the key tenets of national security, territorial integrity, power balancing
against regional and interregional hegemony, and domestic cohesiveness predicate
Iranian national security policy.
xvi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is rare that a sole individual can accomplish any goal in life without some
support either physical or emotional. I am no exception. Since my high school days, the
society and culture of Iran have long been a fascination of mine. Before I ever arrived at
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), I had a personal goal to research and write on the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Work as an active duty Marine Officer has kept me quite busy
over the last fifteen years and I wondered if I would ever find the time to fulfill this goal.
This achievement would most certainly have been later vice sooner if it were not for the
wisdom and foresight of the United States Marine Corps in investing the time, resources,
and confidence in the Officers it selects to study regional security issues. Likewise, I
acknowledge that my selection for this opportunity would likely have been missed if not
for the recommendations and praise provided to the selection board in 1998 by my
superiors in the Navy and Marine Corps intelligence activities. These include the
Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Lowell Jacoby, USN; Deputy Director of
Naval Intelligence, Mr. Paul Lowell; and Marine Corps Deputy Director of Intelligence,
Mr. Michael H. Decker. I particularly appreciate Mr. Decker's kind words of confidence
before my departure from the Pentagon. In addition, I want to thank my good friend
Commander William Eldard, USN, who has rendered unrelenting encouragement and
good humor in my application and subsequent tasks here at NPS.
Whatever worth this manuscript has is largely due to the people who have read
part or all during the various stages of its refinement. These people include Ahmad
Ghoreishi, Glenn E. Robinson, Ralph Magnus, James J. Wirtz, Major Todd W. Lyons,
USMC, and Mary Greenfield. I thank the late Professor Ralph Magnus who instilled in
me a thirst for detail in all my writing, which I applied vigorously to this project. I owe a
great debt of thanks to my thesis advisors, Professor's Ahmad Ghoreishi and Glenn E.
Robinson, for their valuable instruction, advice, and patience throughout this process. I
also extend thanks to Professor James J. Wirtz for kindling my interest in using
international relations theory in my approach to Iran and for his valued comments on my
writing (although I most definitely was not as "parsimonious" as he would have liked). I
xvn
would like to acknowledge a special thanks to those who provided needed editing advice
to enhance this work. They include Captain Frank Petho, U. S. Navy; Mary Greenfield,
Elaine Christian; and Major Todd W. Lyons, USMC. Todd has been a helpful friend and
commentator of the substance of my work.
I am indebted to the staff of the Naval Postgraduate School's Dudley Knox
Library for its professional support of not only me, but also all students on campus.
Special thanks goes to Greta Marlatt for her informative tutorage in the wide array of
electronic sources available in my research. Likewise, special thanks goes to Irma Fink
and Susan Miller who I inundated throughout the past year with requests for interlibrary
loan materials. Irma and Susan were always cheerful and diligent in helping me locate
every source I requested in my research.
I give sincere gratitude to my parents, Michael Gregory and Carol Ann Grogan,
for their unwavering support throughout my life. They have always made me feel like I
could accomplish anything. I would also like to thank Victoria Magro-Croul, my English
and composition teacher, who infused within me a deep affection for the written word.
Her lessons continue to echo in my head whenever I sit at a keyboard, furnishing me
warm memories of the simpler years of youth.
I owe particularly thanks (and at least a few missed camping and fishing trips) to
my three sons, Zachary, Joshua, and Jacob. Although I always tried to keep in mind a
sense of balance between work and family, there were some unavoidable late nights and
working weekends required for me to complete portions of this work. I thank them for
their love and I thank God for the cherished blessing he has given me in each
My final thanks go to my darling wife, Joanne Kristin Grogan. Throughout my
life, she has always been a reservoir of strength, support, encouragement, and buoy to my
spirits. As a Marine wife, she has sacrificed a great deal of her personal career goals for
me and of life of service to our country; this has been especially true during my final
months in Monterey completing this work. I continue to marvel at the depth of her
warmth, understanding, and unflagging love that inspires me every day to be a better man
xvm
in her eyes. She is my best friend and I earnestly thank God for granting me her love and
companionship.
xix
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xx
I. INTRODUCTION
The break-up of the Soviet Union confronted Iran with a set of challenges and
opportunities. On the one hand the long-standing threat presented by the USSR receded
and the door opened for much closer contact with Central Asia and the Transcaucasus,
now divided among eight independent states, six of them with at least nominally Muslim
majority populations. . On the other hand, Iran's security was threatened by both a
United States no longer balanced by a Soviet superpower and the volatility and instability
of the new states created in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. How should this sudden
and unforeseen situation be handled? Should the Islamic Republic of Iran exploit the
weakness of the new states to export radical Islamic ideology and stamp its authority as a
major regional power, or should it follow a more neighborly and cooperative path?
In this paper it is argued that pragmatic, neorealist interests—reducing Iran's
international isolation, opening avenues for economic cooperation and commercial
exchange, restoring religious and cultural links, and safeguarding the mutually
advantageous relationships with influential powers in the region. Important to US policy
makers and analysts is understanding the basis for Iranian decisionmaking. Several
experts still cling to the 1980s- 1990s notion that Iran's decisionmaking stems from its
naive early policy of exporting the Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East. '
Nevertheless, is this the true basis of today's Iranian decisionmaking regarding national
security policies? Was it really the basis for decisionmaking in the 1980s and 1990s?
Does Iran make its foreign policy decisions based upon the expansion of Khomeini's
brand of revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism abroad or does it make its decisions based
upon national security interests of the state? In short, my answer is "no." Many believe
that Iranian foreign policy initiatives following the 1979 Islamic revolution where
indicative of an ideologically based international relations strategy and that neorealist
1
Legro, Jeffrey W. and Moravcsik, Andrew. "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, vol.
24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 5-55; Lebow, Richard Ned. "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the
Failure of Realism," in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, editors. International Relations
Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Zagare, Frank C.
"All Mortis, No Rigor," International Security, vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 107-1 14.
theory is the wrong approach to analysis. However, if we penetrate this veneer we find
evidence of a far more pragmatic nation. Although the Iranians certainly allowed
emotion to reign during the honeymoon years of the 1979 revolution, this euphoria
quickly disappeared with the onslaught of the war with Iraq and Iran's international
isolation due to its overt support of terrorism and irredentist groups among its Arab
neighbors.
Iran's imperative has been—and I contend still is—focused upon those national
security interests of the nation-state model vice the ideological potential for spreading its
brand of Islamic revolution abroad. The causes of these groups, matter how noble in the
Iranian leaderships' eye, do not outweigh the more classic nation-state decisionmaking
process that the Iranian government undergoes in deciding the best course of action in
deciding on an issue of foreign policy and/or national security. It all comes down to what
Germany's Otto von Bismarck called realpolitik. I submit that these forces are always in
interplay with one another within a state. But it is the realpolitik—or neorealist—
approach that always wins out in national security matters of a state. This includes Iran.
Presented are four case studies of Iranian relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey,
Israel, and some of the Persian Gulf States including Saudi Arabia. What each reveals is
an Islamic Iran whose policy decisions and actions compelled by the rational state model
of neorealism and not ideology.
A. IRAN AND AZERBAIJAN
The first of these case studies deals with Iran-Azerbaijan relations. As I will
prove in this case study, when presented with a decision to support one over the other,
Iran considers the issues of territorial integrity and state survival paramount to Islamic
revolutionary objectives of regional fundamentalist groups. The details to follow show
that during the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict of the early 1990s Iran lent both financial
and physical support to the Christian factions over the Islamic fundamentalist Shi'ite
Ibid.
factions in Azerbaijan. Tehran's actions here mirrored similar policies taken in regard to
Islamic fundamentalist factions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 3 This occurs because the Iranian
government perceives the rise to power of zealous, unpredictable Islamist powers along
its own borders—outside of Tehran's control—as a danger to its national security.
Therefore, it has been in Iran's national security interest to back factional groups against
Islamists (s it did in Azerbaijan), despite the ideological paradox. In this respect, the
aftermath of the 1979 revolution has not drastically changed the nation-state decision-
making process of Iranian officials as many US experts think. Iran will continue to favor
policies, which enhance the stability of nations on their borders and rid the region of the
greatest potential perceived threat to Iran's sovereignty and national security—namely
the United States.
B. IRAN AND TURKEY
Likewise, the case study on Iranian-Turkish relations demonstrates that when
presented with a choice between ideological principles and territorial integrity, it was the
issues of territorial integrity and state survival that were deemed by Tehran as paramount
over the Islamic revolutionary objectives of regional fundamentalist groups by Iran.
Turkey, as a Muslim and secular nation, should have been an anathema to the new
Islamic state created by Khomeini but it was not. The survival need of the new regime
during the Iran-Iraq War prompted Khomeini and his revolutionary followers to keep
Turkey, if not as an ally, then at least as a neutral during the war. In the 1990s, Iran used
its leverage with several ethnic groups (i.e., the Kurds, Alevi, and Armenians) to offset its
perception that Turkey posed a potential security in northern Iraq, Azerbaijan, and
Central Asia. Tehran's actions here mirrored similar policies taken in regard to Islamic
fundamentalist factions in Afghanistan and Iraq.4 Moreover, fears of Pan-Turanism are of
significant concern to Tehran. The nation suffered severe economic wounds due to U.S.
3 The Islamist fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan are made up mostly of Sunni Islamists vice Shi'ite
Islamists in Iran.
Fuller, Gramham E. Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan: Its Character and Prospects (Santa
Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1991), 6.
economic sanctions and Washington's containment policy. In this respect, the aftermath
of the 1979 revolution did not drastically chanse the nation-state decision-making
process of Iranian officials as many US experts think. Iran will continue to favor
policies, which enhance the stability of nations on their borders and rid the region of the
greatest potential perceived threat to Iran's sovereignty and national security—namely
the United States. Figure 1 depicts Iran and its surrounding neighbor states.
Figure 1. Map of Iran and Its Surrounding Neighbor States."
C. IRAN AND ISRAEL
The Iran-Israel case study also supports the analysis of the neorealist foundation
of Iranian policy decisions. Tehran's rhetoric and actions appear both conflicting and
paradoxical: however, the common thread running throughout is Iran's perception of
threats to its territorial integrity and a strong desire to balance power against these threats
through both conventional and unconventional means. Conventional means include
5 Map of Iran (1996) on the internet at http://icc.ucdavis.edu/areas/aes/laura/iran.htm. [Accessed 18
October 2000].
military modernization, weapons procurement, and the forging of regional alliances to
counter threats. Unconventional means include the support and influence of terrorist
groups and investments in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iranian policy has
consistently focused on balancing and countering against Israel, seen by Tehran as a mere
extension of US hegemonic penetration of the Middle East. In this respect, the aftermath
of the 1979 revolution has not drastically changed the nation-state decision-making
process of Iranian officials as many US experts think. Iran will continue to favor
policies—no matter how paradoxical—which enhance the stability of nations on their
borders and rid the region of the greatest potential perceived threat to Iran's sovereignty
and national security—namely the United States.
D. IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF STATES
The final case study explored concerns Iranian relations with the Persian Gulf
States of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The two
major factors attracting US interests and concern about regional stability in the Middle
East are its rich oil resources and its strategic geographical location. Although US forces
remained deployed throughout the Gulf region because of Iraq's continued defiance,
Washington has long subscribed to a policy by which long-term local security maintained
by the Gulf States themselves. US policy once viewed Iran and Saudi Arabia fulfilling
this role in Nixon's "Twin Pillars" doctrine.6 Of course, this policy doctrine became
moot in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the 444-day American hostage
crisis in Tehran, and the decade-long demonizing rhetoric of the Khomeini theocratic
regime.
Iran's relations with the Persian Gulf countries operate on two tracks: on the one
hand there is a decided need to cultivate friends, escape regional isolation, and continue
important trade relations; on the other hand, Iran nurtures a desire to assert an
independent and forceful foreign policy. However, Iran's leaders have not balanced these
divergent policies well. Indeed, relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors have been
5
Lenczowski, George. American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, North Carolina: Duke
University Press, 1990), 116.
strained for decades, especially since the revolution. Indeed, relations between Iran and
its Arab neighbors have been strained for decades, especially since the revolution.
Fearful of Islamic revivalism, most Arab states supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War
and paid huge sums of money to sustain Saddam Hussein's war effort.7
Over the last decade, the Persian Gulf states have grown increasingly
apprehensive that Iran is determined to attain regional hegemony. Moreover, Iran's so-
called "bullying tactics"8 have obscured whatever conciliatory moves it may have been
willing to make over control and sovereignty of the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.
Iran's claim to the islands has generated widespread apprehension. What began as a
dispute between Sharjah, Ras al-Khaima, and Iran has evolved and escalated to a dispute
first with the UAE, then with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and now with the
Arab League. The issue is one of principle, but there are also strong strategic overtones.
If Iran were to gain undisputed sovereignty over the islands, it could extend its territorial
waters into large areas that contain rich oil reserves. The UAE has proposed submitting
the dispute to the International Court of Justice for resolution. To date, however, Iran has
refused to accept this avenue of reconciliation. So long as the dispute remains
unresolved, and Iran continues to occupy and reinforce Abu Musa, tensions between Iran
and the GCC will continue.9
Iran finds itself virtually surrounded by states with which it has ideological,
religious, ethnic, and territorial differences. 10 The military alignment with the US among
many of these same countries further heightens Iran's perception of encirclement by
7 Kemp, Geoffrey. "The Impact of Iranian Foreign Policy on Regional Security: An External
Perspective," Foreign Policy in a Changing Region (New York: Routledge), 130-131.
8
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threats. Although early Iranian leaders saw the US as the great opponent of Iranian
strategic aspirations under Khomeini, since the accession to power of the reform-minded
President Khatami, anti-US rhetoric has been toned down considerably. Nevertheless,
major differences remain with the US, often seen as a symbol of Western decadence by
Islamic fundamentalists. There is also resentment in Iran at ongoing US efforts to disrupt
the transfer of advanced military technology from Russia and China, and at Washington's
attempts to exclude Iran from the benefits of Caspian Sea oil development. For its part,
the US has regarded Iran as a pariah state and an exporter of terrorism, and has kept
sanctions in place, although Washington's attitude to Tehran has softened following the
election of Khatami. 1 ] Iranian suspicions of US intentions, however, will be strengthened
by remarks such as those made last year by the commander of US Central Command in
the Persian Gulf, Marine General Anthony Zinni, who suggested that Iran posed a greater
threat than Iraq. " Moreover, the Taliban have also succeeded in ruffling relations
between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
In March, the Saudis gave de facto recognition to the Taliban regime by signing a
protocol allowing only Taliban-certified Afghans to take part in the annual pilgrimage to
Mecca.
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Ironically, this development came at a time when Iran was seeking to augment
its influence in the Gulf by improving relations with the moderate, West-leaning states of
" United States Congress. Senate Committee on Intelligence. Current And Projected National Security
Threats To The United States and Its Interests Abroad: Hearing Before the Select Committee on
Intelligence. 104th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C., 22 February 1996) on the internet at
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terrorism.html [Accessed 29 November 1999].
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the GCC 14—despite the fact that the GCC states provide military facilities for US forces.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia—the dominant member of the GCC, the other members being
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain—and Iran continued
to move towards establishing closer ties, and in May 1998 the Saudi defense minister,
Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz, visited Iran for talks focusing on regional stability.
In early 1999, Iran established diplomatic relations with Bahrain, which accused
Iran in the recent past of supporting Shi' a dissidents within its own territory. Bahrain's
new ambassador, Salman Abdulwahab Al Sabbagh, said of his country's relations with
Iran: "I don't want to speak about the past, but I would like to say that I am optimistic
about the future."
15 As for relations with other GCC states, Kuwait and Iran conduct joint
coast guard patrols in the Northern Gulf region and Oman formed a joint military
committee with Iran some years ago and has recently conducted joint naval exercises
together in the Southern Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. 16
All of these case studies have one common theme. They demonstrate the
accuracy of neorealist theory as the underlying determinant of a state's national security
policy decisionmaking concerning the Islamic state of Iran. Taken together they
demonstrate the key tenets of national security, territorial integrity, power balancing
against regional and interregional hegemony, and domestic cohesiveness Iranian national
security policy.
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II. THE THEORY OF NEOREALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
International relations theorist, Kenneth Waltz wrote, "Balance of power theory
claims to explain the results of states' actions, under given conditions, and those results
may not be foreshadowed in any of the actors' motives or be contained as objectives in
their policies." His balance of power theory begins with assumptions about states: They
are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum,
drive for universal domination. According to Waltz:
States pursue many goals, which are often vaguely
formulated and inconsistent. They fluctuate with the
changing currents of domestic politics, are prey to the
vagaries of a shifting cast of political leaders, and are
influenced by the outcomes of bureaucratic struggles. But
all of this has always been known, and it tells us nothing
about the merits of balance-of-power theory...According to
the theory, a balance of power tends to form whether some
or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a
balance, or whether some or all states aim for universal
domination. 1
Many international relations theorists agree with Waltz's ideas. 19 Stephen M.
Walt states, "Balance of power theory assumes that states are essentially rational actors
whose primary goal is survival...(a)s a result, states strive to increase their relative
power... (i)n the neorealist version of balance of power theory, the distribution of power
is the primary explanatory variable.""
17
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Even as long ago as the time of Thucydides, author of The History of the
Peloponnesian War, 21 political realism (from which neorealism has evolved) contained
three key assumptions: (1) states (or city-states) are the key units of action; (2) states seek
power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and (3) they behave in ways
that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational
terms." Therefore, states will devise policies that will protect their own society by
amassing or maintaining sufficient power, alone or in coalitions, to maintain their
essential security interests.
Political realism and neorealism, according to Robert Gilpin, "must be seen as a
philosophical disposition and set of assumptions about the world rather than as in any
strict sense a 'scientific' theory." Furthermore, Gilpin writes that the proponents of
realism share three assumptions regarding political life. The first assumption is the
essentially conflicting nature of international affairs in which anarchy is the rule; order,
justice, and morality are the exceptions.
The (neo)realist need not believe that one must always forego
the pursuit of these higher virtues, but (neo)realists do stress
that in the world as it is, the final arbiter of things political is
power. All moral schemes will come to naught if this basic
reality is forgotten.
24
The second assumption is that the essence of social reality is in the group. This is
why the relationships between states are important. The building blocks and ultimate
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units of social and political life are neither democratic liberal thought nor the class
dynamics of Marxism but, rather, realism. This is true because human beings confront
one another ultimately as members of groups not as isolated individuals.
"Homo sapiens" is a tribal species, and loyalty to the tribe for most
of us ranks above all loyalties other than that of the family. In the
modern world, we have given the name "nation-state" to these
competing tribes and the name "nationalism" to this form of loyalty.
True, the name, size, and organization of the competing groups into
which our species subdivides itself do alter over time— tribes, city-
states, kingdoms, empires, and nation-states— due to economic,
demographic, and technological changes. 25
The third assumption characterizing realist/neorealist thinking is the primacy that
;d(
noted that men are motivated by honor, greed, and above all, fear."
in all political life is power and security." This observation has eep roots. Thucydides
Neorealism and realism, however, are not identical ideas. Waltz has observed
that international politics is, and always has been, a realm of conflict between "states"
whether they are empires, city-states, or nation-states. In this theory, Waltz recognizes
the "continuity" of these interactions as seen in the historical record of mankind.
A. SIX ASSUMPTIONS OF NEOREALISM
John Hobson's book The State and International Relations, describes Waltz's
theory on neorealism. The following list provides a breakdown of Hobson's explanation
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The "Continuity" Assumption. Because the anarchical states system is
ontologically superior to the units and is an autonomous and self-constituting
realm, international relations never changes but has always been a realm of
necessity and violence. Accordingly, the neorealist method seeks to uncover the
essential a-historical laws of motion of international relations.
The "Positional" or "Relative Gains" Assumption. Anarchy and power
differentiation require states to place a premium on short-term "relative gains"
over long-term "absolute cooperative gains."
The Political "Sovereignty" Assumption. Autonomous nation-states are the
central actors in international relations. The sovereign state is the highest form of
political expression and will remain so despite economic interdependence or
globalization.
The Survival "Rationality" Assumption. The sovereign state is a unitary actor
that rationally pursues its national survival.
The High Domestic Agential State Power Assumption (Billiard-Ball Model).
The State has high domestic agential power. States are likened to "billiard balls"
not simply because they conflict and "bounce off each other," but above all
because their internal or domestic properties are irrelevant to state behavior and
international relations.
No International Agential State Power and the "A-Moral" Assumption.
Because the State has no agency to use it can neither shape international relations
nor mitigate the logic of anarchy, compelling it to ignore international morality as
a basis for action/policy. They must pursue the technical means to survive (i.e.,
adaptation) in a hostile external world of competing states."
Donnelly agrees with Waltz and Hobson. 30 Each of these six assumptions in the
motivation of states in their international relations dealings has a resonance when applied
to state relations throughout history, especially in the 20th century. Figure 2 illustrates the
relations a few major international relations theories with that of neorealism. In its
simplest form, neorealism assumes that the centrality of the state entity as the highest
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Figure 2. The Relationship of Neorealism to other State Theories32
In issues regarding regime survival, neither domestic politics, composition of the
political elite, nor regime ideology makes a significant difference in predicting state
behavior. Iran epitomizes this position. When confronted with annihilation by the Iraqis
in the 1980s, Iran abandoned efforts to isolate itself from the international system and
sought arms from its ideological enemies—the United States, the Soviet Union, and
Israel. When necessary, Iran engaged in power balancing behavior by allying with Syria,
a secular Arab-nationalist state, and Iran has made conciliatory gestures to its Gulf
neighbors to balance against the superpowers in the Gulf. 33
32 Hobson, 218.
33
Kruse, James H. Determinants ofIranian Foreign Policy: The Impact ofSystemic, Domestic and
Ideologic Factors (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), 109.
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To demonstrate the accuracy of neorealist theory in predicting state behavior, I
will use four case studies analyzing the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward
Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and the Persian Gulf states of the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and
Saudi Arabia. In each case, the analysis points to Tehran's quest to counter actual and
potential imbalances within the international relations system portending negative
outcomes regionally and domestically for Iran's policymaking. To clearly understand
this rationale, I will briefly review Iran's security concern's and the foreign policy
imperatives driving these concerns. By understanding these factors, one can better "see"
the framework of the "world" from the Iranian perspective. This information, coupled
with the analysis of the case studies, reveals an Iran which is not a zealous ideologue
state bent upon exporting its revolution around the world at all costs, but rather
Machiavellian and pragmatic in its foreign policy and national security decisions. In the
end, Iran decision makers will form policies, which compliment the state's national
security objectives of territorial integrity, economic prosperity, and survival.
14
III. THE IRANIAN PERSPECTIVE
A. IRAN'S SECURITY PERCEPTION
Iranian officials have come to view the end of the Cold War and the demise of the
Soviet Union with deep concern. Iran can no longer rely on the tried and tested strategy
of a negative balance between Washington and Moscow. 34 With their rivalry over, Iran's
strategic value diminished, ushering in a new, highly unpredictable era for the Islamic
regime. Likewise, still recovering from the losses of the Iran-Iraq War and under the
constriction US economic sanctions, Iran feels embattled and vulnerable to continued
turmoil and chaos that have seemed to perpetually reign along its borders as depicted in
Figure 3.
Since the late 1980s, Tehran has had to respond to systematic changes around it
and has been compelled to function as much as possible within the new international
system, which not only witnessed the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet
superpower in the North, but also the emergence of the US as the undisputed extra-
regional power in the Middle East. 35 Iranian concern with the country's territorial
integrity also increased with the ethnic resurgences that have occurred in neighboring
countries like Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Afghanistan since the breakup of the Soviet Union
has brought some unrest to Iran's ethnic minorities. Fear that secessionist movements in
Iran and on its borders could be used by outside powers to destabilize the country and the
regime have struck a cord with Islamists and nationalists alike both in and out of the
country. In the early 1990s, this fear extended to Iraq where the real potential for the
formation of a Kurdish state drove Islamic Iran to make an ally of secular Turkey to
ensure this did not happen.
34
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FIGURE 3. Iranian Provincial Jurisdictions Arrayed Against Neighbor
States Illustrate Tehran's Sense of Embattlement
The Islamists and many of the nationalists are keen to strengthen the grip of
central authority in the provinces and to deploy military force to counter the power of
irredentist forces, while some elements of the exiled nationalists view tribal reassertion as
a useful means of weakening the Islamic regime 36
Further, largely thanks to Iran's launching of its post-war five-year economic
plans and its lingering economic crisis, in broad terms the country's economic priorities
have begun to influence Iran's foreign policy. Tehran's moderation and its realpolitik
36t
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policy are the main features of this behavioral change. Likewise, Iran's contacts with
neighbors and the abandonment, at least at the formal level, of export of the revolution to
the rest of the region, Arab and non-Arab alike has allowed Tehran to reopen lines of
communication closed since 1979. Economic necessities—the need for foreign capital
and expertise, trade links, importance of expatriate resources, the need to diversify its
economy—have in turn affected Iranian economic policy decisions. This has created a
symbiotic relationship between Iran's economic necessity and its foreign policy with
regard to Central Asia. Keen competition with Turkey for this economic prize has
greatly influenced friction between the two. Therefore, while it is true to say that Tehran
has been redefining its priorities in recent years and has been reconsidering Iran's place
in the world, it would be unrealistic to expect it to abandon the system's modus operandi
or indeed to forego its Islamic profile purely for the sake of economic gains. This indeed
is the view of many in the clerical establishment. As Amirahmadi notes, "As long as Iran
and the Islamic movements (in the Muslim world) espouse the same ideals and radical
ideology, this congruity of purpose will enhance the visibility of Iran and its strength in
in
international politics." Tehran will continue to capitalize on Islam in its international
profile as it fits its national security goals in neorealist terms.
40
Stated another way, "the
fulfillment of domestic objectives has indeed necessitated a restructuring of Iran's foreign
policy." ' A corollary to national politico-military strength is that the leadership has
developed a perception of Iran's role in the region based less on Iran as the hub of an
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expanding Islamic revolution, but rather as regaining its position as a militarily powerful
and politically influential player in the region—towards becoming a regional power.42
B. IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IMPERATIVES
The primary motivating factors in Iran's national security policy behavior since
the end of the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War have been:
• To preserve Iran's territorial integrity;
• To avoid international isolation;
• To promote foreign trade, investment and commercial avenues
for the technology transfers required for sustainable development; and
• The removal of US presence and hegemonic influence in the
Persian Gulf. Iranian elite have a definite anxious perception that
their country is surrounded by unstable states and latent conflict.
This is of paramount importance to Tehran.43
Iran has no outstanding claims to territory not already under its control; however,
some bordering states, including Iraq and the UAE, have claims against Iranian territory,
suggesting that Iran's need for forces to repulse attack is real. The desire for military
balance is the primary driver of Iranian security policy objectives between itself and its
regional neighbors
—
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After the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, he declared Iran would be "Neither
West nor East (but) Islamic."45 In so doing, Iran joined the "Non-Aligned Movement"
(NAM), which chose neutrality in the Cold War stalemate;46 although this appears to be
ideologically driven this position can in fact compliment a neorealist outlook. By
choosing NAM Iran gained needed flexibility in its policy to consolidate the Islamic
Revolution. With this stance Iran positioned itself to better achieve the new national
security objectives of the nation: (1) autonomy in foreign policymaking, (2) avoidance of
costly involvement in the Cold War rivalry, (3) the end Iran's dependence on a single
ideological camp, and (4) the improvement of ties with all states.47 Moreover, Iran looks
to its Constitution, ratified following the 1979 revolution, to provide general guidance.
Germane elements to our discussion include: protecting the independence and territorial
integrity of the Islamic Republic; practicing non-alignment toward hegemonic states and
mutually peaceful ties with non-hegemonic ones; rejecting any form of hegemony; and
defending the rights of all Muslims around the world.
1. Evolving Policy Strategies
A combination of strategic location and energy resources has made Iran a focus
for great power interest and competition throughout the modern period. This fact has
profoundly affected Iranians' perceptions of the world, of the historical process and of
international relations.
49
All Iranian governments, whatever their political orientation,
have developed their foreign policy against this background, and have tried to develop
strategies accordingly. In essence, the aim has been to balance the great powers in a way
that best serves the interests of Iran, by allowing it to defend its sovereignty and integrity
Sadri, Houman A. "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment: Iranian Foreign Policy in Theory and
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against their ambitions and intrigues. Throughout the 20th century, Iran has used various
approaches with varying degrees of success. Some examples include positive
equilibrium (offering something to both powers); negative equilibrium (refusing
concessions to either power); third-party strategy (encouraging the involvement of
another Western power, such as France and Germany, to offset the great powers'
influence); and alliance with one or other power. 50 As the international dynamic has
changed—from early British hegemony, to the Cold War alliance with the US, to the
post-Islamic Revolution non-alignment strategy—so too has Iran's approach to foreign
policy and national security. 51
The post-Khomeini leadership's responses to the challenges Iran faces
—
especially concerning its relations with Turkey—have included a number of reactions,
which support the neorealist primacy of their approach. Perceived essential national
security concerns are given primacy in relations with neighboring states by the insistence
on the principle of territorial integrity and the readiness to cooperate with neighboring
states on mutual non-interference in internal affairs. " Whereas under Khomeini Iran
sought confrontational policies, the post-Khomeini leadership has progressively diverted
from this course to concentrate on economically enhancing policies. While there can be
no doubt that Iran's ideological commitments often clash with its national geopolitical
and economic interests53 one can also identify areas where other interests—such as long-
term security over short-term economic gains—do not harmonize.54
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In laying this contextual framework for analysis, it is important to understand
Iran's policy evolution over the last two decades. In brief, Iran's non-alignment policy
evolved through several trends. These include a two-track policy (1979-July 1982), a
confrontational policy (July 1982-June 1985), a conciliatory policy (June 1985-1993),
and a policy of engagement, or what some have dubbed Tehran's "charm offensive"
(1993-2000). The Two-Track policy began with Bazargan's government and ended when
Iran moved the Iran-Iraq War into Iraqi territory in July 1982. Shifting from defensive
operations to offensive operations led some to argue that Tehran was exporting its
revolution, although this was a poor example of it. Consequently, this action signified
the start of a confrontational policy period. The need to achieve a balance between the
management of Iran's geostrategically shaped external environment, domestic legitimacy,
and economics underlies Tehran's adoption of more conciliatory foreign policies in
recent years.
First, the origin of the regime in an ideological revolution initially imparted a
revisionist drive to export the revolution, which challenged most of Iran's neighbors and
encouraged Iranian intervention in Arab politics; most notably through Tehran's
mobilization of the Shi 'a, its alliance with Syria, and its attempt to Islamicize the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
55 The war with Iraq, which this precipitated and the failure to export the
revolution against obstacles such as the Sunni-Shi'a gap, exhausted revolutionary fervor
as the driving force in foreign policy. The regime is still dependent on the legitimacy lent




Second, geopolitical realities of Iran's location are a factor compelling Tehran's
suspicious response to both external and internal threats. On one hand, Iran would like a
degree of isolation to confidently posture itself against the threats of external powers
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is a large state (both in geographic size and population)—straddling the Persian Gulf, the
Middle East and Central Asia—seeking to establish a sphere of influence within its
region of the world. 57 Shifts in the international and regional balance of power against
Iran have been manifest in defeats by Iraq, US intervention against Iran in the Gulf, and
UN Resolution 598, which were all decisive in shifting the internal intra-elite power
balance towards factions advocating more neorealist foreign policies. A response more
to the geopolitical forces in play than to the dogmatic ideology of Khomeini's
revolutionary tenets.
Third, economic factors, cutting more than one way, have also heavily influenced
Iranian foreign policy today. Oil provides a base of power, particularly allowing
acquisition of military capabilities, while control of oil revenues gives the regime
autonomy internally. Yet, Iran's sole economic dependence on petroleum also made it
extremely vulnerable to any shift in oil price. During the Iran-Iraq War, the
accompanying economic crisis, of which the 1986 fall in oil prices was a watershed, was
a major factor in the adoption of its neorealist posture by Iran's leaders. Continuing
economic constraints from low oil prices, foreign exchange shortages, debt and falling
living standards have only reinforced this orientation among both the Iranian political
CO
moderates and the populace in general. The imposition of sanctions on virtually all-
economic intercourse with Iran has adversely affected the country's ability to get its
economic house in order. When two US Executive Orders, issued in March and May of
1995, imposed severe trade sanctions on Iran, its currency exchange rate plummeted
against the dollar, forcing Tehran to institute exchange controls and reduce its foreign
trade to bring the rate back in line. 59 A number of large oil companies, especially those
57
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which had extensive US operations, put their negotiations with Iran on hold while they
assessed the potential effects of US sanctions on their own business interests. Likewise,
Iran was denied development loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and Japan has been persuaded to withhold credits for a hydroelectric project
in southern Iran. Stringent US visa and monetary regulations hindered all aspects of
Iranian interaction with the US, from commercial and professional contacts to family
visits and academic exchanges.
This policy shift was noted after the Presidential victory of moderate Rafsanjani
and the ensuing domestic factional conflict between Rafsanjani-Khamenei. l Economic
troubles also strengthened the pragmatists' hand against the radicals. Khomeini's death
allowed the neorealist camp to consolidate foreign policy power in a dual leadership
structure. The conservatives believed they could continue to dominate this partnership,
however, this has not been the case.62 This shift has become more striking with the
election, and subsequent re-election, of the moderate Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and
2000, respectively. Both Rafsanjani and Khatami, hoping to improve relations to ease the
animosities of their regional neighbors and to improve Iran's economic footing with the
international community, have sought to lower its profile concerning Islamist extremist
groups. But this has been problematic due to Iran's unique power sharing between the
offices of the President and Supreme Leader, causing an uneasy factional coexistence.64
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The muting of this internal factionalism and ideological drive allowed policy to focus on
the pragmatic areas of economics and geostrategic power balances in the region. The
restoration of global ties crucial to economic health became a major priority. Tehran also
seeks to deflect geopolitical threats
65
and exploit external opportunities.66
Additionally, the neorealist aspect of Iranian policy decisions more accurately
explains Tehran's state behavior in vital issues of its perceived national security situation,
clearly demonstrating this approach in its policymaking. Neorealists, by definition, are
only concerned with issues that effect the security of a nation: "The survival motive is
taken as the ground of action where the security of the state is not assured, rather than as
a realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act of state."67 In issues
regarding regime survival, neither domestic politics, nor the composition of the political
elite, nor regime ideology has made a difference in Iran. When confronted with
annihilation by the Iraqi's during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran abandoned its efforts to isolate
itself from the international system and sought arms from its most repugnant ideological
enemies, the US, Israel, and the Soviet Union. It engaged in balancing behavior,
allying with Syria, a secular state based on Arab nationalism.69 It sought to market its oil
to any nation that would purchase it, often selling on the spot market to American
companies below the posted price. Iran sought to undermine the forces arrayed against it
in the Gulf through conciliatory policies toward regimes such as those of the UAE and
70
Qatar, which were sympathetic to its views.
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For example, American attempts to isolate Iran through dual containment and the peace process.
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2. The Islamic Revolution
The 1979 Iranian Revolution opened up a new chapter in foreign relations for
Iran. Change constituted the very essence of the revolutionary project. This project was,
primarily, a universalization of the world involving all of humanity. It aimed to
reconstruct the social order and communicate its "conception of the universe" to the
whole world. 71 With the Islamic revolution, the foreign policy of Iran abandoned the
resolutely pro-Westem stance, which had typified the previous regime, in favor of an
Islamic one. Islamic foreign policy conceptually divides the world into Dar al Islam
and Dar al Shirk. Olivier Roy remarks that. .
.
According to this theory, there is no territorialized national state
endowed with frontiers and a legal personality. Al Umma, the
community of believers, is not divided into state, and furthermore,
the "infidel state" should not be put on equal footing. The very basis
of modern diplomacy—relations between sovereign states which are
theoretically equal—is missing.
74
Tehran's embrace of realpolitik quickly followed the successive failures of
revolutionary policy when applied to foreign policy. Shi'ite Iran did not manage to bridge
the gap between Shi'ites and Sunnites in the Muslim world, nor to place itself at the head
of the Sunni dissenting movements, whether in Egypt, Afghanistan or Algeria. Iran has
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been unable to replace Saudi Arabia as the backer of Sunni movements, reducing
Tehran's takeover, instead, of smaller Islamic fringe-groups of minor political
importance. Nor has the country been very successful in destabilizing conservative
regimes in other Muslim countries or inspiring any significant movement in Turkey. As
a result, the leadership has returned to more neorealist objectives. Even if their
neighbors' ideologies conflict with that of Iran, Tehran aims to maintain good relations
with these regional nations, making its presence felt by providing various useful services
or taking part in peace negotiations. Iran also wishes to strengthen its economic links
with these neighbors. This does not necessarily represent a change of aims and
objectives, but rather a correction of its strategic course.7
C. THE CASE STUDY EVIDENCE
These case studies of Iranian relations and national security policy focus, for the
most part, during the period since the 1979 Islamic revolution. There are four chapters
consisting of case studies of Iranian relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and the
Persian Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Each
study reveals Iran's neorealist behavior as a primary influence in its policy and national
security decisionmaking. This evidence illustrates Iran's neorealist approach to security
policy: surrounded by hostile neighbors and a powerful external power (the United
States), Iran uses whatever means available to power balance against these threats.
These threats—Turkey to the northeast, Iraq to the west, Saudi Arabia and the
Arab Gulf States to the south, and the presence of US forces throughout the Middle
East—are a chief concern to those foreign policy imperatives already discussed. Still in a
weakened position due to the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War and the economic
stranglehold US sanctions and influence in the international financial circles, Tehran has
had to rely upon more unconventional means to power balance against these international
forces through the use and support of terrorism. When taken together these case studies
75 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia (1997), 156.
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demonstrate the key tenets of national security, territorial integrity, power balancing
against regional and interregional hegemony, and domestic cohesiveness predicate
Iranian national security policy.
27
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IV. IRAN AND AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS CASE STUDY
The following case study typifies the contention that neorealism underlines Iran's
national security policy. The argument preached by several experts that Iran's
ideological predisposition in its policy machinations is proven false in the examination of
Iran's dealings with Azerbaijan after the latter' s independence from the former Soviet
Union. When Azerbaijan's political scene descended into chaos between Muslim and
Christian factions, Tehran did not back the Muslims as many might anticipate. Instead,
Iran was pragmatic in its actions, backing the Christian elements within Azerbaijan over
the Islamic fundamentalist faction. Why would they do this? The answer is an obvious
one when placed in the neorealist framework. The following case study will show that
the events in Azerbaijan during this period threatened Iran's territorial integrity, its
internal stability, and potentially its balance of power with Turkey in the Caspian region.
These are all rational concerns dictating rational choices by Iran's weak leadership.
A. BACKGROUND
Several issues have complicated Iran-Azerbaijan relations since the Azeri's
independence in the early 1990s. Ultimately these boil down to questions of identity and
nationality in both countries,7 but the tense dynamics of the relationship derive in large
part from the fluidity and volatility of post-Soviet Azerbaijani politics. Iran professes
itself a multi-ethnic Islamic society, but there are strict limits on the degree of autonomy
allowed to its minority nationalities. With an Azerbaijani population reckoned as high as
20 million,77 mostly living in northwestern Iran adjacent to the Azerbaijan Republic
border, all political factions in Tehran are concerned about irredentist Azerbaijani
nationalism. So far, there is no evidence of widespread support for this in Iran. There






grievances seem to have been socio-economic and cultural rather than nationalist.78
Iranian-Azeris have a distinct and more Iranian sense of identity than their northern
cousins and there can be no doubt that 70 years of Soviet rule have left significant
differences in outlook and aspiration between them.79 Moreover, Azerbaijan has its own
minorities—among them the Talesh, an Iranian people concentrated near the border with
Iran. It is worth noting that the short-lived 1993 Talesh separatist movement attracted
little popular support and received absolutely no backing from Tehran. 80
1. Ancient Connections
Azerbaijan is located on Iran's northern border in between Turkey and the
Caspian Sea. Formerly territory of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan became an independent
state shortly after the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. Many believe Azerbaijan
sits on top of large deposits of oil, which extends into the central Caspian Sea. It has also
experienced armed conflict with Armenia over ethnic and territorial issues. Despite its
recent dominance by the Soviets, the stronger historical links for Azerbaijan are with
Iran, having been apart of the Persian Empire for 2,500 years before the Russo-Persian
wars ended this arrangement in the first half of the nineteenth century. 81 In every period,
changing policy reflects the frustration and helplessness felt by Iran towards the great
powers that dominated the country for over 200 years. Thus frustration and helplessness
are compounded by memories associated with having been constantly invaded throughout
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history, in turn by the Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, Afghans, Russians and British,
respectively.
2
Iran is composed of numerous nationalities. Not all of them speak Persian or are
Persian in origin—the Azeris, the Turkmens and the Baluchis, for example. Due to the
nation-building process begun in the 16th century by the Safavids, and later through the
process of modernization by Reza Shah in the early 20th century, modern Iran
incorporated these minorities. It was under Reza Shah that the idea of a national state
developed, particularly in the 20 century. Iran remains nervous of tendencies toward
autonomy within its borders—tendencies which have sometimes been exploited by
political groupings, and even encouraged by foreign powers. There is a fear (even if such
a possibility seems unlikely) that Russia or some other neighbor will take the risk of
encouraging a revolutionary or separatist movement. 84
Although the historical, cultural and political debates surrounding the issue of
Azerbaijani identity cannot be explored here in depth, the central arguments can be given
in broad outline. Most Iranians consider that their Azeri fellow-citizens are, and for
centuries have been, fully accepted as part of the populations of Iran. Largely no
"Balkanizing" attitudes exist. In fact, many Iranians point to the thorough integration of
Azerbaijanis into society—including within the national elite circles—and their great
contribution to Iran's modern history and culture as being inclusive. Many Iranian-
Azeris, if they have any reunification feelings at all, believe that the new Azerbaijan
Republic should rejoin Iran, seeing them as being stolen away in the 19th century by
imperialist Russia.
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2. The Imperialist Years
The Azerbaijan Republic was part of Iran in the very early 19th century, but it was
lost to Russia in the Russo-Persian wars. According to the Turknianchai Treaty of 1828,
the border between the two countries became the Araxes River, which effectively cut in
two the lands inhabited by the Azeri people. 85 Due to the weak central governments in
both Russia and Persia at the time, the new borders between the latter and the
Transcaucasia remained reasonably open until 1921 when Iran reluctantly accepted its
loss and signed a new treaty with the Soviet Union. Therefore, these countries, in
particular Azerbaijan, have had very strong historical, cultural, and religious links with
Iran. For instance, the founder of the Safavid Empire, which instituted Shi'ite Islam as
the state religion of Iran in the 16
th
century, was Azeri in origin. Likewise, the present
spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is an ethnic Azeri-
Iranian. Of all the Central Asian and Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan is the only country
with a Shi'ite majority (about six million in Azerbaijan and twenty million in Iran). The
Azeris played a crucial role in both the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-191
1
and the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. It was partly in recognition of their
contribution to the latter revolution that the new constitution of the Islamic Republic
allows the Azeris to use their own language and practice their own culture to a greater
extent than had been the case under the Pahlavi Shahs who feared that allowing greater
cultural freedom to Azeris might encourage them to demand autonomy and later join with
Soviet Azerbaijan. 7
3. The Coming of the Iron Curtain
Tehran's fear of Azeri irredentism extends from the experience Iran had with
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Azerbaijan province to the Soviet Union. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP),
established in 1945, was supported by Russian troops who had occupied part of Iran
during the war. The ADP's objective was the creation of an autonomous communist state
that would then be detached from Iran and join with the Soviet Azerbaijan. 88 This
attempt failed, ironically, due primarily to the lack of support of the Azeri-Iranian
community, as well as great diplomatic pressure the US placed on Moscow to honor its
agreement calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran six months after the end
of World War II. The Soviets complied and, following the withdrawal of the Red Army,
sealed the borders between the "two Azerbaijans." For many years, both family and
personal contacts between the divided Azeris were very much restricted. The detente
between the Superpowers in 1972 reduced tensions enough that the Soviets allowed many
of the followers of the Tudeh Party of Iran to reestablish or continue to maintain their
ties with the Iranian dissidents and the extreme left who had taken refuge in Central Asia
and the Caucasus.90
In the Azerbaijan Republic, nationalist interpretation is very different.
Azerbaijanis are ethnic Turks, viewing ancient Azerbaijan as the victim of a series of
conquests, which altered the destiny of the "nation." Iran is one of these conquerors. In
their minds, all ethnic Azerbaijanis should seek reunification to fulfill their destiny. It is
this sentiment that Iran fears the most from its northern neighbor, and it is from this
security concern Iran has formulated its policy strategy throughout the 1990s.
4. Demise of the Soviet Union
When Soviet Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991, Iran became concerned
that some people in the Azerbaijan Republic might call for the "reunification" of the
former Soviet Azerbaijan with the "Motherland, Iran."91 The sentiments of the Azeris on
Porkhomovsky, 24.
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both sides appeared to be more in favor of the Azeris in the republic to unite with Iran.
According to a nationalist leader, quoted in an Iranian newspaper, the Azeri republic
should now regain its original identity and reunite with the "Motherland, Iran."92 The
newspaper said that the Baku Azerbaijan Salvation Committee, composed mainly of
intellectuals and politicians, has called on the Baku government to consider seriously the
possibility of reunification.93 This sentiment supports Cornell's assertion that "most
Azeris in Iran, given their history as its rulers in certain periods, consider Iran to belong
to them as much as to the Persians—certain Azeri political movements (in the republic)
actually demand not a unified Azeri state, but the incorporation of north Azerbaijan (the
Azerbaijan Republic) into Iran." 4 However, appealing to the nationalistic sentiments of
the Azeris on both sides of the border, such incorporation, if it had been taken up
seriously, would have created great political problems for Iran; as Russia, the US, and
Turkey would have had strongly resisted it. In spite of this, there is no evidence that
either the Iranian or the Azerbaijani leaders ever encouraged such sentiments. Due to the
historical and cultural links between the two Azerbaijani s, however, Tehran began to
regulate travel between the republics by requiring temporary visas be obtained by
Azerbaijani-Azeris visiting their relatives in Iran. To minimize population integration the
clerical authorities have also made it known that any Iranian intending to marry a citizen
from the Azerbaijan Republic must get a permit from the Iranian Ministry of Interior.9
In general, the Azeris on both sides of the border continue to maintain their
historical and family contacts; however, a strong bond between the two peoples does not
necessarily mean amicable relations between their respective governments. This is true
of Tehran and Baku as well. Several factors contribute to this tension: (a) in the early
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years of its independence where the Azerbaijan government showed obvious bias against
Iran and favor for Turkey; (b) the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict and Iran's apparent
support for the latter; and (c) the exclusion of Iran, under pressure from the US, from
partnership in the international oil consortium formed for the exploitation of oil and gas
in Azerbaijan country and the Caspian Sea. 96
5. The First Years of Azerbaijan Independence
Developments in Azerbaijan throughout 1989, including the tearing down of the
border posts between Iran and Azerbaijan by anti-government forces, caused difficulties
for Iran. However, its most serious foreign policy dilemma in Azerbaijan occurred when,
following anti-Armenian riots in January 1990, Soviet troops were moved into Baku.
This led to clashes between Soviet units and Azeri demonstrators, resulting in the killing
or wounding of a large number of Azeri civilians.97 Any strong Iranian reaction to such
Soviet actions could have damaged their bilateral relations. There was even concern that,
if they rose to the Azerbaijanis' defense, the Soviets might have used force against Iran
itself. By contrast, the lack of Iranian support for the Azerbaijanis' plight could have
damaged the chances of future relations and would have been easily manipulated by anti-
Iranian forces in Iran. Also, segments of Iranian public opinion, notably the Azeri
population, were agitating in favor of more active support for the victims of Soviet
aggression. Yet, the government responded cautiously. Iran's Foreign Ministry based its
position on the principle of respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all
states and support for the legitimate aspirations of Azeri Muslims.98
In short, more than any other consideration—religious solidarity or temptation to
export Khomeini's revolutionary ideology—the maintenance of its own territorial
96
Rubin, Barry. "The Geopolitics of Middle East Conflict and Crisis," Middle East Review of
International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 3 (September 1998), on the internet at http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/
meria/index.html [Accessed on 21 February 2000]; and Tarock (1999), 134.
Menashri, David. "Iran and Central Asia: Radical Regime, Pragmatic Politics," in David Menashri,




integrity guided Iran's policies. Iran did pay a certain price for its cautious approach with
segments of Azerbaijani public opinion. Indeed, the Azerbaijani Pan-Turkist nationalists
interpreted its stand as the modern-day version of the historic Russo-Iranian collusion to
thwart Azerbaijan's aspirations for unity and independence. Nevertheless, during a
period of relative stability following the Azeri nationalists coming to power in 1990, until
the Azerbaijan Popular Front's (APF) accession to power and Abulfez Elchibey's
presidency in June 1992, both sides took a number of measures to expand bilateral
relations." In addition to several mutual visits by high-ranking officials to Baku and
Tehran, including a visit by President Mutalibov to Tehran in August 1991, several
agreements for cooperation in various fields went unsigned. In addition, cultural
associations carrying the name of the Persian poet Nizami Ganjavi, a native of Ganja,
formed in both Iran and Azerbaijan. However, many of these agreements remained only
on paper, for the most part, because of political infighting in Azerbaijan and the overall
instability and uncertainty that it created in the country. During this period, while the
nationalists continued with their anti-Iranian rhetoric, relations at the governmental level
remained good. 10°
B. THE PERCEIVED THREAT FROM AZERBAIJAN
Iran has many concerns with this new state that has risen from the ashes of the
dismantled Soviet Union. Geopolitically, Iran must secure an over-700-kilometer-long
border with Azerbaijan from refugees and spillovers of the fighting between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. 101 Moreover, recently found Caspian Sea oil fields have the potential of
creating a very rich neighbor on the economically depressed Iranian northern frontier.
However, the most distinctive feature of Iran's trepidation of the irredentist tendencies of
their Islamist cousins in Azerbaijan concerns population demographics. After all, the
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the Republic of Azerbaijan contains roughly six million Azeris, whereas between 15 and
20 million ethnic-Azeris estimated living in northern Iran. " Thus, Iran's foreign policy
posture has been very ambivalent and puzzling to Western analysts who tend to paint
Iran's top policy goals as the support and export of radical Islamism. Concerning
Azerbaijan, Iran found its national security needs paramount over ideological support for
revolutionary Islamist groups, by supporting the Christian Armenians against their fellow
Azeri Shi'a brethren. 103 Such an action does not fit the moniker of rogue exporter of
radical Islamism awarded to Iran; however, from an international relations theorist
position, Iranian actions make perfect sense.
At the level of interstate relations, the acerbic attitudes of Azerbaijan's leaders
created considerable tension and confrontation between Baku and Tehran. The upsurge
in Azeri nationalism and border violations in the late-Soviet period became a source of
considerable anxiety to the Iranian regime. Likewise, the rise of the APF and
Azerbaijan's determinedly pro-Turkish position immediately after independence,
between March 1992 and June 1993, was the most disturbing for Iran. The APF leader,
Abulfaz Elchibey, was an outspoken nationalist who had often called for reunification
with Iranian-Azeris. Initially, Elchibey pursued an outspoken anti-Iranian/anti-Russian
foreign policy, looking to Turkey and the West for support as a new democracy. Later in
his short presidency, Elchibey's approach towards Iran softened, 104 but there was still a
marked chill in relations until Heydar Aliyev, the leader of Nakhichevan, came to power
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In the past Aliyev had also made remarks that would alarm Tehran, 105 but as
president he has seen to Azerbaijan's best interest in maintaining balanced relations with
Russia, Turkey, and Iran. As befits its pragmatic, neorealist outlook on policy, Tehran
responded by offering him full support during the crises of September 1994 and March
1995, although many obstacles remained. For example, Aliyev 's ready acceptance of
Washington's rejection to Iranian participation in an Azerbaijani oil consortium has
greatly angered Tehran. Consequently, Tehran has blocked the export of a wide range of
goods into Azerbaijan and demanded that Baku begin paying for Iranian electricity
supplies to Nakhichevan. 106
1. The APF: Fanning the Flames of Nationalism and Pan-Turanism
The Abulfazel Elchibey government in Azerbaijan is illustrative of the difficulties
in the relationship between the Azeribaijan and Iranian governments. The coming to
power of the nationalist forces of the APF and, in particular, the assumption of the
presidency by Elchibey in June 1992, was a significant setback for Iran. Those elements
of the APF, which now gained power, espoused a philosophy that made a difficult
relationship with Iran inevitable. To begin with, the irredentist and pan-Turkist attitudes
were a direct threat to Iran. Following his inauguration, Elchibey turned Azerbaijan
increasingly towards Turkey, as well as Egypt and Israel. As a result, during the brief
period of the Elchibey presidency, the negative rhetoric between Baku and Tehran
escalated. Elchibey failed to grasp the geopolitics of Azerbaijan, trapped as it was
between two powerful neighbors, Russia and Iran, and a long-time foe to the west,
Armenia. The official Iranian reaction to Elchibey' s derogatory statements was still
relatively calm. It seems that Tehran viewed Elchibey' s presidency as a passing phase
rather than a lasting phenomenon. Thus, it did not want to jeopardize future relations by
over-reacting. However, the Iranian media was less tolerant and frequently accused the
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APF government of being in the service of imperialism or Zionism. 107 Nevertheless,
geopolitical realities forced the two countries to maintain some degree of cooperation
and, over time, as the high expectations of the Azerbaijani nationalists regarding their
relations with Turkey and the West did not materialize, relations with Iran were
somewhat revised. Especially significant was the Azerbaijani realization of Turkey's
limitations in helping to bring about a favorable solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem. Meanwhile, the antagonistic attitude of the Azerbaijanis may have led Iran to
help Armenia by providing much needed fuel. 108
As was stated at the beginning of this discussion, Iran bases its policy decisions
not on the export of Islamic revolutionary ideology but on pragmatic security concerns
centered on the integrity and security of the state. Iran follows a neorealist approach,
which should be readily recognizable to Western analysts. In this case, Iran seeks a
balance of power situation between the Christian Armenian and the pro-Turkish
Azerbaijani camps. This policy course solved two immediate security concerns for
Tehran. First, it countered Turkish designs for inroads into the Caspian Sea region.
Second, it stifled potential separatist aspirations among its Iran's ethnic-Azeri
populations. Moreover, it served to slowdown Baku's pursuit of oil riches. Iran is
concerned over the potential of Azerbaijan becoming a "Central Asian Kuwait." 109 Such
a wealthy northern neighbor would certainly draw the attention of Iran's economically
strapped society—especially the Azeri-Iranians.
Unfortunately for the Azeris, Iran has constantly sought to cultivate and improve
its relations with Armenia to counter the Azeri nationalists, whereas Turkey joined
Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Likewise, Iran is one of
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trading with the Karabakh-Armenians as well, being the major supplier of foodstuffs and
other commodities to the enclave. 110
a. Iran fs Pragmatic Choice
Iranian policy does not seem to fit the preconceived notion that
Iran is the sinister head of a global Shi'ite terrorist network and cannot be reconciled with
those theories that give this ideologist support primacy in Iranian foreign policy thinking.
These actions do fit the neorealist policy model where Iran seeks to balance against the
perceived threat on its northern border. Likewise, domestic considerations connected to
state integrity explain Iranian policy behavior.
111 How does a tiny country like
Azerbaijan pose a threat to the Iranian regime? Iranian leaders in both domestic political
camps seem to have seen the emergence of an Azerbaijani republic as a long-term threat
to the integrity of the Iranian state. Tehran feared that their Azeri population would urge
Iran to militarily intervene in Karabakh out of a sense of Azeri solidarity with their ethnic
cousins. This anxiety existed despite the fact that the Iranian-Azeris were well integrated
into the Iranian society, have a comparatively weak Azeri identity, and consider
themselves more Iranian than Azei. In fact, there are allegedly Azeri movements in
South Azerbaijan urging the integration of the Azerbaijan into Iran. 112
From the realist approach, these circumstances explain why Tehran saw no
imminent danger in pursuing an anti-Azerbaijani policy. The real threat perceived here is
the potential congruence of economic challenges in Azerbaijan. With Iran's economic
conditions (and by extension its social cohesion) continuing to deteriorate under US
sanctions, the national identity of the Azeri minority in northern Iran could grow in
proportion to popular dissatisfaction with the regime. This would be all the more
110






dangerous if Azerbaijan simultaneously prospered with the exploitation of the promising
oil revenues mentioned.
In 1992, this perception of threat was so strong that Iran saw fit to set up
expensive refugee camps outside its own territory in record time. This was a significant
undertaking for an economically-strapped nation such as Iran; however, these economic
considerations as a whole seem to be secondary as far as the refugee issue is concerned.
Tehran's speed in relocating the refugees indicates the perception in Tehran of a
potentially explosive situation
1I4 As Hiro notes:
Rafsanjani realized that in the long run, Azeri nationalism would
prove as problematic for the Islamic regime in Tehran as it was
proving then for the Communist administration in Moscow...The
emergence of a strong, independent Azerbaijani republic whether
Islamic or not - would fan the flames of Azeri nationalism within
Iran.
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Iran's position towards Azerbaijan and its Azeri-Iranian minority is likely to
remain ambivalent. So far the emphasis has been on positive engagement: there is more
officially sanctioned use of the Azerbaijani language in Iran now than before 1989;
border and visa controls are looser; Azerbaijan has been allowed to open a consulate in
Tabriz; and each country has given some access to the other's broadcast media. Even so,
Tehran keeps a close watch on developments. 116 Likewise, the injection of nationalism
into the debate was an indirect chiding the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the concept of
ethnic nationalism is totally alien to the multiracial Islamic community. In other words,
nationalism per se is seen in Islam as a divisive concept. Irredentist proponents favored
113
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the reunification of the "two" Azerbaijans and complained about Iran's trampling of its
Azeri population's cultural and political rights. Elchibey also favored, at some point, the
formation of a confederation between Azerbaijan and Turkey. 117
Apart from the Islamic dimension of Turkic nationalism, such a concept would
have national security implications for Iran, as shall be explained shortly. In any case,
Elchibey was anti-Iranian, pan-Azeri, and turned Azerbaijan towards Turkey. He thought
of Iran, as he thought of Russia, as a foreign power with expansionist policies in the
region, policies that run counter to Azerbaijan's national interests. On several occasions,
he reportedly blasted Iran as a doomed state, predicting the "reunification" of Iranian
Azeris and Azerbaijan within five years. Elchibey further antagonized Russia when he
took Azerbaijan out of the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS), a move that
resulted in Moscow's increasing support of Armenia. Inadvertently or not, the Elchibey
government lost the support of both Iran and Russia. His government was short lived,
overthrown in a military coup in June 1993, allegedly encouraged by Iran. But a more
reasonable explanation would be that the coup was the consequence of his government's
failure to manage effectively the Karabakh War, as well as Russia's support of
Armenia. 118
The Azeris also suspected Iran of involvement in support of radical Islamic
political movements in Azerbaijan, as well as of encouraging ethnic unrest among
Azerbaijan's Talysh minority, which lives near the Iranian border. Thus, the curious
legacy of the Elchibey-era: an Islamic fundamentalist state, Iran, ended up supporting
Christian Armenia against Muslim Azerbaijan. When Elchibey' s regime fell in June
1993, a more amiable Azerbaijani administration sought to improve relations with Iran by









When Azerbaijan concluded the so-called "deal of the century" in 1994 with a
consortium led by Western oil companies, Iran was initially given a five percent share of
the deal. In April 1995, the United States forced Azerbaijan to exclude Iran from the
deal, which naturally made the Iranians furious, accusing Aliyev of being a tool of the
"great Satan." Iran immediately retaliated by cutting off power supplies to Nakhichevan,
claiming non-payment of debts as a reason. In late 1995, Azerbaijan offered Iran a ten
percent share in the extraction from another oilfield, Shah-Deniz, an offer Iran initially
rejected as not serious. In May 1996, however, Iran finally accepted the offer, a decision
illustrative of the Iranian regime's pragmatism. Although a certain degree of cooperation
exists between the two countries, encouraged by Aliyev, the regime in Tehran still
maintains a relatively hostile attitude to its northern neighbor.
Nevertheless, despite these developments, the relations between Azerbaijan and
Iran have not improved significantly by the end of the 1990s, and the basic guidelines of
Iranian policy towards Azerbaijan do not seem to have changed. Since this time, Iran has
been counteracting all Azeri aims to produce and export its oil. One way of doing this has
been to refuse to cooperate in a planned pipeline route between Baku and the Turkish
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. 1 " 1 This route was intended to stretch from Baku into Iran,
then follow the Araxes River and enter Nakhichevan and then into Turkey, where it could
reach the Mediterranean. 122 Due to the impossibility of involving Armenia in any
pipeline project, a route that would have been the more sense geographically this
circuitous route was drawn. Iranian officials clearly stated that if a pipeline went through
Iran, it would go to the Persian Gulf and not to Turkey; this solution would give Iran
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2. Iran and the War in Nagorno-Karabakh
The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh presented a
challenge to Iran's diplomacy in the Caucasus. Once again, however, Iran demonstrated
a pragmatic, neorealist reaction vice an ideologically based one. This conflict had
economic, political and security implications, and Iran could remain neutral, not take a
one-sided stance vis-a-vis either of the two warring nations. Therefore, one of Iran's first
significant political actions, and the one that demonstrated its ability to place pragmatism
before Islamic ideology in the new republics, was its attempt to broker peace between
Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan. " However, Iran found itself in a difficult
position. It did not want to see the Muslim side victorious due to the potential effects in
Iran. However, the Iranian leaders could not overtly lend its support to the Christian
Armenians at the expense of the Shi'ite Azeris due to the effects this might have on its
Islamic legitimacy.
An illustration of the degree of Iranian fear of Azeri irredentism occurred in the
summer of 1993. At this point, the Azeri military performance in Karabakh was plainly a
disaster, and Armenian forces conquered territories of Azerbaijan proper east and south
of Karabakh. 1 "4 In October, the situation became critical for Iran, as the Armenians
pushed towards the Iranian border, threatening to send a massive refugee flow into the
country. ~ Indeed, a number of Azeri refugees did swim across the Araxes, where their
ethnic kin on the other side welcomed them. The Iranian regime reacted quickly and
moved to set up refugee camps for the fleeing Azeris—but on Azeri territory. Iran,
which by November claimed to harbor over 40,000 people, forced the refugees back into
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community would have if it became aware of the atrocities suffered by their ethinc-kin in
the north. Tehran fears that there would be great potential of the Iranian-Azeri putting
increased pressure on Tehran to intervene on Azerbaijan's side. Even more dangerous to
the Iranian regime would be the risk of heightened Azeri ethnic mobilization within Iran
in solidarity with the northern Azeris in their struggle against the Armenians. 127
The first factor led Iranian radicals to condemn Armenia for using the cease-fires
brought about by Iranian diplomacy to provide for rearmament. The second made
mediation virtually impossible as President Elchibey refused to accept Iran as a mediator.
To a certain degree, then, Iran had acted to resolve the conflict in a positive manner.
But Tehran simultaneously used the Nagorno Karabakh conflict to pursue foreign-policy
goals. Since the conflict erupted into war in 1992, Iran has attempted to exert its
influence on Azerbaijan. For the most part, this has meant working against Azerbaijan
through support for Armenia. " Thus, it seemed as if Tehran was becoming aware of the
danger of a collapse in Azerbaijan, which could have important implications for regional
security. Iran at several points made it clear that it sought to preserve the existing
balance of power in the region, perceiving of crucial importance the Nakhichevan
enclave once again. When Nakhichevan was under threat of an Armenian attack in
September 1993, Iranian troops crossed the river Araxes, prompting a strong Russian
reaction. Iran's action was enough to intimidate Armenia; the Armenian foreign minister
ill
assured Tehran that there would be no more attacks on Nakhichevan.
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This has, however, not always been the case. When the conflict threatened to spill over into Iran,
Tehran actually raised its tone against the Armenians.
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Another example of neorealism in Iranian policy concerning Azerbaijan is the fact
that, except for situations where it was necessary to restore a balance by preventing
Armenia from creating chaos in the region, Tehran used the conflict to pressure
Azerbaijan. Iran accomplished this through different forms of support for Armenia to
include allowing Iran to serve as a transit route for weapons heading to the Armenia
Christians and training Armenian fighters in Iran. It is possible that Armenian factions
have retained contacts with Iran from the time of the terrorist campaign against Turkey,
which had its high tide in the early 1980s. 132 Azeris argue that ASALA 133 still exists, that
its members receive training in Iran, and that ASALA has been one of the forces
influencing the Armenian government of Nagomo Karabakh. 134
Iran then also became involved in mediation efforts to end the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Theoretically, Iran had a better chance than other regional countries to play the
role of mediator. It enjoyed a great deal of credibility with the Armenians and with
certain segments of the Azerbaijanis. Additionally, because of its geographical position it
could offer both sides considerable incentives. Most important, a close link with Iran
would have given Armenia the confidence that Turkic peoples would not surround it.
Indeed, during the spring of 1992, Iran negotiated a number of cease-fires between the
two belligerents, which, needless to say, did not last long. 135
When Iranian mediation efforts failed, and during the hostilities which followed
the Azeris loss of the town of Khojaly in 1992, the nationalists accused Iran of having
plotted the event with the Armenians and having used the mediation efforts as a cover.
At the same time, the opponents of the APF accused it of having sabotaged their efforts,
both on the war front and in the negotiations, to bring down the Mutalibov
132
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13 The failure of the Iranian mediation efforts—as well as many others—is
derived from regional and international factors and from struggles and political
infighting, especially in Azerbaijan. In fact, the entwinement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem and Azerbaijani domestic politics, coupled with regional and international
competition for power, that its resolution became impossible before answers to the issues
relating to those rivalries were found. For its part, Iran did not want others to succeed
where it had failed. However, because of its other security problems, notably its acute
vulnerability to instability in Azerbaijan, Iran was more eager to see the conflict resolved
than were other states, which were less vulnerable to its disruptive effects. Moreover,
reflecting the realities of regional politics and rivalries, the Turkish Prime Minister,
Suleyman Demirel, said that the Azerbaijanis would now realize that they should not look
to Tehran for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Following these setbacks and in
view of the changed political circumstances in Azerbaijan, Iran abandoned its mediation
efforts, stating that it would resume them only if asked by both sides. 138
Despite Iran's efforts, the cease-fire however did not last long. This was due
partly to the fact that the Armenians continued to exploit their advantage in Azerbaijan
territory and partly because the Azerbaijani leadership had only reluctantly accepted Iran
as a mediator. 139 In the meantime, relations between Iran and Armenia had already
deteriorated when Armenian forces shot down an Iranian plane on 17 March 1994, killing
all 34 people on-board. The daily Jumhuri-ye Islam, a radical Islamic newspaper, urged
the government to pressure Armenia to accept responsibility for the "crime," but the
government made no great issue of the plane incident, as it did not want to take an
uncompromising stance towards Armenia. In the end, it continued to urge both Armenia












Sympathy for the Azerbaijan Republic was somewhat tempered by the fact that
there is also a large Armenian minority (estimated between one million and one and a
half-million people) in Iran who are fully integrated into Iranian social and political life.




and the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In the constitution of the Islamic Republic,
they are a recognized minority and as such have their own elected deputies in the Majlis.
In the year immediately after World War II, many Armenian-Iranians went to Armenia
but often visited Iran or otherwise maintained contacts with their relatives in Iran, and the
official Iranian policy was to encourage such visits and contacts. In the past several years,
the two countries have signed a number of trade and economic agreements. In mid- 1995,
the Armenian Prime Minister, Herand Bargratian visited Tehran and the two countries
signed ten trade agreements. The most important of these agreements was the purchase of
Iran's natural gas by Armenia, the construction of a pipeline, and the transfer of
electricity to Armenia. Therefore, the war between the two countries over Nagorno-
Karabakh put Iranian diplomacy to a great test, as Iran could neither be indifferent to the
continuation of the war, nor the defeat of either side. In either case, Iran would have had
internal and external ramifications for Tehran. 142
Although the next chapter examines Iran-Turkey relations, it is worth noting here,
a few key elements linked to Tehran's relations with Azerbaijan. Throughout the
aforementioned crisis, Tehran sought to balance power with respect to the ongoing
regional competition for influence and favor concerning oil concessions in the Caspian
Sea basin.
Ideologically, secular Turkey and Islamist Iran are polar opposites. Naturally,
each sees the other as an unwelcome example and source of inspiration to subversives
within its own society. Iran generally sees Turkey as a pro-U.S., and now pro-Israeli, a
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regional rival of growing strength—in short, as an agent and potential launching pad for
its enemies. The field of Turkish-Iranian rivalry has widened considerably in recent
years, now encompassing northern Iraq, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In northern Iraq,
Turkey cooperates closely with Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, while Iran generally
supports Barzani's rival, Jalal Talabani. In the Caucasus, Turkey firmly backs Azerbaijan
in its dispute with Armenia, while Iran tilts heavily toward Armenia—both seeking a
power balance against the other. Likewise, both Turkey and Iran hope to be the site of
the main export pipeline for Caspian Sea energy. Moreover, Turkey's challenge for
influence in Central Asia, closer Turkish and Israeli ties, 143 and suspected Turkish
support of anti-Iranian groups like the Mujahedin-e Khalq 144 exacerbated Iran's tensions.
Thus, Iran had to balance against Turkey, which also shared a border with one of
the combatants.
145 However, externally Iran had two very important advantages over
Turkey insofar as the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is concerned. First,
Turkey has no border with Azerbaijan, depending upon land routes through either Iran or
Armenia. Second, Armenia closed the Turk's route to Azerbaijan due to the historical
hostility between the Turks and Armenians. Last, and more importantly, because of this
Turk-Armenian animosity, Ankara was in no position to gain favor acting as a mediator
between the two warring nations. 146
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Additionally, Iran did not—and does not—want the Azeris to win the war, as it
would enhance Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan. Such a development could have the
potential of turning Azerbaijan against Iran, if at some point relations between Tehran
and Ankara reach a crisis point. Moreover, Iran would like to keep Turkey from gaining
such leverage considering the very close relationship that exists between Turkey and the
US, a nation Iran considers hostile to its sovereignty, and the military agreement signed
between Ankara and Tel Aviv in February 1996. 147 The existence of a large Azeri
minority in Iran naturally put pressure on the government to side unreservedly with the
Azeri Shi'ites in the republic against the Christian Armenians. The Iranian leadership,
however, did not—and does not—view the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia
through a religious ideological lens. As pointed out earlier, Iran's ties with the
Caucasians go back centuries. Likewise, there was in Iran a feeling that Azerbaijan's
victory would create a refugee problem for Iran, as the country was still under the social
and financial burden of sheltering some two and a half million Afghani and Iraqi refugees
who fled to Iran from their own war-tom countries.
C. SUMMARY
In summary, this case study of Iran-Azerbaijan relations clearly illustrates the
argument that Iran's national security and foreign policy—when faced with the significant
security threats of territorial integrity, internal domestic stability, and regional balance of
power—is predicated on neorealist choices. Azerbaijan presented threats within all these
dimensions of Iranian security concerns to the extent that the ideology of the "Islamic






V. IRAN AND TURKEY RELATIONS CASE STUDY
Iran, being a weak state in the Persian Gulf region, has worked very hard to
maintain the status quo in the balance of power among its neighbors. This is the case,
and has been so for most of the 20th century, concerning Iran's relations with Turkey. In
the period after 1979, Iran has remained distrustful of Turkish intentions in Azerbaijan, in
the newly independent Central Asian states, and in northern Iraq. To the Iranian
revolutionary both Turkey's secular government and its alliance with the US left little
love between the two nations. Consistent throughout Tehran's dealings with Istanbul has
been its policy choices favoring the protection against Iran's perceived threats to
territorial integrity and the maintenance of the balance of power with Turkey directly and
with Turkish "surrogates" along Iran's borders—like the Kurdish factions in northern
Iraq. In all these examples, the power of the neorealist framework has influenced Iranian
decisionmakers.
The following case study amplifies Iranian-Turkish relations, presenting evidence
supporting the argument for a neorealist penchant in Iranian policymaking, despite the
rhetoric produced for domestic consumption.
A. BACKGROUND
The history of the relationship between Iran and Turkey is old and complex. The
father of modern Iran, Reza Shah, laid the foundation of modern Turkish-Iranian relations
when he visited Turkey in 1934. This visit occurred at a time when both countries were
struggling to overcome constraining historical traditions and to establish modern
institutions to gain access to the West. This visit went far to overcome a legacy of
conflict and warfare that stood between the two nations. During the Cold War, Iran
viewed the rise of Turkish nationalism as a necessary method of withstanding the threat
posed by the Soviet Union. 14 The Shah used Iranian nationalism as a defensive measure,
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aiming to keep the country unified, whereas the perception that Turkish nationalist
ideology was expansionist and a potential threat to Iranian sovereignty. Although Tehran
was sometimes anxious, believing it could not depend on Turkey in a crisis (especially
since the Sadabad Treaty had proved ineffective during World War II), the two
governments continuously worked to ease tensions through negotiation. 150
Over the last 20 years, Iran has gone through three distinctive phases: distrust and
enmity; optimism and cooperation (during the year-long (1996-1997) pro-Islamic
government of Necmetin Erkaban); and cautious amity since then. Historically, Iran and
Turkey have been rivals for political and economic influence in the Middle East, the
Caucasus, and Central Asia for more than a century and a half. Further, although they
were members in Western alliance systems such as the Baghdad Pact and the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) for nearly three decades (1950-1979), Iranian-Turkish
relations have rarely been easy. In fact, they have often been tense and acrimonious.
Constrained by short-term interests, Turkey was unable to play an intermediary
role during the Iran-Iraq War. Nevertheless, the war benefited Turkey. Forced to rely on
Turkey as a major source of needed commodities because of their international isolation,
both Iran and Iraq imported either directly from Turkey or from suppliers through
Turkey. Ankara's expectations of its relations with secular Iraq were higher than its
expectations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout the 1980s, the war with Iran
gave Iraq an incentive to cooperate fully with Turkey, including the establishment of
commercial exchanges between the two countries; with Turkey quickly became one of
Baghdad's main customers. For example, 60 percent of the oil consumed by Turkey was
imported from Iraq. 151 When Turkey saw that "Iraq was threatened with collapse under
the battering of the Iranian advance," the Turkish nationalist Minister of State, Kamran






region. " He also stated that "no less than one and a half million Turks and Turkomans
[live] in the northern regions of Iraq."
153 Kamran Inan, in effect, wanted to assert
Turkey's preemptive right in the event that an Iranian advance led to the breakup of
Iraq,
154
which was a potentiality that concerned Iran as well. Likewise, although an
Islamic country, Turkey's constant attempts to project a Western image have obscured its
regional role. This is partly the result of its geopolitical position on the border of both
Europe and Asia, and partly the outcome of having adopted Western norms that, in turn,
favor political and cultural links with the West at the expense of the Islamic world.
Turkey is the only Islamic country that continues to participate actively in Western
cultural and military organizations. Iran has always rejected this involvement with the
West, firmly believing that these attachments hinder Turkey's successful integration in
regional organizations. Moreover, it is these organizations, which Tehran has viewed as
necessary to deflect economic containment and force U.S. military presence from the
region.
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After its long war with Iraq, Iran has had every reason to avoid conflict with
Turkey, and Iranian officials have persistently tried, in spite of their differences, to reach
an accord with Turkey. Some of Turkey's actions, however, have resulted in crises and
provoked emotional responses in Iran. In February 1994, for example, the Turkish army
bombed Iranian border villages in its pursuit of Kurdish activists from the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), 156 resulting in nine deaths and nineteen injured. The Iranian
government's response to the bombing was cautious, enabling a group of Turkish
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Another example of poor Turkish judgment from Iran's viewpoint was the year-long
detention of the freighter Cap Maleas on suspicion of arms smuggling for the PKK, and
its release after an admission by the Turkish interior minister that the incident was the
result of a mistake.
In addition, on 10 March 1994, an editorial in the Iranian government newspaper
Kaylan depicted Turkey as being in a crisis, with its economy in shambles, the Kurdish
problem unsolved, internal democratic forces repressed, and Islamic activism on the
rise.
157 The same editorial suggests that, correspondingly, militarism in Turkey is on the
rise and armament industries are anxious to expand. Consequently, Turkey has the
potential of becoming one of the greatest military powers in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). This kind of editorial, published in an official Iranian newspaper,
indicates the level of anxiety that prevailed in Iran. It is Tehran's belief that due to
domestic problems, including the conflict with the Kurds, Turkey may resort to war in the
region. For example, General Gures's argument about Turkey's regional importance,
published in an Iranian military journal, indicates just how much the Turkish situation
1 CO
might concern Iran. Since Turkey is a friend of the U.S. in the region, it is natural for
Iran to feel that Turkey actually acts as a Western agent. Government-run newspapers in
Iran constantly write about the rise of Islamism in Turkey, its subservience to the West in
general and the U.S. in particular, and express concern over Turkey's military buildup. 159
The Iranian government's neorealist approach to foreign policy, however, has deemed it
more productive to promote neighborly relations with Turkey vice escalating hostilities.
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To be sure, the Iranian revolution of 1979 made the Iranian-Turkish relationship
even tenser and, at times, more turbulent. Ankara joined its neighbors in great
apprehension and concern due to the ambiguity of Iran's policies in the 1980s. But while
the Arab states of the Persian Gulf felt threatened by the Islamic Revolution and its
advocacy of political Islam, Ankara felt rather secure from the effects of this new polity
in the early 1980s.
161 The Turkish secular elite appeared to be confident that the state
institutions and Kemalist traditions were strong enough to withstand the tide of Islamic
resurgence. The confidence of the elite came also from the fact that the sharp edge of the
Ayatollah Khomeini's call to Muslims to rise and free them from Western political and
cultural domination primarily aimed at the monarchies of the Persian Gulf rather than
Turkey.
It could also be that he and his revolutionary aides had concluded that the Gulf
rulers who claimed to be the upholders of Islamic principles and the Sharia were more
vulnerable than Turkey to Khomeini's call. After all, Turkey had become a secular state
nearly a century before and many on the Anatolia Peninsula regarded themselves more
European than Middle Eastern, despite their Muslim heritage. Moreover, at the time of
the Iranian Revolution, Turkey, unlike the Gulf States, was a member of NATO and
therefore better shielded against outside intervention or political pressure.
Despite the absence of outright confrontation between Tehran and Ankara in the
1980s and early 1990s, their relations remained strained, although both countries were
members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 163 formed in 1985. The
Turks, for example, accused Iran over the years of assisting and/or providing shelter to
the PKK and even of carrying out terrorist activities on Turkish soil. 164 The Iranians, for
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their part, claimed that the Turks harbored and aided Iranian opposition groups that were
operating from a base in Turkish territory. 165 Additionally, Tehran has maintained that
Turkey is a willing partner in Washington's anti-Iranian policy in Central Asia and that
the recent military agreement between Israel and Turkey has created serious security
implications for Iran—with Israeli strike aircraft potentially able to reach Iranian territory
without having to cross a hostile border.
Turkey and Iran are regional powers with both mutual and competing interests.
As was the case with Azerbaijan, Iranian policy decisions vis-a-vis Turkey reflect the
pragmatic needs of the Iranian regime. Several case studies of Iranian-Turkish relations
support this assertion. I will concentrate on these relations as they concern the Iranian
policies in Central Asia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea Basin, and the Kurds—all of varied
importance to Turkey as well.
B. CENTRAL ASIA: IRAN, TURKEY AND THE NEW "GREAT GAME"
Iran's policy toward Central Asia has been a rather disappointing one. Iran never
matched the U.S. or even the Turks in terms of economic influence there. The U.S.
boycott is not the only reason—Tehran has been late to recognize the newly independent
states of the former USSR and to acknowledge their strong sense of nationalism. 1
Despite hopes for more cordial dealings, relations have remained very cold for Iran with
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and distant with Kazakhstan. 167 The strongest of these ties were
with Turkmenistan and Armenia, two close friends of the United States.
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The fall of the Soviet Union brought with it many concerns for Iran, not the least
of which was the potential rekindling of the historical rivalry for political and economic
influence between Iran and Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Iran's concern was that Turkey might not only attempt but succeed
in reviving the old ethnic and cultural ties between it and Central
Asians in order to resurrect the 'Turkish empire' or something
resembling it.
These concerns were only reinforced when Turkish President Sulleyman Demirel
chaired a conference in Ankara, attended by several Central Asia presidents, with the
objective of "strengthening and expanding cooperation between Turkey and the
republics."
169 A statement issued at the end of the conference called for unity among the
Turkish speaking states and, further called upon the participants "to work towards the
development of democracy, economic liberalism, secularism and the separation of
religion and politics." 170 It was this last item concerning the separation of politics and
religion, which Tehran took as a clear reference and veiled challenge to Iran's Islamic
government. Then again, in May 1997 during a visit to Turkmenistan, Demirel warned
the Central Asians that Iran's hard-line fundamentalists were trying to spread their
influence into the region.
Tehran's core concerns continue to be ones of sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and economic access. Consisting of many diverse ethnic groups, Iran becomes very
sensitive when a political dispute between it and a neighboring state turns into an ethnic
or nationalist conflict. Iran has been invaded by Iraq to "liberate Arabistan" (Iran's
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instigated from Azerbaijan, and it continues to have a heated dispute with the UAE over
the small islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs'. Given this historical
record, one cannot blame Iran for its nervousness over Turkish rhetoric concerning
Central Asia. Tehran must consider whether these Turkish statements are just rhetoric or
a signal of true pan-Turanistic desires to reestablish its ancient empire.
1. Iranian Policy in Central Asia
Khomeini's original policy of exporting the Islamic revolution focused on the
Arab countries; the enemy par excellence was the West, including Israel, and its Arab
conservative allies—both for ideological reasons. Although the Iranian revolution had a
strong anti-imperialist and leftist dimension, its true Islamic legitimacy extended from
contesting the Islamic credentials of the Arab Muslim states, especially the Saudi
Wahhabis who were very hostile to Shi 'ism, but who were in control of the Holy
Cities.
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The war against Iraq (1980-1988) gave a strategic rationale to Iranian ideological
hostility toward the Sunni Arab world: Baghdad got the support of the West as well as all
Arab states save Syria, whose Alawi regime was engaged in civil war against the Sunni
majority. Tehran played the Islamic card to bypass the "Arab front" to undermine the
legitimacy of the conservative Arab countries, as well as to be the main player in the
Persian Gulf; more precisely Tehran played the Shi'a card with the Hezbollah in
Lebanon, the High Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, the
Alawi regime of Syria. Khomeini's priorities focused more to the south, in this regard,
then they did toward Central Asia and Turkey. Focusing most of its resources toward the
Persian Gulf, Iran chose to underplay its propaganda campaign toward Central Asia,
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dedicating only one radio transmitter toward Turkmen. Likewise, there was apparently
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This radio transmitter was located in Iran's northeastern Gorgan region.
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no endeavor made to spread propaganda among the only Shi 'a population of the Soviet
Union, the Azeris. 174
The main pillars of Islamic Iran's foreign policy collapsed between July 1988 and
August 1991 after three successive blows to the regime. First, Khomeini's forced
acceptance of the cease-fire with Iraq in July 1988 meant that the Ayatollah's "road to
Jerusalem" could no longer "go through Kerbala." Second, the 1990-91 Gulf War
revealed that Iran's foreign policy followed its national interests in true neorealist form.
Tehran assured interlocutors from Riyadh that he had no intentions of joining forces with
Baghdad and, for the first time, the Islamic Republic of Iran's national interests coincided
in part with those of the conservative Arab states: namely, the desire for a weak, but
united, Iraq.
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This was put to the test when, in February 1991, Saddam Hussein shelled
the sacred Shi' a shrine of Ali in Najaf in an attempt to force Khomeini to enter the war. 176
Despite the affront and the massacre of thousands of Shi 'a pilgrims Tehran remained
silent—showing that Shi 'a solidarity could easily be sacrificed upon the alter of
neorealism as Iran sat back to watch the Coalition's dismantling of Iraq's military
machine. 177 The largest and final blow for Iran was the quiet collapse of the Soviet
Union in August 1991, which suddenly opened a vacuum on the northern side of Iran,
creating another regional imbalance and giving the hated U.S. regional, if not global,
hegemony. This also meant that Washington's existential client-state Turkey, would gain
inroads into Central Asia, where Tehran hoped to at least develop crucial economic links.
Iran's perception of embattlement and isolation continued with the launching of
the Arab-Israeli peace process in 1994. Even the lasting alliance between Iran and Syria
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would have been threatened by the return of the Golan Heights to Damascus, followed by
a peace treaty between the two former enemies. This sense of isolation pushed Iran to
violently oppose the peace process, leading to the establishment of the U.S. "Dual
Containment" policy in 1993 and the 1995 economic sanctions act. In response, Iran
adopted from 1995 onward a more moderate policy towards the Middle East and tacit
acceptance of the status quo in the Gulf. This action went far in mending Iranian fences
with the conservative Arab states, leading to the positively received Islamic Summit of
December 1997 in Tehran. However, while the imposition of the status quo in the
Middle East as well as in the Persian Gulf left little room for an active Iranian policy in
the area. Conversely, the assertiveness of the newly independent states and the
development of oil and gas production in the Caspian area obliged Iran to adopt a more
creative policy toward Central Asia.
2. Pan-Turanism Fears
In the 1991, glow of the Soviet Union's twilight, Turkish President Suleyman
Demirel declared that his nation should be at the helm of "a Turkic-speaking world
1 OA
stretching from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic." Today, Demirel is president
again, and his nation is increasingly establishing a renewed influence within the newly
independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Iran, ever mindful of the balance of power and its effects on Iranian security,
looks upon statements like this with both ire and suspicion. Tehran has noted that there
are Pan-Turanist groupings in Turkey that dream of a Turkish Empire, or at least some
form of association or cultural union embracing the Turkic states of Central Asia and
Azerbaijan. Alparslan Turkes, head of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) has been one
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of the most active Pan-Turkists in Turkey though in his later years Turkes has
considerably mellowed. It was still a surprise when then Prime Minister Suleyman
Demirel included Turkes in his entourage on an official tour of Central Asia in early
1992.
182
Turkes has advocated a Turkic Commonwealth led by a High Council of Turkic
Republics and the organization in Turkey of four Turkic States and Communities
Assemblies sponsored by the Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood
and Cooperation Foundation (TUDEV). 183
In addition to delegations from northern Cyprus, Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus, these Pan-Turkish gatherings included Turkic representatives from
various Russian republics including Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia. Although
these meetings were unofficial and not sanctioned by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, prominent Turkish politicians including Ozal, Demirel and Ciller felt the need to
attend and address them. Bodies based in Turkey such as the Research Foundation of the
Turkish World, the Turkish Cultural Research Association and the Turkish Clubs
Association also have Pan-Turkist sympathies. 184
These events have given Tehran concern. Furthermore, on 12 December 1999,
Turkey and Kyrgyzstan reached a five-year agreement wherein Turkey was ready to
forgive Kyrgyzstan' s $2.5 million debt and would provide limited military aid to the
Central Asian nation. Meanwhile, Turkey's relations with Turkmenistan appear strong as
well, based primarily on economic ties. At the heart of the relationship is a possible
extension of the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which could transport natural gas from
Turkmenistan to Turkey. 185 Meanwhile, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan have less
developed relations with Turkey, which Turkish propaganda attempts have not helped.
Ankara's "excessive emphasis on commonalities" between the people of Turkey and the
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Turic-states, has only caused varying levels of resentment in Central Asia. 186 This is to
Iran's advantage and is indicative of why they chose a policy, which was more subdued
and nuanced, downplaying religious dogma and replacing it with economic enticements.
Yet, Iran's legacy of the 1980s continues to haunt its ability to have its neorealist policy
shift embraced by these new republics.
3. Limits of Iranian Policy in Central Asia
Despite formal speeches about the "common cultural heritage" of Islam and
Persia, the problem for Iran after 1991 has been the lack of both expertise and leverage in
Central Asia. The "Shi'itization" of Iran in the 16th century created a real cultural
border with the countries where Persian was the language of culture but which remained
1 RR
Sunni—Afghanistan, Northern India, and Central Asia. Likewise, the bulk of the
Central Asian Muslims are Sunni Hanafi, and their historical connections were with the
Indian subcontinent, or, to a lesser extent, with the Volga Tatars, themselves closer to the
Ottoman reformist movements. 189
Iran did not use the ethnic leverage, either, for obvious reasons. Focusing on
specific ethnic groups, however, could backfire in a multi-ethnic Iran. For instance, Iran
would never acknowledge an ethnic solidarity with the Azeris, because it could stir up
ethnic Azeri feelings in Iran. To play on ethnic identity with the Tajiks would have also
antagonized the "Turks" (Uzbeks, Kyrgys, Kazakhs, etc.) who make up the bulk of the
population of the newly independent Muslim states. 190 On the one hand, Iran did not
186
Hunter, Shireen T. Central Asia Since Independence (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic








Ibid. The reluctance to play on ethnicity is nevertheless a constant pattern of Islamic Iran's foreign
policy: in Afghanistan for example, Iran never built a special relationship with the only "Persian" party, the
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make the same blunder as the Turks, who considered all Central Asians to be "ethnic
brothers." On the other hand, by allowing itself to consider that the countries in Central
Asia lacked a genuine culture and history, Tehran sorely underestimated national feelings
resident in these people.
Lastly, a regularly mentioned connection, beyond Islam and ethnicity, is that of a
"common cultural heritage."
191 However, neither the Iranians nor the Central Asian
republics acknowledged the real basis for a common cultural ground: the Turko-Persian
synthesis, where a Sunni-Persian culture has profoundly penetrated the Turkic languages
and societies, and conversely where population from Iranian stock has been linguistically
Turkicized. Such a concept runs counter to the new nationalism, based on ethnicity and
national languages.
192
Uzbekistan looks on Tamerlan as the true "Uzbek" and is not
interested in acknowledging the Persian side of the "Timurid" culture. For most of the
Iranians, on the other hand, the Iranian identity is a synthesis not so much between Islam
and their sense of Persian identity as there is between this identity and Shi' ism. The
Tajiks particularly felt this ambivalence in the relations between Shi 'ism and the Persian-
identity when they tried to emphasize their cultural proximity with Iran by posing as the
forerunners of Persian identity, and not as followers of the modern Iranian Shi 'a
culture. Tehran, uneasy with the ethnic and cultural links, regularly underlines the
linguistic tie, that is the use of Persian, contrary to its counterpart in Baku. However,
very little has been done to give a political dimension to this low-profile linguistic
solidarity.
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There is a general distrust toward Iran in the different Central Asian republics,










superiority does little to alleviate these misgivings. Iran regularly presents itself as a kind
of elder brother who can teach lessons to the young countries in terms of strategy, Islam,
culture, and even language in the case of the Tajiks. There are also obvious limits to the
Iranian economic influence. Despite Iranian economic goals in the region, if trans-border
trade is flourishing with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the overall picture of economic
cooperation does not favor Iran. 195 To improve its overall cooperation with Central Asia,
Iran is relying on the ECO; however, this organization is a forum for discussion and has
not achieved much in terms of cooperation to date.
Iran's policy toward Central Asia has evolved from a conservative and cautious
attitude towards the newly independent states to a more assertive policy based on the role
it would like to play in providing landlocked countries with gas and oil. The main aim of
Iranian foreign policy has been to prevent the United States and its Turkish and Saudi (on
the religious field) allies to fill the vacuum left by the fall of the Soviet Union, effectively
isolating Iran. Likewise, Iran has avoided playing the Islamic card in Central Asia
because of its lack of Islamic leverage. 196 A last reason, and a consequence of the latter,
is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with little or no interference from the other
revolutionary institutions such as Pasdaran, the Office of Islamic Propaganda, or the
different secret services shapes Iranian foreign policy concerning Central Asia. 1 7 This is
an indication of Iranian neorealist behavior in regards to Central Asia.
For example, Iran gave support to the Tajik Islamic Revolutionary Party (IRP) in
1992 and provided asylum in Tehran to some of its leaders, such as Qazi Akbar
Turajanzade. Many militants of the IRP utilized Iranian-type slogans, dress, and
revolutionary rhetoric during the civil war of 1992; however, once in exile, it appeared
that most of the militants went to Pakistan and Afghanistan, supported by Pakistan-based
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Sunni movements, including Arab militants. In fact, Tehran uses double standards
easily as long as it furthers its national interest. Absolute pragmatism might go along
with strong ideologically worded statements. Another good example of Iranian
neorealism as it pertains to this region is the opportunistic reference to the Israeli role.
One one hand, Tehran vehemently condemns the close relations between Israel and
Azerbaijan, while, on the other hand, it keeps silent about the huge Israeli influence in
Turkmenistan, where Iranian NIOC has partial ownership of a plant in which the Israeli
society Mehrav owns the lion's share. 199
4. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
Another good example of Iranian neorealist and policy tactics to balance against
Turkish initiatives and the potential of pan-Turanism has been Tehran's courtship with
Turmenistan. Shaped by an absolute pragmatism, Iran's relations with Turkmenistan
revolve around economic cooperation. For example, Iran seems undeterred in its pursuit
of amicable relations with Turkmenistan, despite its official secular government200 and its
development projects with Israeli and Turkish companies, which play an important role
in the economy."
Nevertheless, Iran has sought out and made numerous deals and agreements with
Turkmenistan for pure economic necessity while balancing against the threatening
influence of Turkey. On 25 May 1994, Nyazov and Rafsanjani met in Mashhad and
initiated cooperation centered on "dis-enclavement" through Iran. A succession of
agreements for economic, travel, and cultural exchanges followed. 202 Although Tehran
198 Roy (1999), 34.
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regarding banking, customs, and transportation was signed in January 1995. In June 1995 a deal was
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has no hope of finding much more leverage in a country so historically opposed to Iran,
Tehran appears to be happy to have a small in-road for pragmatic economic cooperation.
In tandem with these efforts, Iranian policy makers sough to engage at what ever level
they could to counter Turkey's policy maneuvers wherever possible. Uzbekistan has
very cool relations with Iran due to their concern for Tehran's potential involvement in
Islamist and nationalist movements." Likewise, in Kazakhstan relations are equally as
distant and based mostly on a number of trade and transportation agreements from
January 1996 and July 1997.204
Of all these states, Tajikistan presents the only real opportunity for Iran to
establish a foothold in Central Asia, through a strong Islamist movement there that
advocated both Persian and Islamic identity. The Iranians rapidly acknowledged the
local nature of political alignments in Tajikistan, the neo-communists coming from the
Kulab province and the Islamists originating in the Gharm valley. Although cold, the
relations with the government of President Imamali Rahmanov never ceased. In July
1995, Rahmanov paid an official visit to Tehran, followed again by a series of
cooperation agreements in various fields. At the same time, the alignments in Tajikistan
ceased to be ideological and became increasingly ethnically oriented, to the dismay of
Tashkent. After the fall of Kabul in September 1996, Masud established working
relations with Rahmanov, stockpiling Russian ammunitions in the Kulab airfield for
Masud. The Tajik opposition in Afghanistan, headed by Mollah Nuri, chose Masud' s side
and not the Taliban. Masud worked as a peace broker between Nuri and Rahmanov.
Nuri, based in Afghanistan, came back to Dushanbe in September, while Akbar
Turajanzade stood in Tehran. Competition between both men complicated the
announced to build a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran. In August 1995 a trade agreement
was signed between Iran, Turkmenistan, and Armenia. Northern Iran has been provided with Turkmen gas
since December 1997.






situation, while armed groups, acting on their own cast a shadow on the peace process.
Finally, Turajanzade left Tehran, under Iranian pressure, to join the coalition government
906
as Deputy Prime Minister in April 1998.
C. INTRIGUES AND COUNTER-INTRIGUES: AZERBAIJAN THROUGH A
TURKISH LENS
The preceding chapter on Iran-Azerbaijan relations dealt specifically with the
relations of these two nations in presenting evidence to support my neorealist argument.
The following section will discuss some of the same situations again, however they will
be examined on how they influenced relations between Iran and Turkey. So as not to
belabor the reader with the details again, I have condensed my analysis to some key
observations.
Events in Azerbaijan in the 1990s complicated Iranian-Turkish relations. For
907
both countries, the central issues revolved around questions of identity and nationality,"
but the tense dynamics of the relationship derive in large part from the fluidity and
volatility of post-Soviet Azerbaijani politics. Iran professes itself a multi-ethnic Islamic
society, but there are strict limits on the degree of autonomy allowed to its minority
nationalities. With an Azerbaijani population variously reckoned at between 10 to 20
million, mostly living in the northwestern Iran adjacent to the Azerbaijan Republic
border, all Tehran governments are concerned about irredentist Azerbaijani nationalism.
In 1994, there were anti-government riots in Tabriz, as in many other Iranian cities;
however, the grievances seem to have been socio-economic and cultural rather than
70R
nationalist." Iranian-Azeri have a distinct and more Iranian sense of identity than their
northern cousins, and there can be no doubt that 70 years of Soviet rule have left
A letter of understanding on defense cooperation was signed in Tehran on December 29, 1997, the
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significant differences in outlook and aspiration between them.209 Moreover, Azerbaijan
has its own minorities—among them the Talesh, an Iranian people concentrated near the
border with Iran. It is worth noting that the short-lived 1993 Talesh separatist movement
attracted little popular support and received absolutely no backing from Tehran.210
Although the historical, cultural, and political debates surrounding the issue of
Azerbaijani identity cannot be explored here in depth, the central arguments can be given
in broad outline. Most Iranians consider that their Azeri fellow-citizens are, and for
centuries have been, fully accepted as part of the populations of Iran. By and large no
Balkanizing attitudes exist. In fact, many Iranians point to the thorough integration of
Azerbaijanis into society—including within national elite circles—and their great
contribution to Iran's modern history and culture as being inclusive. Many Iranian-
Azeris, if they have any reunification feelings at all, believe that the new Azerbaijan
Republic should rejoin Iran, seeing them as stolen away in the 19th century by imperialist
Russia.
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1. Iran's View of the Threat of Azerbaijan
The majority of the ethnic-Azeri nation is resident in northern Iran, not in the
Caucasian republic as opposed to Azerbaijan itself." " The upsurge in Azeri nationalism
and border violations in the late-Soviet period became a source of considerable anxiety to
the Iranian regime. Likewise, the rise of the APF and Azerbaijan's determinedly pro-
Turkish position immediately after independence caused Tehran concern. For its part,
Ankara sought both a courtship with the potentially oil-wealthy Azerbaijan for economic
advantage and to balance power against Armenia, Russia, and Iran. Tehran perceived
Turkey's support to Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis as a potential threat to
its northern border. Likewise, Elchibey's outspoken anti-Iranian rhetoric and overtures to










maneuvers, which would ultimately be to Tehran's long-tern detriment. 213 Iranian
anxiety was finally assuaged when Heydar Aliyev, the leader of Nakhichevan, came to
power on the back of Suret Huseinov's coup in 1993.
214
In the past Aliyev has also made
remarks that would alarm Tehran, 215 but as the President of the Azerbaijan Republic he
has seen Azerbaijan's best interest in maintaining balanced relations with Russia, Turkey,
and Iran. Befitting its pragmatic outlook on policy, Tehran responded by offering Aliyev
full support during the crises of September 1994 and March 1995. In spite of this, there
remain many obstacles in the relationship. For example, Aliyev' s ready acceptance of
Washington's rejection of Iranian participation in an Azerbaijani oil consortium angered
Tehran. In retaliation, Iran blocked the export of a range of goods and demanded that
Azerbaijan start paying for Iranian electricity supplies to Nakhichevan.
2. Iran's Perception of the Growing Pan-Turanic Threat
The Elchibey government in 1992 and the nationalist APF heightened Iran's
perception of a growing threat to its security from the perspective of its indigenous Azeri
population in the north and its balance of power with Turkey. These irredentist and pan-
Turkist attitudes were a direct threat to Iran. When Elchibey came to power in June
1992, he turned Azerbaijan increasingly towards Turkey, as well as Egypt and Israel.
This supports the thesis argument for Iran's neorealist pragmatism centered on the
integrity and security of the state. Iran follows a neorealist approach, which should be
readily recognizable to Western analysts. In this case, Iran sought a balance of power
situation between the Christian Armenian and the pro-Turkish Azeribaijani camps.
Apart from the Islamic dimension of Turkic nationalism, such a concept would












turned Azerbaijan towards Turkey. He thought of Iran, as he thought of Russia, as a
foreign power with expansionist policies in the region, policies that run counter to
Azerbaijan's national interests. On several occasions, he reportedly blasted Iran as a
doomed state and predicted the reunification of the "Azeri nation." Elchibey further
antagonized Russia when he took Azerbaijan out of the CIS,218 a move that resulted in
Moscow's increasing support of Armenia. Inadvertently or not, the Elchibey government
lost the support of both Iran and Russia. His government was short lived, overthrown in
a military coup in June 1993, allegedly encouraged by Iran. However, a more reasonable
explanation would be that the coup was the consequence of his government's failure to
9 1
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effectively manage the Karabakh War, as well as Russia's support of Armenia."
In sum, Tehran was power balancing throughout this crisis and ongoing regional
competition for influence and favor concerning oil concessions in the Caspian Sea basin.
Ideologically, secular Turkey and Islamist Iran are polar opposites. Naturally, each sees
the other as an unwelcome example and source of inspiration to subversives within its
own society. Iran generally sees Turkey as a pro-U.S., and now pro-Israeli, regional rival
of growing strength—in short, as an agent and potential launching pad for its enemies.
The field of Turkish-Iranian rivalry has widened considerably in recent years, now
encompassing northern Iraq, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In northern Iraq, Turkey
cooperates closely with Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, while Iran generally supports
Barzani's rival, Jalal Talabani. In the Caucasus, Turkey firmly backs Azerbaijan in its
dispute with Armenia, while Iran tilts heavily toward Armenia—both seeking to power
balance against the other. Likewise, both Turkey and Iran hope to be the site of the main
export pipeline for Caspian Sea energy. Iran's tensions have also been exacerbated by
Turkey's challenge for influence in Central Asia, closer Turkish and Israeli ties,
220
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suspected Turkish support of anti-Iranian groups like the Mujahedin-e Khalq."




Makovsky, Internet. The Iranians particularly object to a 1996 Turkish-Israeli military cooperation
agreement that allows Israeli jets to exercise in Turkish airspace four times a year. Iran's concerns that
Turkey has brought the once-distant Israeli enemy to the edge of the Iranian border exacerbated by
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Thus, Iran had to balance against Turkey, which also shared a border with one of
the combatants.
22 However, externally Iran had two very important advantages over
Turkey insofar as the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia was concerned. First,
Turkey has no border with Azerbaijan, depending upon land routes through either Iran or
Armenia for travel and commerce. Second, due to the historical hostility between the
Turks and Armenians, the route to Azerbaijan through Armenia was closed and, more
importantly, because of this animosity Ankara was in no position to gain favor acting as a
mediator between the two warring nations. 223
Additionally, Iran did not—and does not—want the Azeris to win the war, as it
would enhance Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan. Such a development could have the
potential of turning Azerbaijan against Iran, if at some point relations between Tehran
and Ankara reach a crisis point. Moreover, Iran would like to keep Turkey from gaining
such leverage considering the very close relationship that exists between Turkey and the
US. America is a nation Iran considers hostile to its sovereignty and considers both Israel
and Turkey puppets of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Therefore, Iran became
very wary with the announcement of a military agreement signed between Ankara and
Tel Aviv in February 1996."" The existence of a large Azeri minority in Iran naturally
put pressure on the government to side unreservedly with the Azeri Shi'ites in the
republic against the Christian Armenians. The Iranian leadership, however, did not and
numerous press reports suggesting that Turkey and Israel are cooperating in intelligence-gathering against
Iran.
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does not view the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia through a religious
ideological lens. As pointed out earlier, Iran's ties with the Caucasians go back centuries.
Likewise, there was in Iran a feeling that Azerbaijan's victory would create a refugee
problem for Iran, as the country was still under the social and financial burden of
sheltering some two and a half million Afghani and Iraqi refugees who fled to Iran from
their war-torn countries.
D. THE KURDISH QUESTION IN IRANIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS
Finally, we will examine the role of the so-called "Kurdish Question" in Iranian-
Turkish relations. 226 Soon after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian Kurdistan became the
center of opposition to the Khomeini's Islamic government. The Islamic revolution
provided an excellent opportunity for Kurdish nationalism. The Kurdish Democratic
Party of Iran (KDPI), founded in 1945, became the center for political expression of the
Kurdish people in Iran."" Having fought against the Shah, this group soon found the
need to posture against Tehran when Khomeini usurped the democratic expectations of
the 1979 revolution.22 Their continued threatening of separatism, coupled with the
tensions of the Iran-Iraq War, provided ready grist for the fears of the leadership in Iran
over territorial integrity. Likewise, Turkey shares Iran's concern with separatism as it
concerns the Kurds. 22 Also exacerbating Turkish concerns was the existence of past
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and the deadly challenge the PKK insurgency present to Ankara. Therefore, the Kurdish
situation provided both Iran and Turkey with ready levers to use against each other in
different ways over the last few decades—each demonstrated neorealism in their
approach to the Kurds. With respect to Iran, the following case study discussion will
aptly illustrate Iran's neorealist base in international relations policy. Tehran used
factions within the Kurdish population to balance power against other Kurdish factions,
as well as Iraq and Turkey. Then, when the potential reality of a Kurdish state began to
form following the Gulf War, Iran changed its tactics and allied itself with Turkey to
destroy any chances of this occurring. The motivation was similar to other situations
examined already—the danger of ethnic-irredentism and the impacts on Iranian internal
security.
The first known use of the name Kurdistan dates from the time of the last great
Seljuk Sultan of Persia, Sultan Sandjar, circa 1157, which created the first Kurdish
administrative province. This province, to the northwest of Hamadan, encompassed the
whole of the area between Azerbaijan and Luristan, including the regions of Hamadan,
Dinawar, Kermanshah, and Sennah to the east of the Zagros Mountains and to the west of
Shahrezur and Khuftiyan, on the Zab River. 231 However, the Kurds, being a mountain,
pastoral people have always been ambivalent to borders and boundaries, traveling where
the pastures best support their herds. " One commonality that has remained with the
Kurds since ancient days is the fact that they have largely been under the control of one
empire or another to this day.
In the past within Iran, the Kurds have played a substantial role—in fact, Iran was
even ruled by a Kurdish dynasty, the Zands (1792-95). But since that short time, the
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Kurds have been marginalized in Iranian polity, be it a monarchy, military dictatorship,
or Islamic democracy.234 The one plus for Iran has been that the Iranian Kurds, like
many other ethnic groups in Iran, identify themselves as Iranians as well as Kurd with no
inherent contradiction.
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"No Kurdish political party has failed to declare its attachment
to the territorial integrity of Iran. It is clear that the Iranian Kurds have never been
radical separatists."
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But this attitude began to change in the late 20th century. This
occurred, in part, due to the regional conflicts (in Iran and Iraq, Iran and Turkey, Iraq and
Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan), which hampered cross border movement. Second is
the realization that Kurdish patience and moderation has paid low dividends and that
perhaps the time was ripe to gain autonomy. 23 It is this factor, the potential of a
separatists Kurdistan, coupled with its relations with Turkey, which most motivated
Tehran's policy behavior since 1980.
Turkey had already experienced and forcibly squelched Kurdish insurgent activity
during the 1970s; however, the Kurds recovered and intensified with successive waves of
guerrilla activity along the Turk-Iraqi border after November 1983." Ankara became
concerned that Baghdad was no longer able to control its Kurdish population in the north
and that the KDP and/or the PUK would cooperate with the PKK which had established
guerrilla camps in the mountainous border area from which it conducted its forays into
Turkey. 239 From this growing concern, Turkey's military penetrated Iraq's border up to
25 miles with 8,000-10,000 troops, attacking the PKK killing and capturing several
hundred with the tacit approval of Saddam Hussein. This drew much consternation from
234








Barkey, Henri J. "Under the Gun: Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question," in Olson,
Robert, editor. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of
Kentucky Press, 1996), 73; and Pahlavan, 87.
239 Olson (1998), 30.
74
the leadership in Tehran who were convinced Turkey was preparing itself for the
eventual seizure of Iraq's northern oilfields.
Iraq had no love lost for the troublesome Kurds and, with its primary focus on
winning its war with Iran, Baghdad concluded the agreement introduced by Turkey
allowing hot pursuit operations into either sides' territory against the Kurdish
, 240insurgents.
When Baghdad acquiesced to Turkey's demands for a "hot-pursuit"
treaty in October 1984, Tehran refused a similar request...The
Iranians agreed, however, to a "security agreement" on 28
November 1984 requiring "each country to prohibit any activity on
its territory aimed against the other's security. 241
1. Under the Shroud of War: Iranian Concerns with Turkish Intentions
It is not surprising Iraq would make these concessions with Turkey under the
circumstances. Likewise, the Iranian responses to what it was seeing are equally logical
when filtered through the neorealist lens. In 1986, although Iran rarely liked to
encourage separatist groups of any type— given its own fears about the Pandora's Box it
might represent—Tehran formed an alliance with both the Kurdish Democratic Party
(KDP), led by Masoud Barazani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal
Talabani.
242
By November 1986, these groups were receiving large quantities of
arms and assistance from Iran as the Iranians intensified their
military campaign along the northern front with Iraq. Several
offensives in the Haj Unran area were undertaken with substantial
KDP and PUK involvement.243
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Iraq, in supporting its war effort was utilizing the oil pipeline it had with Turkey
to avoid the threat to its shipping in the Gulf from Iran. Thus, in a peripheral way,
Turkey became a consideration for Iran as well. Low-intensity guerrilla attacks by the
PKK in Turkey accompanied the upsurge in military activity following the KDP-PUK-
Iranian alliance in 1986.
244
This activity prompted another round of Turkish military
raids of increasing intensity into northern Iraq. These actions further strained the already
tense relations between Tehran and Ankara. The Iranians were bitterly critical of the
Turks bombing raids on the Kurds for a few reasons. The Iranians considered the Kurds
an ally in the war with Iraq but, more importantly, was Iranian perceptions of Ankara's
intent.
245
After all, to Khomeini Turkey was nothing more than a puppet of the West
(i.e., the US) in the Middle East. Likewise, Iran was receiving no international support
although it was the victim of Iraqi aggression. However, to the anxious Iranians it was
the timing of Turkey's raids launched at the very time Iran was initiating its new
offensive in the Haj Umran area, which was most annoying. 24 Not to mention the
Turkish harboring of other Iranian opposition groups who were operating from within
Turkey—like the Mojahedin-i Khalq 247
Therefore, Tehran decided it would leverage the "special interest" Turkey had
with the Kurds to ensure Turkey's neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, "tolerating" the basing
248
of various dissident Turkish groups on Iranian territory—to include the PKK." (Iran has
even stirred up trouble—to a limited extent—between Turkey's Shi'ite or Alevi
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population.)249 This policy, although risky in its own right, was effective in Tehran's
eyes. The potency of Kurdish militancy and its significant effect on Turkey's internal
security placed the authorities in Turkey under enormous strain. Compounding this was
the fact that this new insurgency was coordinated from abroad, outside the reach and
control of the Turkish security forces. 250
Turkey was not alone in having a Kurdish insurgency group targeting the regime.
Iran, too, had its Kurdish enemies whom Turkey was able to use as a counter lever to
Iran. The KDPI had been a force in Iran for many years. It had fought against the Shah's
regime and, when the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution did not deliver the democratic
state the group expected, it went on the offensive against the Islamists, seeking Kurdish
autonomy.
251 The leader of this group in the 1980s was Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou
who, throughout the 1980s, refused to modify the KDPI's demands for Kurdish
autonomy. Never tolerant of separatist groups in its midst, Iran's anxiety was
exponentially heightened due to the grave wartime environment of these years. A year
after the cease-fire, on 13 July 1989, Ghassemlou was assassinated in Vienna while
meeting with representatives of the Iranian government and, although one of Iran's own
diplomats was injured in the incident, suspicion of Tehran's hand in the killing was
great.
25 Of course, this alliance was predictable under the framework of neorealism.
Iranian territorial integrity is threatened and the leadership makes its policy decisions
according to that threat.
In 1986, Turkey escalated its military campaign against the PKK with an
incursion into Iraqi territory on 15 August 1986 and followed by larger operations on 3-4





Green, Jerrold D. Terrorism and Politics in Iran fSanta Monica, California: The RAND
Corporation, 1995), 11.
2
Entessar, Nader. "Kurdish Conflict in Regional Perspective," in ME. Ahrari, eidtor, Change and
Continuity in the Middle East: Conflict Resolution and Prospectsfor Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1996), 42-43.
77
and 27 March 1987. The then Majlis Speaker, Hashemi Rafsanjani, voiced the concerns
of Iran's leadership that Turkey had designs on the north Iraq oil fields of Kirkuk,
feelings which continued into the 1990s. It was this fear that Ankara would gain either
direct or indirect control of these oilfields and the resulting shift in the regional balance
of power that prompted Iran to make the national security decisions it made at this
time.
25 Such control would move Turkey's "security border a few hundred miles south
and east,"254 which would, if allowed to occur, shift the balance of power in an
unfavorable way for Iran. Moreover, these events were occurring in conjunction with a
similar problem of influence vis-a-vis Azerbaijan (discussed earlier) and the new
international framework of both the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War—a truly traumatic
environment for the Iranian leadership. Since Turkey's preoccupation with the Kurds
eclipsed all other security concerns for Ankara at the time, Tehran chose to use its
influence with some of the factionalized Kurdish groups to counter Turkey. This action
illustrates once again Iran's neorealist approach to policy decision and strategy when
threats to its territorial integrity present themselves.
2. Iran's "Chameleon" Policy and the Abortion of a Kurdish State
In the aftermath of the Gulf War and Iraq's defeat, problems between Iran and
Turkey were exacerbated once again by Turkey's major campaigns against the PKK in
northern Iraq. These relations and the Kurdish question, however, would swing between
opposition and alliance with Iranian nervousness about Turkish intentions replaced by a
desire to penetrate its isolation, form better regional ties (especially economic) and seek
to marginalize U.S. influence in the region. As regards Turkey, Iran policy would change
like a chameleon to meet its neorealist goals.
In 1992, 1995 and 1997 Turkish military forces launched massive campaigns into
northern Iraq that involved ever-growing numbers of troops: from 10,000 to 60,000
253
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men." This build-up created a festering suspicion as to Turkey's true intentions. After
all, from Tehran's perspective Turkey was a client state of U.S. hegemony in the Middle
East, evidenced by Ankara's long alliance with the U.S. and the role it played in the
prosecution of the 1990 Gulf War. Then, with the establishment of Operation Provide
Comfort, Tehran believed its suspicions justified with the hated-U.S. gaining yet another
entree into the region and providing a potential safe-haven in Iraq for anti-Iranian
opposition groups, especially the KDP-I. Therefore, Iran took action to ensure such a
national security threat was preempted by attacking and bombing suspected KDP-I camps
within the "no-fly zones" in Iraq throughout the spring and summer of 1993.256
From 1993 to 1995, Turkey was willing to use its support of the KDP-I as a lever
to prevent Iran from supporting the PKK. However, according to author Robert Olson,
Iranian support to the PKK camped in both Iraq and Iran was far greater than that of
Ankara's aid to the KDP-I. 257 Likewise, Tehran's strategy in regard to its use of the
Kurdish card was multi-faceted: (1) counter Turkish designs in northern Iraq; (2) deflect
U.S./Western influence in the region; (3) counter Turkish support of Azerbaijan; and,
more importantly (4) ensure an independent Kurdish state went unrealized to preempt
Kurdish-Iranian irredentism." In the end, it was this last concern which, between 1992
and 1998, both Turkey and Iran saw was in both their best interests to counter by
managing their trans-state Kurdish issue—the pragmatic choice of neorealism.
After 1993, the Iranians and Turks met and signed a series of security protocols
aimed at preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish state, bandied about in the
international media. Syria had also been a PKK supporter to Turkey's chagrin, however,
Iran, through its own alliance with Syria,259 was able to gain Damascus' support on the
25
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Kurdish agreements." These agreements stipulated that neither country would permit
any terrorist organization to exist on its territory. Rafsanjani stated that Iran would take
direct measures against known PKK camps issuing orders for any PKK member shot
regardless of whether they were wearing uniforms or were merely smugglers helping
support the cause. Iran gave Turkey evidence of its commitment to the protocols on 4
May 1994 by turning over to Turkish security forces 28 captured PKK members, ten of
which were dead." ' A month later, on 13 June, Ankara made a request to Iran's visiting
Interior Minister Mohammad Besharati, for permission for the Turkish air force to bomb
PKK bases located in the areas around Mount Ararat and Mount Tendurek in and near
Iranian territory." Two days later Turkish press public announced that Iran had granted
permission for the proposed Turkish air strikes, leaving communications open for further
strikes on PKK logistical sites. In return, Turkish President Demirel announced that
Turkey would move against the anti-Iranian Mojahedin-i Khalq based in Turkey. 264
During the period between 1994 and 1995, Turkish-Iranian relations underwent
strain due to the internecine fighting of the two main Kurdish factions in northern Iraq
—
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Iran
supported the PUK and Turkey the KDP to gain a level of influence in this unstable area
and as a lever against each other's policies." A patron-client relationship with each
Kurdish faction was established and factions became more dependent upon their
respective patron country. Despite denials by Iranian authorities that they are providing
support to the PKK, Turkish intelligence reports believed otherwise. For instance, there
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are approximately 50 PKK camps in Iran, in which 1,200 terrorists are being trained
every year, and transported to the Turkish border by military planes that belong to Iran.26
In addition, Iranian officers of the Pasdaran likely trained PKK terrorists in these camps
as well as in northern Iraq. Tehran maintains the attitude that "Tehran would continue
supporting the PKK in return for more PKK terrorist activities in Turkey." '
This ambiguity was further aggravated when the two largest Kurdish factions, the
KDP and PUK, began to each move closer to their state patrons (Turkey and Iran,
respectively), threatening to draw both Ankara and Tehran into a proxy war in northern
Iraq. This is when Iranian leadership decided to deploy troops. For Iran, this ran counter
to its longer-term strategy of developing a relationship with Turkey, which would allow
Iran to penetrate the economic constraints imposed by Washington's Dual Containment
policy.
268
In the end, playing upon the neorealist desires of Ankara and its geopolitical
need to contain the PKK, Tehran was able to gain Turkey's cooperation in some
economic agreements of critical importance to Iran. Likewise, Turkey gained assistance
in neutering the PKK and the halt of Iranian support to Islamist fundamentalist opposition
groups in Turkey."
9
For instance, the national security issues between the two countries concerning
the Kurds were specifically given prominence when Demirel met with Rafsanjani in
Tehran 15-17 June 1994, the first visit by a Turkish president to Iran in decades. His was
a coup to Iran's master neorealist strategy discussed in the beginning of this paper to
counter territorial threats and regional isolation. Relations continued to improve in 1995
266
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despite rhetoric to the contrary.' According to Olson, there are three major
geostrategical and geopolitical imperatives requiring cooperation by Iran and Turkey for
the management of the Kurdish issue. First, their mutual interests in participating in the
oil and gas resources and their distributive networks. Second, the desires of each to
refrain from undo interference in each other's policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Third, Iran and Turkey's need to agree on their respective spheres of influence in
northern Iraq.
271
Turkey's concern for possible Iranian support to the PKK and Iran's
concern with Turkish support to the KDP-I, even more for support to Azeri nationalists,
were both payoffs and threats that each held against the other. Thus, by mid- 1997 Iran
and Turkey appeared to have reached a tacit understanding that each would restrain
support for their client Kurdish factions to ensure the maintenance of an inter-state
balance.
3. Today's Iranian-Turkish Relations: The Kurdish Issue Remains
Although this showed promise from the Iranian perspective, relations continue to
find a lightning rod in regards to each countries Kurdish problems. For example, some
believe that Iran in 1997 inadvertently sent mixed signals on its position regarding
Turkey's campaign against the PKK in Iraq. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia-
Pacific Affairs was calling for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern
"7*70
Iraq, citing Tehran's concern for Iraqi territorial integrity;" " however, this rhetoric was
downplayed by Rafsanjani a few days later at the D-8 Summit in Turkey, where he
emphatically asserted that the interests of Turkey and Iran were intertwined and that
"Turkey is our friend while the PKK is not." ' Further, in an interview with Turkish
70
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television, Rafsanjani declined to explicitly condemn Turkey's military actions in Iraq,
instead focusing on the "headaches" caused by large groups of Kurds fleeing into Iran to
escape the fighting, bringing with them weapons, disease, and a host of problems.274
However, despite Rafsanjani's statements of mutual interests, contrasting rhetoric came
the next day from the fundamentalist outlets when a Voice of the Islamic Republic ofIran
commentary, which blasted Turkey's cooperation with Israel, stating it would likely lead
to Arab retaliation against Turkey.27 Although this was likely a product of the rising
factional struggle between the Iranian moderates and fundamentalists instigated by the
resignation of the Islamist proponent Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, whose
policies complemented the Islamic hardliners' agenda.
Conversely, in 1998, Iran and Turkey made several agreements on dealings with
the Kurds with Tehran's new engagement policy and charm offensive, which began in
earnest that year. In March 1998, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Iranian
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi met during the Islamic Conference in Doha, Qatar and
agreed to take allied action against the Iraqi Kurdish group PKK—a huge gesture to
Ankara on Tehran's desire to improve relations. After all, the Kurdish issue is of
fundamental importance to Turkey, which is concerned with security in its own Kurdish
areas. The willingness of Iran to cooperate in operations against the PKK satisfies a basic
Turkish need by increasing the forces available for handling the Kurds and denying the
Kurdish rebels refuge in Iran. 276 However, Tehran's motivations were not altruistic for
Iran was intent on reversing the results of the Iran-Iraq war. They want to recover that
portion of the Shatt al-Arab they surrendered to Baghdad at the ceasefire accords.
Turkey's willingness to participate in operations against the Kurds in the north is
indispensable to any plan to dismember Iraq. Iranian diplomacy has been moving in the
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Relations have begun to sour again in recent years. For example, on 18 July
1999, Iranian media reported that Turkish planes killed a number of Iranians during the
bombing of suspected PKK positions in Iran. 27 On this day Iranian media broadcast a
statement by the Iranian foreign ministry condemning an alleged Turkish air raid on
border outposts in the mainly Kurdish inhabited Piranshahr area in Iran's Western
Azerbaijan province, claiming that Iranian brigade positions were resulting in some
injuries and one death." The next day, the Iranian Army command issued a statement
emphasizing that it had the right of "proper response" to these provocations. It also said
that Iran holds Turkey responsible for the "further development of events."280 Turkish
Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu denied the Iranian charges, saying that he had
no information on the claims, and added only that his office was still collecting
information on the matter, and later, on 19 July, said that the Iranian claims were simply
-jo i
not true." Moreover, this episode prompted Turkey to raise the international relations
ante by accusing Iran of continuing to shelter PKK rebels. 28 In response, of course,
Tehran denied these accusations, making the counter claim that there were no PKK bases
on its territory, demonstrating clearly that the Kurdish question remains a leveraging
point for both countries.
E. SUMMARY
In summary, this chapter has provided specific examples illustrating Iranian
neorealism in its policy decisions with Turkey. In examining the interactions of these
two nations in Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and with the ethnic Kurdish factions straddling
the territories of both countries, as well as Iraq, the evidence is overwhelming in
278 STRATFOR. "Turkey Accused of Attacking Iranian Targets," (20 July 1999) on the internet at
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supporting the neorealist argument. Iranian perceptions of threat to its territorial integrity
have always predicated a pragmatic response from Tehran. Again, the close relationship
Turkey has with the U.S., its secular-Muslim government, and its superior economic
position relative to Iran only serve to amplify Iran's perceptions. In the case of Turkey,
these perceptions are amplified by Istanbul's actions with each of the elements discussed
here presented Tehran with threats on each of these levels simultaneously, prompting the
pragmatic actions it took to counter Turkish power.
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VI. IRAN AND ISRAEL RELATIONS CASE STUDY
The following case study will again provide evidence to support the thesis that the
international relations theory of neorealism drives Iranian national security and foreign
policy. This analysis is of interest because it shows how the Islamic revolutionary
government leadership was able to rationalize its dealings with its Zionist enemies in Iran
when the need dictated. This Iranian policy behavior manifested itself during the Iran-
Iraq War, in its vacillating support of Hezbollah in the 1990s, and in its rhetoric against
the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.
A. BACKGROUND
Until the overthrow of the Shah's regime in 1979, Israel and Iran had established
a degree of diplomatic relations with government missions in both countries, becoming
de facto allies in the Western camp of the Cold War.283 Under the Shah, from 1953 to
1979, Iran was one of Israel's primary suppliers of oil and a major commercial partner.
In addition, the intelligence services of the two countries cooperated closely, and Israel
exported military hardware, provided training and other assistance to Iranian military
forces. The Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran's joining of the anti-Israeli camp abruptly
terminated these close, but discreet, relations in 1979, upon the success of the Islamic
Revolution. Shortly thereafter, Iran called for the "eradication" of Israel through armed
struggle and its replacement by a Palestinian state. As a symbolic gesture, Tehran gave
the PLO the building of the former Israeli mission. In the 1980s, however, Israeli
concern about the fate of approximately 30,000 Jews remaining in Iran, interest in
assisting Iran in its war with Iraq, and cooperation with the US in its efforts to free
American hostages held by Iranian-backed Shi'ite extremists in Lebanon, led to a
renewal of contacts between Israeli and Iranian leaders and shipments of Israeli arms to
Tehran, which—when revealed—became the Iran-Contra.284
283 However, it should be noted that this relationship was never formalized by an exchange of
ambassadors.
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Today, Middle East analysts and researchers in the West face a paradox
concerning Iran. Iran has suffered greatly under the burden of US economic sanctions
and its label as a "rogue state" and supporter of international terrorism. To alleviate this
suffering, Western thinkers would expect the pragmatic Iran decision maker should seek
policies to appease the West, such as withdrawing financial support to groups like
Hezbollah, to remove economic sanctions, which would allow foreign investment and
debt restructuring thereby creating positive results for the country and its people.
However, this is not the course Iran has taken, even under the more moderate Khatami.
The real question is why does Iran persist despite the economic hardship imposed on it to
stop this practice? Is it out of ideology? The answer is no. Iran continues to support
Islamist groups because it benefits, in some way, their desire to balance power against
their perceived national security challenges—the largest being the United States. This is
why Iran attempted to send armaments in December 1992 to Bosnian Muslims in breach
of the UN arms embargo applying to all former-Yugoslav states.285 Bluff or not, it
energized US policy makers to decide on some measure of direct intervention. If the
Iranian plan was to force our entanglement in the Balkans, they succeeded, since the
original US contingency plan to enable European forces to act has blossomed into a long-
term force commitment with no end in sight.
In the same vein, Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, former Marine Corps General
and Unified Commander of the former US Atlantic Forces Command, in his statement to
Congress on 2 November 1999, stated:
Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terrorism. CIA Director
Tenet affirmed before Congress earlier this year that hardliners
continue to view terrorism as a legitimate tool of Iranian policy, and
they still control the institutions that can implement it. As noted in
this year's Patterns of Global Terrorism... Iran continues to be
involved in a range of terrorist activities. These include providing
material support and safehaven to some of the most lethal terrorist
groups in the Middle East, notably Hizballah, Hamas, and the PLJ.
Parks, Michael, "Competing Visions of a Future State," Los Angeles Times Special Edition (6 April
1993), H5.
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Iranian assistance has taken the form of financing, equipping,
offering training locations, and offering refuge from extradition. In
the case of Hizballah and Hamas, Iranian support totals tens of
millions of dollars in direct subsidies each year. Tehran also
continues to target Iranian dissident's abroad."
Ambassador Sheehan went on to add that two official Iranian government
organizations, the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and
Security, have "institutionalized the use of terrorism as an instrument of policy over the
past two decades. These two government organs have long-standing ties to the terrorist
groups I mentioned earlier, among others, and they appear determined to maintain these
relationships regardless of statements to the contrary from some of Iran's political
leaders."
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Although Iran continues to supports rejectionist groups opposed to the Arab-
Israeli peace process, the Khatami administration as recently as June 1999 stated that if
the Palestinians accepted the peace process and the existence of Israel, Iran would do the
same.
288
But Iran's regional neighbors continue to be suspicious. Sunni rulers in the
Gulf have always been jittery about Iran's authority over their sizable Shi'ite minorities.
These Shi'ites trace their origin to Iran or perceive Iran as a religious center. Today Arab
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B. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
The Iran-Iraq War began with Iraq's invasion of Iran's oil-rich Shatt-al-Arab
region along the northeast coast of the Persian Gulf. The heavy revolutionary rhetoric of
the new Islamic Republic is as much to blame for provoking Iraq's military invasion as
was Saddam Huessein's greed and resource envy. It was a long and bloody conflict that
was, at first, spearheaded from the Iranian side by the zealots of the Pasdaran. 290 Their
"human wave" tactics, although initially effective in stopping Iraqi advances, cost the
nation hundreds of thousands of their young men. 291 Several Western and Arab powers
actively supported Iraq with sales of weapons and equipment while Iran was isolated.
Although some support came from the People's Republic of China and North Korea, it
did not help Iran's more crucial needs of spare parts and ammunition for its
predominantly US-made inventory inherited from the deposed Shah." "So while the new
revolutionary government was outwardly hostile to both the US and Israel, its leaders
knew they ultimately needed to acquire replenishments for their US equipment if the war
was a prolonged conflict. This is when the Israelis made contact with their proposal to
assist in some arms sales which would later come to be known in the US as the Iran-
Contra Affair and a more pragmatic Iran came out from behind it's ideological dogma.
1. Iran-Contra Affair
Following the victory of Iran's revolutionaries, Israeli officials became
increasingly concerned with the both the biting rhetoric from the Ayatollah Khomeini and
the status of the small, indigenous Jewish-Iranian population in the new Islamic Republic.
Moreover, the Israelis were anxious to undercut Iraq, who they saw as a potential Arab
adversary. It was from this direction that Israel began to seek out, through clandestine
communications, a dialogue with Tehran and an offer to help them in their war effort.
Contrary to the public, ideological rhetoric of the mullahs, Tehran demonstrated great
290
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, as a true neorealist state should. Israel promised to seek the spare parts,
equipment, and ammunition the besieged Iranians needed to fend off the reconstituting
Iraqi military from the US.
In early July 1985, Israel presented to the US government the first of three
consecutive requests regarding American-Iranian relations, submitted to National
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane by David Kimche, director of Israel's Foreign
Ministry.
29
"Kimche informed him that Iranian officials had conveyed to Israel their
interest in a discourse with the US and that, to prove their bona fides, they were willing to
influence the Hezbollah in Lebanon to release American hostages in Beirut."294
McFarlane also found that the Iranians would expect some benefits for themselves from
such dialogue, probably in the form of weapons. A second Israeli request arrived in mid-
July by Premier Peres through his consultant and special emissary, Adolph Schwimmer,
who was an international arms dealer. 29 It was here that "the hook" was presented to
President Reagan's National Security team. "Schwimmer informed McFarlane of a recent
contact with the Iranians through another go-between, Manuchehr Ghorbanifar (an
Iranian arms merchant), who had been told that Iran could obtain the release of the seven
Americans captured in Lebanon in exchange for 100 Tube Launched, Optically Tracked,
Wire Guided (TOW) missiles from Israel."29
McFarlane knew that Reagan was anxious to find some way of gaining the
freedom of American hostages in Lebanon and promptly cabled Secretary of State
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Schultz (then on a trip in Asia) telling him of this proposal. 297 In response, Shultz
consented to "a tentative show of interest without commitment" from the US to the
Israelis and Iranians. 29 ! Both McFarlane and Donald Regan, White House chief of staff,
later testified that the President encouraged them to "go ahead" and "open it up."299 A
third Israeli request arrived on 3 August 1985, when Kimche again visited McFarlane in
Washington. Israel's proposal was essentially a repetition of the earlier request for an
exchange of 100 TOWS for the seven hostages, but with a plea that the US agree to
replace the missiles thus sold by Israel to Iran. McFarlane discussed this proposal with
Reagan and the members of the National Security Council (NSC).300
Although Shultz and Weinberger opposed the idea of an arms-for-hostages swap,
President Reagan gave his approval for the deal, provided that: (1) only modest amounts
of arms would be transferred to Iran; (2) the arms would not drastically change the
military balance; and (3) the arms would not include major weapons systems. 301
Furthermore, President Reagan—undoubtedly with the backdrop of the Cold War in
mind—also indicated he wanted Tehran to know of US desires for a renewed political
relationship. Author Samuel Segev indicates: "On 30 August 1985, Israel transferred 100
TOWS to Iran, 302 followed by a delivery of another 408 TOWS on September 14, 1985.
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It was not until 3 November 1986, that news of the arms dealing between the US,
Israel, and Iran got out by way of the Lebanese weekly As Shiraa. 304 Rafsanjani, then
Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Armed Forces, scrambled to preempt domestic
fallout from the revelation by arguing that Iran's war effort against Iraq demanded
weapons from any source. 305 Although popular response was extremely negative—citing
that the needs of the state should never transcend the principles of Islam—Khomeini, as
the faqih, both knew of and sanctioned contact with the US and Israel. 306 Likewise, he
never silenced Rafsanjani' s repeated offers to assist in gaining the release of American
hostages in Beirut. In neorealist fashion, both Khomeini and Rafsanjani understood that
state survival and potential victory required these weapons. What is most significant
about these series of events as they relate to this discussion, however, is not the weapons
themselves or the ramifications the affair had on US domestic politics when the deal was
revealed, but rather, it was the stark fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Supreme
Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, agreed to do business with the Zionist entity and
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Equally remarkable, the US government opened a secret channel for selling arms to Iran in 1985,
even as it urged other governments to stop all military sales to the country. US motives seemed designed
partly to induce pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon to release Americans held captive there, and partly to
improve relations with Iran.
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In more recent related developments, indicatative of Iran's true pragmatic colors,
the Israeli newspaper Haaretz on 20 June 1999, published a report claiming that Iranian
President Khatami had sought Britain's help in mediating disarmament talks between Iran
and Israel. Although Iran's foreign ministry blasted the report the next day and its release
would seem doomed not only to sink the talks, but also to seal the fates of 13 Iranian
Jews about to go on trial in Iran on allegations of spying for Israel and the US. However,
the decision to release details of back channel Iran-Israel negotiations may be a warning
to Iran's hard-liners that Israel is willing to release details of 20 years of such talks
—
dossiers that could ruin more than a few of Iran's great Islamic revolutionaries.
Moreover, in Iran-Contra, Israel supplied the weapons destined for Iran. The Haaretz
article was a shot across the bow of any Iranian official who believed Israel had any need
to conceal and maintain its secret links to Iran more than Iran needs to conceal and
maintain those same links. Should Israel choose to publish a chronicle of back channel
relations with Iran, there are a host of great Islamic revolutionaries who stand to lose a
great deal. More than just 13 Jews could hang for the stories Haaretz could publish. And
while Israel was willing to publicly blow a minor peripheral back channel negotiation
with Khatami to make its point to the hard liners, Khatami would only stand to gain
should Israel choose to release a more complete expose, as it would not only sink his foes
but also paint Iran historically in a more moderate light.
Thus, Iran's political and regional isolation, as well as its economic debilitation,
explains a great deal about its foreign policy orientations and formulation. This results
not only from the prolonged and costly conflict with Iraq, a country that is itself isolated,
but also because of Tehran's purposefully hostile and aggressive policy towards the
member states of the GCC. There are several explanations for this antagonism. These
include the fundamentally pro-Western and specifically pro-US orientation of the GCC
states,
30)
the ideological factors that do not automatically divide the Persian, Shi'a
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Islamic state from its primarily Arab, Sunni political neighbors but that do help to
exacerbate the already deep political divisions between them, and the profound
disagreement among these regional states about the definitions and implications of Gulf
security strategy. To balance these conflicting ties, Iran has made a concerted effort to
improve relations with its non-Arab neighbors to the north, east, and west. Thus, it has
worked assiduously with neighbors like Turkey, Pakistan, and Syria to countervail its
insecure Arab borders to the south.310
2. Iran-Iraq War Cease-Fire
The Ayatollah Khomeini himself made a similar neorealist choice when he
decided to accept the cease-fire with Baghdad, despite the years of ideological rhetoric he
had delivered declaring that the war would never end until "Hussein was deposed and
Iraq in ruins."
311
In 1987, Iran's leaders prepared for what they hoped to be a last round
of offensives designed to end the war and topple the Iraqi government. As the situation
became steadily graver, international concern mounted. In July the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 598, calling for both sides to stop fighting, withdraw to the pre-war
border, and submit to an objective international body to determine responsibility for the
war. Iraq seized on the resolution, but Iran refused to end hostilities with victory so near.
Iran continued its attacks but did not achieve the victory for which it had hoped. By
1988, Iraq, sufficiently rearmed and regrouped, drove the Iranians out of Al Faw and
several other border areas. Iran was in no position to launch a counterattack, and the
international situation seemed increasingly favorable to Iraq. Finally, many Iranian
leaders, acknowledging the futility in further warfare, worked to persuade Khomeini to
accept Resolution 598.312 Although the resolution failed to provide key Iranian aims
—
such as an end to Hussein's government, payment of reparations, or clear identification of
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Iraq as the initiator of the war—Khomeini endorsed the cease-fire in July. On August 20,
1988, both sides ceased fighting in accordance with the terms of Resolution 598.
C. THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT FROM ISRAEL
Two themes emerge from a review of statements by top regime leaders over the
past ten years of the threats facing the Islamic Republic: they fear, or claim they fear, an
attack by the US, or an attack by Israel; or some conspiratorial combination of the two.
From the Iranian perspective, this is not without some basis: the US has been
bombarding, almost daily, various military targets in Iraq, Iran's neighboring state, since
the mid-1990s. Operation Desert Storm was a sobering experience for Iranian leaders.
Iran had just emerged from being roundly defeated by Saddam Hussein; and here, an
even stronger Saddam was ripped to shreds by the US military, which fielded weapons
previously, unimagined by anyone in the region. If the Americans could do that to Iraq,
what could not they do to Iran? 314
Likewise, Israel has directly threatened Iran as well in recent years. In 1997,
Israel reportedly was planning an attack on Iran's nuclear installations once it received
new, long-ranged F-151 aircraft from the US. 315 The $85 million US-built F-151 can
deliver a heavy weapon load at low level over very long distances, advertising
pinpoint accuracy. The twenty-five F-151's ordered by Israel would give it the
capability to fly under the radar detection envelope and strike all the Arab states,
including Iran. In fact, refueled by air, the F-151 can easily reach as far as Pakistan,
or deep into Russia, to deliver its payload. If just having this capability was not
313
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enough to catch the attention of the Iranian leadership, Israel also publicly declared
that it would use such an aircraft to bomb Iran's fledgling nuclear installations.
Although, many analysts chalked-up these Israeli threats as calculated to give the
embattled former Israeli President Netanyahu a badly-needed political boost, as well
as, a ploy to divert attention away from the then foundering Peace Process, for Iran it
stood as another confirmation that its paranoia was not unwarranted. And if the F-
151s were delivered from the US, it would be confirmation that Israel was nothing
more than a client state of the US ready to do its bidding.
What this demonstrates is the Islamic Republic of Iran has a very broad view of
strategic defense, encompassing policies (such as terrorism), considered beyond the pale
in the West. Planning a terrorist attack, such as the Khobar Towers bombing, is far less
expensive and ultimately less dangerous for Iran, than spending billions of dollars for
new offensive weapons and actually using them against the US or Israel. Terrorism
provides Iran with a cheap deterrent and the ultimate in deniability. Despite a great deal
of evidence, including eye-witness reports and the arrest of at least one member of the
terrorist group that carried out the Dhahran bombing and admitted to having been trained
in Iran, the Clinton administration has failed to take any retaliatory measures against the
Islamic Republic.
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At the same time, Iran began development of the Shahab-3, receiving extensive
technical assistance from North Korea, China, and increasingly from Russia, which
became Iran's main technology partner. Several journalists report the Shahab-3 to be a
derivative of the 1,000-1,300 kilometer range North Korean Nodong-1 missile, well
within reach of targets in Israel. 319 Although there have been conflicting reports as to
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whether Iran actually obtained this technology, journalists and experts agree that Tehran
is researching the ability to field such a weapon 320
It is these strategic maneuvers by Tel Aviv, which persuade Iran's leaders that
they have justification in their concerns of Israel as a national threat. They claim Israel
wants to overthrow their regime, and destroy their society or, failing that, the leadership
in Tehran claims that Israel is secretly plotting to attack Iran with nuclear weapons.
Islamic Republic leaders have consistently used Israel as an excuse for their own special
weapons projects. They have waged a persistent war of terrorism against Israel,
including direct attacks—such as the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in
1992—and indirect attacks against Israeli citizens carried out by Iranian proxies such as
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. "Analysts have observed that
attitudes toward Israel among Islamic Republic leaders lie somewhere between paranoia
and total hysteria." 321
For example, recent statements' concerning the Shahab-3 missile reveals that Iran
developed this missile specifically to deter Israel, not Iran's neighbors, " illustrating yet
another example of Iran's neorealist approach. With this tactic Iran also seeks to drive a
wedge between the Arab states and the U.S. by drawing a positive balance of power with
its Arab neighbors by taking up the "anti-Zionist" battle standard. Support for this is
found in a commentary published shortly after the July 1998 test of the Shahab-3, where
Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said the Shahab-3 "missile was aimed firmly at a hostile
FAS delivery of the Shahab-3 was slated to occur in 1993 but was halted due to American pressure on
North Korea. However, FAS, citing Israeli press reports, contends there were deliveries of the Shahab-3
made to Iran after 1993 and that Tehran has been conducting tests of the technology.
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Clearly Iran worried about the balance of power and tension among its Arab neighbors and sought




Furthermore, he wrote that "[a]t least in the mid-term the neighboring
countries do not pose any threat." 324 Instead, said Shamkhani, Iran was worried about
"the nuclear capability of the Zionist regime."
32 Two days later, Judiciary Chief
Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, in clear reference to Israel, " called the Shahab-3 a
"strategic weapon meant to guarantee the defense of the nation in face of any external
threat" which was intended to "strengthen the defense of the Islamic world against any
possible threat... (and) creating a military balance in the world."3 7 However, the clearest
expression of Iran's intention for this weapon was at the 25 September 1998 military
parade in Tehran, when the Shahab-3 was first put on public display, draped with English
and Farsi-language banners that said: "Israel must be wiped off the map." 3 l In an
interview after the parade, Defense Minister Shamkhani was even more explicit: "We
have written on the warhead of the Shahab-3 that this will not land in any Islamic
country," he told reporters. "Of course this program will be pursued and we will have the
Shahab-4 and even the Shahab-5 to respond to our defense needs."329
Does this attitude continue to pervade Iranian national security thought even
under the popularly mandated moderate President Khatami? Former US National
Security Council staff advisor and Middle East expert Gary G. Sick observed during the
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question and answer period of a recent Department of State (DoS) press conference
following a speech by Secretary Madeline Albright:
[A] gentleman from the audience asked the panel members to
comment on groups in the US who could be opposed to a
normalization of ties between the Iran and the US, specifically
naming AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) as the
leading example. The question was met with deafening silence. Not
a single panel member took upon himself to say a word. This is
nothing short of a testament to Israel's deep influence and power in
Washington D.C., and very sad that even those from academia
perhaps feel uncomfortable to tackle this "ghost at the table" of Iran-
US relations—as if such discussions are taboo or could adversely
impact their stature or reputation.
It is instances like this that further feed Iranian perceptions that there is an
alleged fusion of foreign policy objectives between the US and Israel, which ultimately
threaten Iran.
D. IRAN AND THE PEACE PROCESS
There is no ambiguity regarding Iran's political hostility to Israel. The Iranian
regime has issued many statements that effectively deny Israel's right to exist. Iran has
been a vehement opponent of the Israel-PLO peace settlement, and some leading Iranian
religious and political figures have called for the use of armed violence to prevent it.
One of the very first acts of the provisional government was to condemn the quasi-
diplomatic Iranian-Israeli relationship fostered by the Shah and to turn over the former
Israeli mission in Tehran to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). All trade with
Israel was banned, especially the sale of oil. Iranian leaders contended that Israel's
existence was illegitimate, because it came about because of the destruction of Palestine.
Therefore, Iran advocated eradicating Israel, reconstituting Palestine, and denouncing as
30
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traitors those Arabs who advocated compromise with Israel, such as Egypt's Anwar
Sadat.
332
In October 1991, Iran sponsored an "International Conference to Support the
Islamic Revolution in Palestine" that included representatives of Hamas, the Hezbollah,
PFLP-GC, and Abu-Musa. All of the groups have been associated with terrorist violence.
Iranian officials have held high-level meetings with Palestinian extremist groups in
Damascus and hosted other meetings of the Hezbollah and Hamas in Iran. Several of
these groups—including Hamas and Islamic Jihad—made statements acknowledging
Iranian funding in 1993.333
1. The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Iran
Iran has strongly opposed each step forward in the peace process. Iranian radio
referred to the Gaza-Jericho agreement between Israel and the PLO as "a stain of shame"
and "unprecedented treachery." 334 On 1 1 February 1995, Iranians, marching at a rally in
Tehran's Azadi Square marking the sixteenth anniversary of the overthrow of the Shah,
chanted slogans like "death to America" and "death to Israel." President Rafsanjani
reinforced this sentiment with a speech acknowledging Iran's encouragement of anti-
Israeli, Palestinian, and Lebanese groups. Iran vehemently attacked the Palestinian
elections in January 1996 and charged that only one in fifteen Palestinians had voted. It
claimed that Arafat's victory in the elections was a fraud that did nothing more than
"demonstrate the legitimacy of the combatant groups among the people of Palestine."335
Iran also seems to have encouraged Hamas and Islamic Jihad to execute the wave
of bombings that took place in the months before the Israeli election in May 1996.
Concurrently, Iran stepped up its arms shipments to the Hezbollah during the months
32
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preceding the Israeli election-cycle. For example, discovered at the Belgian port of
Antwerp in March 1996 was a major shipment of arms and explosives destined for
Iranian terrorists based in Germany for use against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe.
Iran views Hezbollah as its spearhead in the battle against Israel. 336 According to analysts
at the commercial intelligence analysis company STRATFOR, reliable reports indicate
that since April 1996, thirty Iranian planes loaded with ammunition and weapons have
landed at Damascus airport. Their cargo, which included SAGGER337 anti-tank missiles,
long range Katyusha 338rockets and high explosive anti-tank mines, was subsequently
transferred to Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. 3 Tehran reportedly sent ten
flights worth of arms in the 45 days before the Hezbollah began a major series of rocket
attacks on Israel in April 1996.
4
Further, Iran provided the Hezbollah with some 500-
900 additional Russian-made Katyushas. Iran almost certainly encouraged the wave of
Hezbollah rocket attacks on Northern Israel that helped lead to a major Israeli
confrontation with Lebanon in early May 1996 and international rebuke on Tel Aviv. It
is likely that the timing for these attacks was to both delay peace negotiations between
Israel and the PLO and to try to influence Israeli public opinion to vote for the Likud,
rather than the Labor Party. 341
Other support Iran is alleged to provide is financial funds and training. Of
particular note, Iran was instrumental in the founding of Hezbollah and continues to fund
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its operations at a level of approximately US$80 million per year, which is to be
increased in 1997 to US$100 million. Furthermore, according to public reports
Hezbollah terrorists receive training at Iranian military installations with Teheran
maintaining close contact with the Hezbollah hierarchy through its embassy in Beirut. 342
According to Cordesman, then Iranian Vice President Hassan Habibi, met in the
Iranian Embassy in Syria with representatives from several prominent terrorist
organizations in the Levant.
343
Further, Hussein Sheikhoeslam,344 an official in the
Iranian Foreign Ministry, accompanied Habibi and one of the men responsible for taking
hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, to the meeting, which likely provided
money to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Hezbollah. Following this meeting
Sheikhoeslam declared publicly, "The Islamic Revolution is in for a glorious
future... (t)here is no peaceful solution. The Israelis must return to the countries they
came from."345
More moderate Iranians, however, have argued that Iran should do nothing to
hinder the peace process, allowing it to collapse under its own contradictions. President
Rafsanjani has said that while Iran does not support the peace process it will do nothing
to undermine it: "Practically speaking, we do not take any action against the peace plan.
When we see this whole process is unjust, we state our opposition as a matter of
principle. But if the content of the peace plan is just, the substance is just, we shall go
along with it."346
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Official statements by then Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati similarly support
a possible shifting in the Iranian position:
We do not believe that the recent developments (Arab-Israeli
negotiations) are progressing in this direction (establishing peace).
There are conditions, and perhaps desires and objectives, promoted
by the Zionist regime. According to this Zionist desire, if Israel fails
to control the region by maintaining it occupation of the Arab
territory under the well known international conditions and
circumstances, it will seek to control the region by controlling
economy and culture in the Arab and Muslim states...We believe
that there is an Arab and Islamic determination to resist it. My
explanation for this issue is based on my conviction that there is no
similarity or harmony between the Zionist state and other states in
the region, particularly if we remember Israel's history which is
replete with crime, aggression and the occupation of territory. 347
These statements, however, are often contradictory. Iranian President Rafsanjani
also declared in February 1996 that the Arab-Israeli peace process posed a "great danger
to the Palestinian cause," and added that the "Islamic Republic of Iran, with its immense
resources, possibilities and facilities and revolutionary spirit, is the staunch supporter of
the Palestinian cause." The Iranian government and media welcomed the attacks Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah made on Israel in 1996 and the devastating suicide
bombings of February-March 1996 as divine retribution. Why take this contradictory
stance? Indeed, Iran has been a pendulum of signals to the West regarding Israel in
recent years.
Iran has strongly objected to the new contacts between Israel and moderate Arab
states like Morocco and Oman. When Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited
Oman, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry stated that, "Allowing occupiers to
get a foothold in the region not only paves the way for the Zionist regime to come out of




of Moslems... (It is) detrimental to the unity of Moslem nations and the region's peace
and security."34
In a similar vein, concerning the Arab-Israeli peace process since Oslo, Iran has
shown that it remains committed to the proposition that Israel has no right to exist and
that its destruction is a desideratum. The following statements, coming from the highest
levels of authority in Teheran, give evidence of the ideological obsession, which Iran has
with Israel's very existence:
The government and people of Iran are of the opinion that the Israeli
entity is false and artificial. In fact there is no nation named
'Israel'...The Zionists scraped together some people from all over
the world and, based only on racism, brought about the Zionist
regime by virtue of the conquest of Palestine;349 [and] The power of
Islam will ultimately bring about the end of the usurpatory and
rootless Zionist regime, which has forced its presence upon
Palestinian land and which must be destroyed; 350 [finally,] When
others talk about liberating Palestine they mean the 'annexed'
territories of 1967, we mean all Palestinian Land... Iran is the only
country which is opposed to the basic existence of Israel. 351
2. Terrorism and the Peace Process
Since President Khatami's election in 1997, several senior officials have
condemned terrorism. In November 1997, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi condemned
a terrorist attack on tourists by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood; while in early January
1998, Foreign Ministery spokesman, Mahmoud Mohammadi, condemned attacks on
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civilians, including Israelis, in his January CNN message to the American people.
Khatami stated, "Any form of killing of innocent men and women who are not involved
in confrontation is terrorism" and that "terrorism should be condemned in all its
-icy
forms." " These all reflect positive steps on the part of Iran's leadership in the eyes of
the West. However, despite these positive public statements, Iran continues to support
groups engaged in terrorism and to assassinate opponents of the clerical regime. Iran is
still heavily involved in state supported terrorism: it still funds, trains, and arms groups
that engage in terrorism; senior Iranian officials continue meeting with representatives of
terrorist groups such as Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah; Iranian intelligence
continues to stalk American personnel in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, and Tajikistan, to gain
information that would be needed for terrorist attacks on Americans; and Tehran
continues to attack opponents of the regime.
354
3. Iran's Opposition to the Peace Process
Not even the supposedly reform-minded Khatami has been willing to mention
possible relations with Israel. In his famous "Dialogue of Civilizations" speech, Khatami
singled out the "Zionist regime" as the only state Iran would not recognize. Some of
Iran's harshest vitriol toward Israel comes on Jerusalem Day, the last Friday in Ramadan,
when Iran sponsors demonstrations, both domestic and abroad, calling for Jerusalem's
liberation. In 1998, former Iranian president Rafsanjani, declared in his Jerusalem Day
speech, "The crimes that the Zionists committed were far greater compared to those of
Hitler."
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from a neorealist perspective it makes sense. Iran continues to see Israel as both a direct
threat and as a foil of American policy in the Middle East and therefore continues to
posture against Zionism in supporting the Palestinian cause.
In the days after the restart of Syrian-Israeli talks on 6 December 1999, the
Iranian press was mute, but it has since taken an increasingly hostile stance. On 31
December, Majlis Speaker 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri called for "wiping Israel off the world
map" and Supreme Leader Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i called for the "annihilation" of
Israel. In a clear criticism of Syria for negotiating with Israel, Khamene'i said, "I don't
want to cite the one-time revolutionary nations by name . . . but any negotiation with the
Zionist regime amounts to treason."358
E. BALANCE OF POWER QUESTIONS
Ideologically, secular Turkey and Islamist Iran are polar opposites. Naturally,
each sees the other as an unwelcome example and source of inspiration to subversives
within its own society. Whereas Turkish officials are convinced, Iran has emerged as the
region's leading supporter of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), even while continuing
its long-time support to Islamist movements within Turkey. 359 Turkish officials reported
believe that Iran provides the PKK with weapons, training, and funds, and that it hosts up
to fifty PKK camps. Ankara recently claimed, "After Syria halted its support of the PKK
to a certain extent, Iran took over Syria's role [as the PKK's leading state supporter]."
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during the war with Iran.
57
Rubin, Michael "Europe's Critical Dialogue With Iran: An Assessment," PolicyWatch, Number 43
(10 January 2000), on the internet at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/
policywatch2000/433.htm [Accessed on 21 February 2000].
358
Ibid.
>9 The Turks now reject the notion that PKK cross-border activity is strictly the result of Iran's
inability to control its border—Tehran's traditional explanation—though some Turkish officials privately
blame the hostile action strictly on Iranian hardliners acting independently, rather than on the government
of President Muhammad Khatami.
360 Makovsky, Internet.
107
In similar fashion compared with Israel, Iran generally sees Turkey as a pro-US,
and now pro-Israeli, regional rival of growing strength—in short, as an agent and
potential launching pad for its enemies/61 The Iranians particularly object to a 1996
Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement that allows Israeli jets to exercise in
Turkish airspace four times a year. Iran's concerns that Turkey has brought the once-
distant Israeli enemy to the edge of the Iranian border were fanned by numerous press























Figure 4. Iran once felt removed from a direct Israeli threat 362
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As Figure 4 shows. Iran once felt some level of comfort with the buffering states
of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia between Iranian borders and Israel.
Today the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel has created a new-
vulnerability to Iranian security. Figure 5 graphically depicts a scenario wherein the
Israelis gain compliance with their new Turkish allies to initiate air strikes against the
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Figure 5. Iranian perceptions of vulnerability to Israeli attack.363
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Moreover, Tehran also suspects Turkey of subversion. It accuses Ankara of
giving refuge to members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, opponents of the Iranian regime.
(This is not quite the mirror image of Turkey's accusations about Iranian support for the
PKK, as Iran does not claim that the group uses Turkish territory to attack Iran.) Tehran
also probably worries that Ankara seeks to subvert the Islamic Republic's large Turkic-
language-speaking Azeri minority, which constitutes some one-fourth of Iran's
population.
364
As for Syria, it has been a principal ally to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the
Middle East since 1982, involving both political and economic ties. At the time of this de
facto alliance formation, Iran supported the government of Hafiz al Assad against the
Muslim Brotherhood, which had risen in rebellion against the secularizing policies of the
ruling Ba'ath Party. Iran's backing of the Syrian government was significant because the
Muslim Brotherhood was the first Islamic political group to claim the Iranian Revolution
as the primary inspiration for its rebellion. Soon after the crushing of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Damascus shut down the pipeline through which Iraqi oil crossed Syria to
reach Mediterranean ports. This action against another Arab state, ruled by the Ba'ath
party, was an important gesture in support of the Iranian war effort. The action was also a
hostile blow against Iraq because of the blockade of Iraq's Persian Gulf ports since the
beginning of the war, and the only other exit route for its oil exports was through a
smaller pipeline traversing Turkey. Iran had agreed to provide Syria 20,000 barrels of oil
per day free of charge as compensation for the transit fees Syria would lose by closing the
pipeline. Iran also agreed to sell Syria additional oil it required, at a heavily discounted
price. In 1987, this agreement was again renewed. Syria also provided Iran arms from its
own stock of Soviet- and East European-made weapons.
Recent diplomatic revelations concerning the potential for the signing of a
bilateral peace treaty between Syria and Turkey seems to have caught Tehran off guard.
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Likewise, Tehran views with great concern Syria's apparent readiness to end its state of
war with Israel. Over the past decade, this relationship has been more political than
material, built upon intelligence cooperation; mutual antipathy toward Iraq, Israel,
Turkey, and the more moderate Arab states; and support for terrorist groups like
Hezbollah. Cooperation in intelligence and security is especially strong. The most active
aspect of Iran-Syria relations has been support for Hezbollah and other terrorist groups.
The Israeli paper Yediot Ahronot reports that Prince Bashar, Assad's son and designated
heir, to be heading soon to Tehran to soothe Iran. Recent meetings between Iran's and
Hezbollah's leaderships and strong signals in Iran's press against the Syria-Israel peace
process suggest that Tehran is preparing to step up its anti-peace process action.367
1. Hezbollah and Iran's Involvement in Lebanon
The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon fuelled the Ayatollah Khomeini's
interest in supporting the PLO. He condemned the "deathly silence" of the Arab states
that failed to come to the aid of the besieged Palestinians and called for their use of the
oil weapon to pressure the West to condemn Israel. The struggle against Israel, Tehran
proclaimed had to be "Islamized," that is, extended to embrace the whole Muslim world.
According to Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Majlis, achieving the eradication of the
"Zionist regime" could only be done by massing all the capabilities of the Islamic world,
primarily Iran, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. In December 1979, Iran had dispatched some
200-300 "volunteers" to join their "Palestinian brothers" in fighting against Israel in
southern Lebanon. Following a protest by the then Lebanese President Sarkis, Syrian
President Assad sent them to one of Fatah 's military camps some 15 miles from
Damascus, and promised that they would never be permitted to enter southern
Lebanon. In September 1981, Khomeini had created the Supreme Council of the
366
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Islamic Revolution, a body supervising terrorist operations. Recruiting men from Shi'a
communities throughout the world, he brought them to Iran for indoctrination and
training in the nine boot camps in Iran, and formed them into the Islamic Revolutionary
Movement. Hezbollah's primary backer is Iran, from which it receives money and
weapons, much of it channeled through Damascus, which is host to numerous terrorist
organizations' headquarters and has twice-weekly Iran Air service to Tehran. The key
issues in gauging the effect of peace talks on the Syrian-Iranian relationship will be the
level of Hezbollah terrorism during the peace talks, the constraints placed by Syria on
Iranian access to Hezbollah, and the extent of Iranian efforts to circumvent Syria in
supplying Hezbollah. 370
Since 1990, the Iranian financed Hezbollah has dramatically increased the tempo
of military operations against Israeli and SLA units operating in the "security zone". By
these operations, Hezbollah seeks to force a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the zone,
while improving its standing among Lebanon's Shiites at the expense of its main rival,
Amal. Hezbollah carried out 19 attacks on Israel and South Lebanon Army (SLA)
personnel in the zone in 1990, 52 attacks in 1991 (eclipsing Amal in the process), 63
attacks in 1992, 158 attacks in 1993 (not including Operation Accountability), 187
attacks in 1994, and 344 attacks in 1995. Thus, hardly a day went by last year in which
Hezbollah did not attack Israeli and SLA personnel. Out of the 344 attacks in 1995, there
were 270 incidents of artillery fire (usually involving long-range small arms, mortar,
Katyusha, and antitank missile fire), 64 roadside bombings (both suicide and remotely
controlled), and two infantry assaults. Hezbollah has also conducted terrorist operations
against Israeli targets abroad; in March 1992, for example, a Hezbollah car bomb blew up
the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (killing 30) in retaliation for the assassination of
Hezbollah leader Abbas Musawi several weeks earlier. Underscoring Syria's role in
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supporting Hezbollah's rearmament since April's Grapes of Wrath operation by Israel,
Hezbollah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Fadlallah said on 13 December: "Syrian President
Hafez al-Assad assumed a firm and responsible stand on the side of the [Islamic]
resistance; if it were not for [al-Assad's support], Israel's agents would have ...
destroyed] the resistance."
2. Iran's Possible Future Actions
If one extends systematic power balancing explanations to a wider global setting,
the Syrian-Iranian alliance might be rooted in a shared interest in deflecting US
hegemony over the region. At a regional level itself, this could take the form of
balancing the pro-Western axis in the Middle East, which currently includes regimes such
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This seemingly permanent by-product of the exceptional
penetration of the Middle East subsystem naturally tends to generate its own
• • 373
opposition.
Of course, geopolitics does not fully determine alliances, and where it leaves
some choice of alliances, domestic factors are likely to become more important. For
example, for Iran under the Shah, an Israeli alliance was an alternative to balance against
the radical secular states of Iraq and Syria in the 1960s and 1970s. Conversely, the new
Islamic Republic of Iran replaced its Israeli alliance with a Syrian one, making it appear
that the new regime's policies were ideology determinative.374 Anti-imperialism, in the
sense of opposition to the regional dominance of the global superpowers and their
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regional surrogates, is one of two major roots of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Although
cautious at first, by the early 1980s, bringing Iran and Syria closer together because of
shared threats from "imperialist" forces; however, Iraq's invasion in 1980 both isolated
and mortally threatened Iran. Likewise, Syria felt increasingly threatened with the loss of
its alliance with Egypt against Israel following the Camp David Peace Accords.375
Mixed rhetoric from Iran has met the Arab-Israeli peace process to date. Tehran
is likely to see movement on this issue as a threat to its current power balance. 376 An
Arab-Israeli peace settlement could precipitate bandwagoning377 in which all states align
against Iran, leaving the Republics national security strategy in shambles. It is for this
reason that Iranian policy has seemed torn between ideological opposition to the peace
agreement and the need to preserve its alliance with Syria to avoid further international
and regional isolation. Both Rafsanjani and Khomene'i chose to mute any opposition
they had to the peace process at this time to avoid further labeling as a pariah state and
excluded from regional economic and security ties. The practical fact that Iran could
actually do very little, beyond rhetoric and some financial aid to Islamist groups, as long
as Syria was unready to back-out of the peace process had no doubt encouraged this
restraint. Several militant Islamist groups feared the peace process would end in the
surrender of Palestinian rights. However, at the time Rafsanjani was apparently willing
to risk accusations of being "soft on Israel" among his domestic audience to fulfill the
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Why is Iran worried? A successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict which
achieves Palestinian rights and recovery of some lost Arab territory would give all
concerned (except Iran) an interest in the stability of this new Middle East structure. That
is why the Oslo accord revived Iranian alarm over the direction of the peace process in
1990. To confront Oslo, Iran reputedly urged Syria to pull out of the peace talks and
escalate the resistance in southern Lebanon. Iran would fund the creation of a Lebanese-
Palestinian Islamic front there to militarily challenge the accord. Tehran even went so far
as to approve sending heavy weapons to Hezbollah; however, Syria rejected this and
blocked the transit of the weapons. Unfortunately, given both the Islamic Republic's
rhetoric and the power-grip of radicals, there is little optimism that Iran's relations with
Israel will thaw in the event of Syria-Israel peace. Even after any future Israeli-
Palestinian deal, an Iranian detente with Israel will move at a glacial pace, if at all.
a. Iran Could Do Nothing
In the wake of the announcement of the resumption of Israel-Syria
talks, Iran's media, showing restraint, reported the minimum, and offered little
commentary. Although Iran might oppose Middle East peace in principle, it could choose
not to pose obstacles to its path. In part because of their common religion with many
Palestinians, Iranians are generally sympathetic to the Palestinians. According to
conversations on the streets of Tehran and provincial capitals, however, the Palestinian
question is not at the forefront of their concern. Indeed, Iranians have in common with
Israelis the fact that almost every person has a family member or close friend who died in
a war with an Arab state. On 18 November 1999, the moderate Iran News called for a
wait-and-see attitude, voicing the dilemma that while some think "that peace with the
Zionists is unthinkable and Palestinian combatants must be supported all the way," others
feel that if the Islamic world and the majority of Palestinians make peace, than Iran
should follow. Although some candidates for the 18 February 2000 parliamentary
elections may hold such a view, they are unlikely to express this opinion openly—an act
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that would only embolden hardliners and the Council of Guardians, which vets and
disqualifies candidates it considers too moderate. 380
b. Iran Could Derail the Process
Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has used its vitriol toward "the Zionist
Entity" to deflect attention from its own internal woes and to stake a claim to leadership
of the Islamic world. Indeed, Iran currently holds the three-year chair of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference. 381 On 18 December 1999, the pro-Khamene'i, pro-intelligence
services Jwnhuri-yi Islami castigated Damascus, declaring that "Syria . . . has recognized
the sinister and illegitimate existence of the occupiers of Palestine."382 Ominously,
during his Friday sermon on 17 December 1999, Khamene'i himself threatened, "We will
catch by the scruff of the neck those defending the betrayal of the Palestinian people." 383
Even if Iran chooses not to act against Syria, there are signs it may indeed choose to
heighten its violent opposition to the peace process. In Lebanon, Iranian officials
allegedly train operatives from Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Israel reports some Hamas
members killed have been among those in recent clashes in southern Lebanon. This
coordination could lead to new fronts in anti-peace-process terrorism. 384
F. SUMMARY
In summary, while it is not yet clear whether the operation will jumpstart Israeli-
Syrian negotiations—as envisioned in the "understanding" negotiated by former US
Secretary of State Warren Christopher—its impact on Hezbollah is more straightforward.
Despite its claims of victory, Hezbollah remains constrained by various cross-pressures
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that will prevent it from extracting any major advantage from Israel's Grapes of Wrath
operation and that will compel it to act with caution in the coming days.
Undoubtedly, Hezbollah would like to resume daily operations in the security
zone to demonstrate that it retains its powers of resistance, as the attack on the SLA
outpost indicates. Almost certainly, Iran will push these Islamic militants in this
direction; however, Hezbollah is surely being asked to act with restraint by the thousands
of refugees streaming back into southern Lebanon, so as not to bring additional harm to
one of its main constituencies. Most importantly, Syria—the dominant power in
Lebanon—may also be urging a temporary respite, although Damascus is likely to see
advantages in permitting operations to resume before Israeli-Syrian negotiations
reconvene. Moreover, the ground-swell of popular support for the organization across
confessional lines, which has reportedly led to an influx of cash contributions and
sympathy, is likely to be short-lived and of limited significance. Most Lebanese do not
share Hezbollah's vision or goals, and this places objective limits on Hezbollah's potential
as a mass organization. Moreover, Hezbollah itself will need lots of money to repair the
war-damaged infrastructure in southern Lebanon and help its supporters repair homes and
businesses that were damaged in the fighting. It will thus have to balance its desire to
continue active resistance against Israel, with the risk of sparking a backlash that could
harm its short-term fundraising efforts if it is perceived to be responsible for a new round
of fighting.
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VII. IRAN AND PERSIAN GULF STATES' RELATIONS CASE STUDY
The following case study is actually an amalgamation of four smaller case studies
on Iranian national security and foreign policy toward the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia will again provide compelling evidence to support the
thesis that Iranian national security and foreign policy is based upon the international
relations theory of neorealism.
A. BACKGROUND
Although the Shah had been unpopular among the rulers of the six states on the
Arab side of the Persian Gulf, the Revolution in Iran, nevertheless, was a shock to them.
Iran under the Shah had been the main guarantor of political stability in the region. Under
the Republic, Iran was promising to be the primary promoter of revolution. All six
countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—were ruled by
hereditary monarchs who naturally feared the new rhetoric from Tehran. Indeed, during
the first year following the Revolution, throughout the Gulf region numerous acts of
political sabotage and violence occurred, claiming inspiration from the Iranian example.
The most sensational of these was the assault by Muslim dissidents on the Grand Mosque
in the holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Other clashes occurred between groups of local
Shi 'a and security forces in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq further alarmed the Persian Gulf Arab
states. In 1981, they joined in a collective defense alliance known as the GCC. Although
the GCC announced its neutrality with respect to the Iran-Iraq War, Iran perceived its
formation as part of the Iraqi war effort and generally was hostile toward it. The GCC for
its part suspected Iran of supporting antigovemment groups throughout the Persian Gulf.
These concerns were heightened in December 1981, when authorities in Bahrain
announced the discovery of a clandestine group that had plans to carry out sabotage and
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terrorist acts as part of an effort to overthrow the government; several of the plotters had
links to Iranian clerics. In December 1983, a series of bombings occurred in Kuwait,
including incidents at the American and French embassies; the Arab nationals who were
captured and charged with these acts of terrorism were members of an Iraqi Shi'
a
movement, Ad Dawah, that was headquartered in Tehran. In May 1985, a suicide driver
unsuccessfully tried to kill the ruler of Kuwait. 388
Iran has sent mixed signals in dealing with its southern neighbors. It reduced its
support of Islamic extremist movements within the southern Gulf after the death of
Khomeini, and has often stated that it is seeking to improve its relations with the
Southern Gulf states. For example, it has avoided confrontations over oil policy, and has
negotiated with states like Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman over improvements in relations, and
the sharing of offshore oil and gas. In May 1992, Iran gave Kuwait back six airliners that
Iraq had seized and flown to Iran during the Gulf War (although only after trying to
extract large fees). By the mid-1990s, the most serious issues affecting Iran's conduct
towards its neighbors are Iran's actions in dealing with the UAE, and the extent to which
Iran has or has not contributed to the current political upheavals in Bahrain. '
Until 1987, Iran and the GCC members found more reasons for cooperation than
confrontation, despite suspicions of Iranian involvement in subversive activities. In
general, Iran avoided dealing with the GCC as an entity, preferring to ignore its existence
and to treat each country separately. Iran's relations with the six component states varied
from friendliness to hostility. For example, Iran and the UAE maintained relatively
cordial relations. Economic ties reinforced the political ties between the two countries.
An Iranian mercantile community in the UAE was concentrated in Dubai, a city that
emerged—following the destruction of Khorramshahr—as an important transit center
where international goods destined for Iran found their way into smaller boats capable of
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docking facilities. In Bahrain, where the ruling family was Sunni Muslim and a majority
of the population was Shi' a, lingering suspicions of Iranian intentions did not inhibit the
government from improving diplomatic relations with Tehran. Because there were no
outstanding issues between Iran and Qatar, relations between them were generally
correct.
390
Nevertheless, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait made efforts to seek a
rapprochement with Iran in 1985 and 1986. The Saudi efforts were more successful and
resulted in an exchange of visits between the Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers in 1985.
The Saudis and Iranians also began to cooperate in some areas of mutual interest, such as
international oil policy. In contrast, relations between Kuwait and Iran did not improve
significantly. In the fall of 1986, Iran began to single out Kuwait's ships for retaliatory
attacks, and this led to a worsening of diplomatic relations. 391 Given its geostrategic
location, Iran has found its borders vulnerable on several fronts: political upheaval and
civil war in Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan392 ; strong military states with active
irredentism movements in Turkey and Iraq; an arms race threat among its wealthy Arab
neighbors393 ; and the continued threat from a strong external power represented in the
United States. 394 It is for these reasons that Tehran has seen the necessity to continue
supporting Islamist groups like Hezbollah as a counterbalancing agent and the need to
gain control of strategic points such as Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb
islands.
390
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Iran's long-term goal in the Persian Gulf is regional security maintained solely by
the Gulf littoral powers. 395 In turn, the effectiveness of this policy to maintain regional
stability has hinged upon cooperation between Iran and the Arab states. Since the end of
the Cold War, GCC members have sought improved relations with Iran through bilateral
agreements and resumption of diplomatic relations. Relationships range along a
continuum from formal recognition to nonmilitary cooperation as a short-term option, to
security arrangements in the long-term.
396
Throughout the early 1990s, any gathering of
GCC foreign ministers would discuss increasing cooperation with Iran, and the need to
strengthen ties and common interests with the GCC to enhance stability and security in
the Gulf.
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Likewise, Iran has been presenting a more amiable diplomatic front to its
Arab neighbors. This has been the case with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the
UAE—although the UAE has been slow to reciprocate given the events of 1971 and 1992
on the disputed Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs'.
B. IRAN & THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES RELATIONS
Relations between Iran and the UAE have undergone continuous tension since the
1979 Islamic Revolution. In large part, these relations have revolved around the
sovereignty of the three tiny islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs' (See
Figure 6). Unlike the transparent Iraqi attack of Kuwait, which precipitated the 1991
Persian Gulf War, the Iran-UAE dispute dodges such easy labeling as an act of
aggression. In fact, from the perspective of the Iranians this was another example of
neorealist thinking. Oil forms the major export resource for Iran's economy. US-led
sanctions against Iran have blocked any plans to diversify its economy. Therefore, oil,
and Iran's ability to transport it to world buyers, is of vital national security interest to the
leadership in Tehran. Likewise, due to geostrategic fate, Iran has only one natural path to
transport this critical commodity and that is through the Strait of Hormuz.
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Disputed Islands
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Figure 6. Map Showing Location of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser
Tunb Islands.398
Tehran does not have to reflect far in its history to learn the lessons of national
impact that interdiction of Iran's oil shipments might have on its security. It need only
refer to the so-called 'Tanker Wars" of the 1980s. As this episode demonstrated, Iran's
ability to maintain influence on the Strait of Hormuz is a national necessity. This being
true, Iran's action vis-a-vis Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands is not
surprising. It is an understandable national security policy decision when placed within
the pragmatic framework of neorealism.
39S Maps of the Middle East (The Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection The University of Texas at
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First, the dispute between Iran and the UAE involves complex territorial claims
that long precede the emergence of the present Iranian regime. Iran and the UAE have
had radically different views of the legal meaning of prior claims to the islands since the
19
th
century. Iran feels it had a right to the islands because it exerted at least indirect
control over Abu Musa and the Tunbs before Britain's seizure of the islands in 1887,399
pointing to claims that are more ancient.
Conversely, the UAE feels that it has the right to the islands because Iran has not
exerted meaningful control over the Tunbs in modern times, while the islands were under
the control of the ruling family in Ras al-Khaimah. Furthermore, the UAE argues that
Abu Musa was under the control of the ruling Arab family in Sharjah, and that although
the family had branches living in both Iran and Sharjah, the main branch was in Sharjah.
Note that several international experts dispute the level of authority the ruling Qawasim
family of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah exerted over the islands, and the fact that
Qawasim paid intermittent tribute to Iran.400
1. The Islands Dispute Heats Up
In April 1992, Iran became involved in a serious dispute with the UAE over the
control of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. These three islands are located
in the lower Gulf north of Dubai and south of Qeshem Island.401 They are north of the
main shipping channels and west of the Straits of Hormuz—the entrance to the Gulf.
Control of the islands offers Iran a significant potential strategic advantage; it can
threaten tanker traffic through the Gulf—which involves the movement of 20 percent of
the world's oil and an average of 75 ship transits per day.402 It also improves Iran's
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ability to defend its key naval bases in the lower Gulf and affects competing claims to
offshore oil and gas rights. Moreover, apart from its military significance, Abu Musa is
rich in resources, containing half a billion barrels of oil in addition to substantial deposits
of gas and red iron oxide.403
2. Background of the Claims
Arguments over the ownership and sovereignty of these islands remained moot as
long as Britain controlled the Gulf. While the Shah's father made claims to the islands
beginning in the 1930s, the British had treated claims of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah as
legitimate for nearly a half-century, and the British decision stood through force
majeure .404 This situation changed in 1968, however, when Britain announced it was
withdrawing from the Gulf. This British decision left Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah
without a military protector, and the Shah acted to take advantage of the situation. After
all, both the US and Britain had agreed that Iran would be the main regional security
guarantor in the Gulf when Britain withdrew.405
a. The Shah Relieves the British
On 30 November 1971—the day before British forces formally ceased to
exert military control over the emirates and Ras al-Khaimah, and the UAE gained
independence—Iranian marines used hovercraft to seize Abu Musa and the Tunbs.40
This seizure of the islands resulted in several casualties, but none of the islands then had
a large native population. The Greater Tunb is little more than a barren rock, and had no
population at the time, except for a few visiting fishermen. The Lesser Tunb was so
small that its only previous strategic importance had been as a shipping hazard. Of the
three, Abu Musa was the only island large enough to have a small port and a few square










permanent population was well under 50, except for gangs of Arab laborers who mined
the iron oxide on the island.407
The Shah soon made it clear that Iran intended to exert full sovereignty over the
islands. In fact, Iran's Prime Minister, Abbas Hoveida, informed the Iranian Majlis that
full Persian sovereignty "had been restored following long negotiations with the British
government, and that Iran, "in no conceivable way relinquished or will relinquish its
incontestable sovereignty and right of control over the whole of Abu Musa Island."408
The Shah, however, did provide compensation to the Emir of Sharjah for the seizure of
Abu Musa and allowed some Arabs from the UAE to remain on the island. The Shah
also reached an agreement with Sharjah in 1971 that gave 55 percent of the affected oil
and gas revenues to Iran and 45 percent to Sharjah.409 Iran has since claimed this
agreement explains why it allowed UAE citizens to continue to live and work on the
island. The UAE, however, has claimed that the Shah seized Abu Musa and the Tunbs'
through sheer force majeur, and that neither Sharjah nor Ras al-Khaimah ever agreed to
accept Iran's control and sovereignty over the islands. In any case, the Shah left several
aspects of control over the islands unresolved.
b. The Islamic Republic Seeks Full Control
This dual administration persisted for over two decades—through Iran's
revolution into the early 1990s. Then, quite suddenly in 1992, Iran reasserted full direct
control of Abu Musa. Iran claimed it did so because it had not received a fair share of the
offshore oil production from the island, although the Iranian media soon began to refer to
41
the entire island as Iranian territory and as part of "Hormuzgan Province." Iran
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Arab residents. Further, during April and May 1992, Iran staged the largest amphibious
exercise it had conducted since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. This exercise took place in
the Straits of Hormuz at the same time that Iran was reasserting its control of Abu Musa.
It lasted 1 1 days, demonstrating Iranian capabilities to block the Straits from an outside
invader (i.e., the US)411 . The exercise covered an area of some 10,000 square miles of
ocean, and involved 45 surface ships, 1 50 small craft, and an unknown number of Iranian
Air Force aircraft.412
The UAE reacted rather belatedly to the development, but when it did, it chose to
reopen the issue of the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs as well. Although the Shah
had occupied all three islands in one fell swoop, there was a basic difference in the status
of Abu Musa. Sharjah came to an agreement with Iran over Abu Musa, but Ras al-
Khaimah did not reach such agreement with Iran over the Tunbs. In September 1992
Mustafa Haeri-Fumani, adviser to the Iranian Foreign Minister, visited the UAE for talks,
which broke down over the agenda that included the Tunbs. 413 The UAE countered these
developments with a proposal to solve the sovereignty problem by leasing the entire
island to Iran, and altering the sharing of oil in favor of Iran. Iran rejected this proposal,
and the UAE reacted by renewing its claims to the Tunbs and obtaining support from the
GCC and Arab League.414 Iran countered by breaking off talks over the issue on 28
September 1992, charging the GCC states and Arab League states with conspiring with
US plotters; Iranian President Rafsanjani declared the issue an US "conspiracy... to
justify its illegitimate presence in the Gulf."415 However, in December 1993 the GCC
Summit finally endorsed the UAE proposal to refer the dispute to the International Court
of Justice and urged Iran to agree to it. Sheikh Muhammad, Chairman of the Ministerial
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Council of the Summit, took every care to make the request palatable to Iran. He stated,
formally: "We have mutual interests and live in the same region with Iran. There is no
dispute other than the occupation."416
The dispute has been on the GCC agenda and is routinely included in all GCC
resolutions; however, many members (except the UAE) are growing weary of making it a
primary issue when Iran seems willing to seek rapprochement with its Arab neighbors.
The communique issued at the end of the Summit held in Kuwait in December 1997
expressed satisfaction at the positive indications of Iranian policy that were demonstrated
at the OIC Summit and called for the GCC-Iranian relations to be based on "peaceful co-
existence, good-neighborliness, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual interest."
It also called for a negotiated solution between Iran and the UAE.417
In the spring of 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to the Iranian
deployment of chemical weapons on the island, including 155-mm shells and an Iranian
force of up to 6,000 as "very threatening."418 Some US experts believe, however, that
Secretary Perry exaggerated the Iranian build-up and confused the deployment of poison
gas with the deployment of non-lethal agents. They believe that the total Iranian
presence on the islands and the immediate vicinity has only reached temporary
maximums of about 3,700 men.419 In May 1998, the new Iranian Foreign Minister,
Kama! Kharrazi, went to the UAE to discuss the Abu Musa Island among other things.
The Iranians claimed that the visit "opened new avenues for discussion on all issues
including an acceptable solution to the islands." Sheikh Zayed, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi
and the President of the UAE, was a little more restrained in his assessment, when he said
that the two sides had agreed to continue the talks on the bilateral relations, including the
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question of the three islands.
420 Abu Musa, nonetheless, is now a bilateral issue between
the states concerned.
Moreover, since its occupation of the islands, Iran has run yearly joint naval
exercises in and around the Straits.
4 l
Finally, in 1999, the GCC states countered Iranian
military exercises with some of their own to demonstrate its own show of force—albeit
small. The two-week, live-fire exercises were dubbed Tademun-6 {Solidarity-6)
maneuvers in early October 1999.
422
General Said al-Abdullah, Qatar's chief of
operations, said that each of the six participating GCC states contributed two frigates for
the exercise that began on 2 October. The Emirate's UN ambassador, Mohammed bin
Hussein al-Shaali, stated that Iranian deployments on Abu Musa show that Tehran "is
seeking to transform the island ... into a stationary aircraft carrier, something which
endangers the security of the Emirates and the oilfields." Further, the UAE has become
alarmed at the growing rapprochement between Iran and some members of the GCC,
particularly Saudi Arabia, and has complained that this diplomatic effort undermines its
moves to reclaim sovereignty over the disputed and strategic island.4
In the meantime, several sources confirm that Iran has built-up a garrison force of
at least a battalion and possibly over 1 ,000 Revolutionary Guards on Abu Musa and the
Tunbs.424 Moreover, they have deployed added artillery and 10 older tanks placed in
sheltered positions, stockpiled small caches of CS gas, and created concrete ramps and
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has extended the runway on Abu Musa to the point where it can be used to handle B-727
and B-737 jets, has deployed Improved HAWK 425surface-to-air missiles, and is
expanding the port to allow it to base large naval vessels. It has also improved the
facilities on Greater Tunb, installed a new generating plant, and deployed additional
Naval Guards forces.426
3. Today's Iran-UAE Stalemate
In most recent media accounts, the UAE continues to renounce Iran's apparent
consolidation of the islands' control. The UAE sent a "memorandum of objection" to
Tehran denouncing the Iranian government's opening of a "municipality house in Abu
Musa Island."427 This was followed, a few days later, by an expression of support for the
UAE from the Secretary General of the GCC, Sheikh Jamil al-Hujeilan stating:
The GCC have always asserted in its official meetings' successive
statements its backing to the UAE in its legitimate right to restore its
three islands—Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa
—
occupied by Iran.428
Further, Hujeilan added "Iran's response to the call of the UAE to settle the
dispute over the island(s) will, to a large extent, contribute to strengthening relations the
GCC member states always seek to rebuild with Iran."429 Moreover, the UAE and its
425 The HAWK, short for "Homing All the Way Killer," is a medium range, surface-to-air guided
missile that provides air defense coverage against low-to-medium-altitude aircraft. It is a mobile, all-
weather day and night system. The missile is highly lethal, reliable, and effective against electronic
countermeasures. Basic HAWK was developed in the 1950s and initially fielded in 1960. The system has
been upgraded through a series of product improvements beginning with the Improved HAWK in 1970.
The "Improved" HAWK variant was typically used for export to foreign defense buyers. Iran received its
Improved HAWK missiles in the early 1970s, when the Shah was a key US regional ally countering the
Soviet Union's designs in the Persian Gulf.
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GCC allies have not felt immune from punctuating their response with saber rattling of
their own; conducting live fire exercises as Iran conducted its own joint naval
exercises.
430 Be that as it may, Iranian officials, although quick to offer regrets for the
GCC's stated position and reiterate Tehran's desire to continue to improve relations with
the GCC states, made it clear that this would "not make a change in the Iranian policy"
concerning its territory.
431
In fact, quoting earlier Iranian Foreign Ministry statements
concerning this situation, the "three disputed Gulf islands will remain 'Iranian
forever.'"
432
To document their claimed of Iran's hegemonic designs in the Persian Gulf, the
US and the GCC point to Iran's annexation of three small islands near the Strait of
Hormuz: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran and Sharjar (who subsequently
joined the UAE) had jointly administered these islands for two decades. Iran's Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated Tehran sought Abu Musa as an "exclusive
naval base to counterbalance the post-Gulf War defense alliance between the US and the
Arab states of the GCC."433 Concerning the legitimacy of Iran's claim on the islands,
Iran's permanent representative to the UN—Kamal Kharrazi explains:
We have documents that show these islands have been part of
Iranian territory for centuries. For years, Britain occupied these
islands, but in 1971 they decided to withdraw. Therefore, the Shah
sent troops to retake them based on an agreement among the British
government, the Iranian government and the emirate of Sharjar. At
that time, there was no UAE. The Shah accepted the sovereignty of
Bahrain in return for the withdrawal of the British government from
the islands. We have an agreement signed in 1971 spelling out how
430
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the island of Abu Musa is to be governed by Iran and Sharjar. The
security of the island has been maintained by Iran since 197 1.434
Responding to this claim, UAE Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zeid al-
Nahayyan replied:
Let them bring them (the documents) to the International Court of
Justice, and we will bring our documents...We will accept any
verdict the court issues, whether for or against us. If (the Iranians)
refuse arbitration, it means they do not possess sovereignty.435
For the purpose of American foreign policy, the practical problem has been
determining whether these Iranian actions are defensive or offensive in nature. The
Clinton Administration officials have emphasized the aggressive aspects of the Iranian
build-up, and the islands have a very geostrategic position. Cordesman observes that:
The main east-west shipping channels through the Gulf pass within
10-15 kilometers on either side of the Tunbs, as well as the Island of
Jazireh-ye Forur, about 50 kilometers to the east. Both the Tunbs
and the deeper waters in this part of the Gulf are on the Iranian side
of mid-point between Iran and the Southern Gulf, although the
Tunbs are not within the 12 mile limit of Iran. Abu Musa is about
40 kilometers south of the smaller Tunb and 25 kilometers south of
the east-bound tanker channel—which is the channel that passes to
the south of the Tunbs. It is about 50 kilometers southeast of the
Iranian Island of Jazireh-ye Sirri. As a result, control of the Tunbs
extends Iran's ability to threaten the tanker channels with missiles
and hit and run naval raids, while control of Abu Musa ensures that
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4. The Strategic Value to Iran
It is important to note, however, that there are limits to the strategic value of these
small islands, and that even Abu Musa is difficult to use as a survivable base for naval
operations and placement of ASMs in the face of attacks by US airpower.437 This fact
tends to lend credence to Iranian denials of hegemonic intentions. Further, while the
three islands do have a strategic position near the main shipping channels in the lower
Gulf, Iran has long had ASMs deployed in other positions near the Strait, which could
attack any large vessels moving in and out of the Gulf. Iran also possesses bases at Forur
and Sirri, and at Qeshem, Hengam, and Larak—islands that are closer to the Strait of
Hormuz, larger, and easier to defend. All five of these islands are also capable of staging
mining and Naval Guards operations against shipping in the lower Gulf. Iran has
reportedly deployed SILKWORM ASMs on Qeshem Island and on Sirri Island near
the Strait of Hormuz.
439
These missiles have ranges of up to 90 kilometers.440 There are
reports that Iran has deployed advanced long-range ASMs like the SUNBURST on Sir
it 1
Island, although US experts have never confirmed such reports.
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So far, Iran has not used the islands to take any aggressive actions in the Gulf.
Iran, however, did act at a time when it claimed it was trying to improve its relations with
the Southern Gulf states. Why? Well, this again is indicative of the primacy of neorealist
thinking in Iran's national security decision making. The Strait of Hormuz is a central
national security concern for Iran in several respects. First, the Strait is the lifeline for
Iran's economy. Linked to Iran's economic survival is its ability to keep the Strait of
Hormuz open because of its high dependence on oil exports. In contrast, both Iraq and
Saudi Arabia are equally dependent on oil exports but they have alternative routes to ship
their supply—through Turkey and the Red Sea, respectively. Second, the Strait is the
main access avenue for Iran's number one security concern in the Gulf—the US military.
Specifically for Iran, as it relates to the Strait, is the power projection afforded the US
through its carrier battle groups, carrying strike aircraft, cruise missiles, and Aegis
cruisers. The lessons of the Gulf War were not lost on Iran. Thus, Iran took action to
ensure achievement of its primary national security concerns, despite the ramifications
they would bring upon its other foreign policy goals in the region. This is the epitome of
neorealist behavior in a state.
In like fashion, some Middle East experts see Iran's actions as a reflection of a
continuing conflict between the influence of pragmatists and extremists in the Iranian
government;
442
although Rafsanjani visited Abu Musa shortly before the seizure and
almost certainly approved every step Iran has taken regarding the islands. In fact, the
Iranian action in Abu Musa must be seen from a nationalist perspective and as one that
has broad popular support in Iran. But, the US and GCC countries fear once Iran, which
has been on a heavy rearmament spending spree for some years now, rearms itself it
intends to intimidate its smaller GCC neighbors and become the regional hegemonic
[Tarantula] III patrol craft and reaches speeds upward of Mach 3. After the Soviet break-up, Ukraine
redesignated the ASM as SUNBURST and sold at least eight to Iran for a price of $450,000 per missile,
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power in the Persian Gulf.443 Rearmament aside, Iran's sheer size in and of itself has a
very intimidating effect on its Arab neighbors. With an estimated population of over 60
million, Iran has more people than Iraq and the GCC put together. James Bill, speaking
to a conference on US-Iran relations, puts into perspective the US-GCC concerns
regarding Iran:
The very size of this country makes its smaller neighbors nervous.
And its loud and sometimes threatening voice does not inspire
confidence among its weaker, softly obese, hugely rich neighbors.
These jittery neighbors, therefore, are happy to have the support of a
world class giant (in the US) that can be called in whenever they feel
threatened.
444
5. Review of Relations
In sum, Iran's national security posture with regard to the disputed islands
demonstrate again the correctness of Waltz and the rational camp of theorists which
support neorealist theory in international relations models. Iran's decision to forgo
amiable relations with the UAE and its GCC partners to seek protection of its territorial
claims and its economic lifeline embodied by the Strait of Hormuz illustrates this.
Iranian economy, although somewhat diversified, is still largely hinges upon the sale of
its most abundant resource—oil. This waterway is also the choke point of the United
States naval access to the Persian Gulf. With its awesome power projection capabilities
relative to Iran, the US, and specifically the US Navy, is seen as the threat to Iran's
economic link. Therefore, these islands help Iran posture to achieve its long-term national
security objectives of protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the nations
economic future.
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C. IRAN & BAHRAIN RELATIONS
Interrelated with Iran's claim over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands is the Iranian
territorial claim upon the small Gulf island nation of Bahrain. Bahrain is the only country
in the GCC with a majority Shi'ite population—though politically in the minority.
Furthermore, Bahrain is the only country in which Iran has periodically claimed
sovereignty as its 14th province, with claims dating back to the 6th century Persian
Sassanid Empire and persisting intermittently up until 197 1.445 After the establishment of
the Islamic regime in Iran in 1979, new threats to Bahrain's ruling elite manifested
themselves in uncovered coup plots and general unrest among Bahrain's majority Shi'a
population.
44 The following discourse will review the highlights of these events and put
them in perspective neorealist policy choices made by Tehran at different points to
balance power against Iran's primary threat in the Gulf, namely the United States.
1. Iran Empathy with the Shi'a of Bahrain
Iranian maps often showed Bahrain as part of Iran and the Iranian Majlis even
passed laws applying to Bahrain—although they had no power or effect.447 During the
1960s, after a long silence on the matter, the Shah of Iran strongly reasserted Iran's claim
to Bahrain in an official note to the British government in early 1968—shortly after
Britain had announced that it would leave the Gulf.448 This, in turn, led to negotiations
between Iran and Britain, resulting in an agreement late in 1969 to refer the issue to the
UN Secretary General. In turn, the UN would appoint a mission of inquiry to determine
the wishes of the people of Bahrain. It was clear that this agreement would lead to
Bahrain's independence under the Al Khalifas, but it served the Shah's interests by
making it increasingly unlikely that Britain could unite Bahrain into the federation of
445
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Emirates that would bring together most of the smaller states in the Southern Gulf. In
addition, the Shah did not challenge Bahrain's sovereignty after the UN decided in favor
of independence in 1970.449 In 1979, however, the Shah's fall and the rise of Khomeini
created a new radical group that could appeal to Bahrain's Shi'ite majority, many of
whose clergy trained in Iran.450 This, coupled with the ma
gave the radicals in Tehran a natural conduit for influence.
ny Iranian residents in Bahrain,
Shortly after Khomeini's rise to power in 1979, he stated that Bahrain was part of
Iran.
451 He also sent "messengers" to Bahrain to promote Iran's religious revolution.
This led to riots in Bahrain as early as August 1979—when some 1,500 Shi'ite
demonstrators rallied in favor of the Iranian revolution.
452 As a result, Bahrain's security
forces arrested many of the demonstrators, exiled some, and expelled at least one pro-
Iranian Sheik, as well as several members of the Shi'ite clergy.4 Further Shi'ite
protests, including some violent demonstrations against the US presence in Bahrain,
occurred at the time of the student seizure of the US embassy in Tehran.454
Meanwhile, Khomeini's mantra of Iran's destiny to export the Islamic revolution
to other states did not sit well with Bahrain's ruling elite. These developments helped
make Manama a strong supporter of Iraq at the start of the Iran-Iraq War, allowing Iraq to
disperse some of its aircraft in Bahrain.
455
Further, the Al Khalifa family made it clear
that it supported Iraq's initial victory claims. This led to new Shi'ite protests in April
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1980, in which Bahrain's security forces arrested at least 50 Shi'ite leaders, forcing them
to organize a new structure designed to control and infiltrate Shi'ite opposition. At the
same time, Iran began actively to provide funds, training, and arms for its supporters in
Bahrain.
456
The tensions between Bahrain and Iran reached a crisis point in mid-December,
1981. During this time Bahrain's government arrested 73 people, including 58 Bahraini
nationals, 13 Saudis, one Kuwaiti, and one Omani, and eventually deported up to 300
others, all members of a Shi'ite group called the Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain, who had planned a coup for Bahrain's national day on 16 December 1980.457
Many had trained in Iran and had smuggled in arms, men, and some $120,000 in cash
from Iran. The group had obtained Bahraini police uniforms and planned to
assassinate key members of the Al Khalifa family and government officials. They
intended to declare an Islamic republic when their leader arrived from Iran. "The plot
was discovered by an immigration official in Dubai who noted suspicious movements
from Iran to Bahrain. Bahraini security officials then discovered that the Iranian charge
d'affaires in Manama was both importing equipment, like walkie-talkies, from London in
his diplomatic pouch and funding the group."459 Another 13 members of the group were
found to be operating in Saudi Arabia and others in the UAE. Despite the fact that the
group received considerable support in the Diraz and Awali districts of Baharian, no
public protests resulted from the arrest of the group's members. The group had some
150-200 guerrillas training in Iran460 and had ties to Hadi al-Modarasi; a Shi'ite mullah













Hadi al-Modarasi subsequently became the head of the Gulf Affairs Section of Iran's Revolutionary
Guards after this episode.
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These discoveries led Bahrain to be cautious in dealing with those it arrested for
the coup attempt. Any signs of public demonstrations were carefully suppressed. 462
Rather than arresting them, the government expelled another 200-300 Shi'ites and kept
new arrests that it made in 1983 a secret.463 Bahrain also made a major effort to expand
economic opportunities for Shi'ites, while it increased efforts to penetrate every Shi'ite
group and cell. These government efforts largely contained violent protests and pro-
Iranian actions, although low-level sabotage and occasional incidents continued until the
end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.464
It was this history between these two countries that drew immediate suspicion
from Bahrain officials. They believed Iran was somehow behind the 1994 Shi'ite
rioting—unrest that continues to rumble within Bahrain's Shi' a community to this day.
Baharaini officials believe that Iran has actively supported the present Shi'ite unrest in
Bahrain, and has active ties to a number of the more extreme Shi'ite clerics and members
of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain that have helped trigger demonstrations
and riots. Bahrain also expelled an Iranian diplomat, Third Secretary Abdul-Rasool
Dokoohki, for "activities incompatible with his diplomatic status" in early February
1996.
465 They also arrested forty-four Bahraini Shi'ites on 3 June 1996 for plotting to
overthrow the government. Bahrain indicated that many of those arrested had at least
some political ties to Iran, receiving training in Iranian-funded camps in Lebanon, Iran, or
Afghanistan.
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The Bahraini leadership certainly felt this was the case in 1994 when, in
December of that year, arresting a leading Baharini Shi'ite leader upon his return from
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This lead to unprecedented rioting by members of the Shi'ite community and
resulted in Bahrain recalling its ambassador from Tehran. A statement by the Bahraini
Interior Ministry said "that the incidents were accompanied by an organized foreign
media and propaganda campaign. Moreover, Iran spread some misleading rumors to
increase tension and escalate the situation."4 Iran's state-run radio said anti-government
protests in Bahrain will "continue unless democratic reforms are introduced and social
corruption is stopped." The radio also accused Bahrain's Sunni dominated regime of
encouraging immigration in "an apparent attempt to decrease the large proportion of
Shi'ites in the population."
470 A letter to the British press by the Bahraini Ambassador to
Britain, further implied Iran's culpability: "During December Bahrain experienced a
wave of unrest deliberately provoked and supported by foreign-based terrorists bent on
destabilizing the Gulf region."471 The implications were clear that Bahrain felt Iran was
behind the rioting and the fact it took place two weeks before the holding of the GCC
conference in Bahrain was seen as an attempt to unsettle the GCC countries. Iranian
Foreign Minister Velayati did little to allay these fears, stating, during an address to the
Forty-Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly that: "The Islamic Republic
of Iran, possessing the longest shoreline along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, has
been well aware of its role and responsibilities in promoting and maintaining peace and
security in the area, and has spared no effort in this regard."
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Today, Iran seems to have reduced its support of radical groups in Bahrain during
the period immediately after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the death of Khomeini.
Anti-government Shi'ite activity in Bahrain was also limited during the Gulf War. Since
1992, however, Bahrain has experienced growing economic problems, which have led to
serious internal unrest among Bahrain's Shi'ites.473 Iranian-trained, Bahraini Shi'ite
clergy and students, many of whom were educated in Qom, have supported some of this
unrest. Iran also continues to permit the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain to
maintain an office in Tehran, and may be providing substantial funds to the group's main
office in London—the location of most other Bahraini exile organizations. Still, Bahrain
has not "warmed" considerably to recent Iranian gestures of neighborly love. Manama's
monarch still finds comfort in the US military presence as evidenced by its welcome of
Washington's proposal to emplace a missile defense system in the region and the basing
of a new squadron of US F-16 jet fighters by the end of 2000.474 The New York Times
quoted Bahrain's Crown Prince Shaykh Hamad bin Tsa, who joked to a senior US
official: "In Iran you have three people in charge: you have Khamenei, who is in charge
of religion and terrorism. You have Rafsanjani, and he is in charge of business and
terrorism. And then you have Khatami, and he is in charge of internal politics,
moderation and terrorism."475
2. Fears of a Pro-Iranian "Fifth Column"
The concern of Bahrain officials mirror those of other GCC member countries
which express differing views about the threat Iran poses in terms of its support for other
Shi'ite and Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Gulf area. Some officials feel that
473
"Blaming Iran," The Economist, Lexis-Nexis.
474 STRATFOR. "Middle East and Africa News Briefs," based on reports from Bahrain Tribune
(English) (2 May 2000) on the internet at http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/news/000502.htm [Accessed on 20
May 2000].
475
Sciolino, Elaine. "The World: America Frets as Its Chums Pay Their Own Games; Saudis Make
Nice With The Irani," New York Time (12 April 1998), on the internet at http://archives.nytimes.com/
archives/ search/fastweb?search [Accessed 21 April 2000].
141
Iran has set up intelligence and surveillance networks in all the southern Gulf states, at
least penetrating many of the Islamic extremist movements there, although their level of
control is questionable. As well, they feel that Iran has actively surveyed potential targets
for military or terrorist action, such as critical oil facilities, power plants, communications
centers, and desalinization plants. Ultimately all their concerns are based on the
unnerving perception that Iran has a potential fifth column element within each GCC
Shi'a community.476 To illustrate, the UAE has upward of nearly 100,000 Iranians with
a continual flow of dhow traffic between Iran and the UAE, affording potential Shi'ite
revolutionaries a perfect clandestine communications conduit.477 Although not as large
as Bahrain's Shi'a community, about 16 percent of the UAE's population is Shi'ite and
UAE security officials are concerned of the potential problems posed by Iran's claims
over the Gulf around Abu Musa and the Tunbs.478
It is worth noting here that Bahrain is not alone in its concerns about the Shi'a
comprising an Iranian "fifth column" element within their borders. Other GCC states
share their concerns. For example, Iran has often spouted hostile rhetoric directed toward
to Saudi Arabia, and Iran's media and some of its political leaders have vigorously
attacked the Saudi royal family, causing repeated riots and other problems during the
Hajj. Some Saudi officials feel that Iran has also provided training, funds, and possibly
arms for Shi'ite minorities in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Furthermore, they
believe that Iran is indirectly encouraging Sunni extremist movements that would not
otherwise support Iran's Shi'ite faith, or show any interest in dealing with Persian led
movements. Similarly, Iran has reportedly maintained a robust intelligence network in
Kuwait since the Iran-Iraq War—a war in which Kuwait supported Iraq. During that war
it supported and encouraged Kuwaiti Shi'ites and Iranian expatriates in numerous
bombings, sabotage, and assassination attempts. Kuwait has made repeated efforts to
destroy these networks, expelling or imprisoning many of those it believes has ties to
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Iran. Although Iran has been much less hostile to Kuwait since 1989, it seems likely that
it retains significant intelligence links to Shi'ite groups in Kuwait.
Given this background, it is not surprising that many Gulf States have adopted a
dual-track diplomacy with Iran. On the one hand, they have maintained a dialogue with
Iran, maintained relations, and attempted to expand trade and encourage Iran's
moderates. On the other hand, they have strengthened their military forces and ties to the
US and used forums like the GCC to condemn Iran.47 The Foreign Ministers of the
GCC provided a particularly strong condemnation of Iran at the meeting on 2 June
1996.
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This condemnation came only days before Bahrain announced that it had made
44 arrests to block an Iranian supported conspiracy.481
3. Iranian Policy Logic vis-a-vis Bahrain
In a neorealist context, Iran's actions benefit one of its primary national security
policy goals in the dislodgment of US military forces from the Persian Gulf region.
Bahrain is home to several crucial US commands and bases, most importantly that of the
US Navy's Fifth Fleet Headquarters. By backing a potentially successful coup in 1981,
Iran was causing almost fatal trouble to an Iraqi ally during the Iran-Iraq War and
creating a potential crisis for US forces in the region. If the 1981 coup were successful, a
pro-Iranian government might well discontinue US basing rights. Therefore, in this
respect the decision to fund the coup plan, despite the "blowback" ", was logical and
fitting within Iran's overall national security policy scheme. Tehran denies that the 1994
479
Olson, William J., ed., US Strategic Interests in the GulfRegion. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1987), 51; and Ahrari and Noyes, 213.
480
Bahrain's Foreign Minister condemned Iran for interfering "in the internal affairs of Bahrain and
other member countries," and for "repeated measures" concerning the strategic Gulf islands of Abu Musa
and the Tunbs. They urged Iran "not to resort (to) or encourage acts of sabotage, and to respect the
sovereignty and independence of council states." They condemned Iran for seeking to develop an arsenal
that "exceeds its ordinary and legitimate defense needs."
481
"Bahrain: Spot the Villain," Lexis-Nexis.
4
"Blowback" is an intelligence term used to describe the effects of mostly covert actions which,
although designed to give "plausible deniability to the nation backing the action, are linked to the backing
nation causing undesired public relations and diplomatic repercussions.
143
Shi'ite uprising in Bahrain was supported by the Iranian government; however, the extent
of involvement by the extra-governmental bonyards remains unknown. Regardless,
from a neorealist perspective it still fits within Iran's desire to create divisions in Arab
nations, which support US forces in the region. Today, in 2000, Tehran appears to have
taken a new policy tack, which focuses on greatly allaying the fears of its Gulf neighbors
to create a wedge between the US and the Arabs whose domestic populations resent
American military presence. In this framework, covert operations to support Shi'
a
uprisings like those of 1981 and 1994 would not be beneficial to the government's
international policy goals.
The unique situation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its separate 'ulama'
power base and the bonyards deflect a firm statement in this regard. If the radical
elements fear they are losing hold of power with the moderate factions, dark international
incidents which highlight Iran as the "rogue state" might isolate the moderates and keep
the radicals in power. From this perspective, future Iranian instigation of Bahrain's Shi'
community might be the "pragmatic choice" for the radical Iranian clerical establishment,
as they perceive the integrity of the revolution and their hold on power threatened with
extinction. A classic neorealist response—"survival of the state."
4. Review of Relations
In sum, government officials in Bahrain feel Iran directly encouraged protests and
violence to precipitate broad social revolution, and they fear that Iran may take more
direct subversive or military action if the situation in Bahrain continues to deteriorate.
Moreover, they are concerned that Iran has used its theological schools to radicalize the
Bahrain Shi'ite clergy that train there, that Iran seems to have trained cadres in
revolutionary techniques, and that Iran may try to exploit the possible threat posed by this
pro-Iranian "Fifth Column" living in Bahrain to the detriment of the ruling minority in
483 The bonyards, or Islamic foundations, are under the control of the fundamentalist clerical
establishment with vast financial holdings. They are purported to be the source of funding for many of the
Islamist groups still operating worldwide. Not under any control or oversight by the democratic
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Manama.484 On the other hand, in recent years Iran appears to have forsaken its
revolutionary and ideological support for Bahraini Shi'as in favor of the more pragmatic
goals of improving relations with its Gulf neighbors (like Bahrain) to meet its long-range
strategic agenda. More evidence of Iranian neorealism in policy making.
D. IRAN & OMAN RELATIONS
Iran's relations with Oman have been equally complex and, throughout the early
and mid-1980s, have been characterized by alternating periods of tension and mutual
accommodation.485 For example, immediately after the Revolution, Iranian propaganda
singled out the sultan of Oman as an example of the kind of "un-Islamic tyrant" who
should be overthrown. This hostility sprang from the revolutionaries' perception of the
Omani ruler as having been a close friend of the Shah. Iran's view had developed in the
1970s when the shah sent military assistance, including an Iranian military contingent, to
help the sultan crush a long-term rebellion. More significant, however, the Iranian
leaders regarded the sultan as subservient to the US. They denounced his policies of
supporting the Camp David accords, providing facilities for American aircrews that
attempted the unsuccessful rescue of the hostages in April 1 980, signing an agreement for
American military use of the air base on Masirah Island, and discussing with the US
construction of an airfield on the Musandam Peninsula overlooking the Strait of
487
Hormuz. Oman generally refrained from responding to Iranian charges and
consequently avoided an escalation of the verbal barrages. Despite the many areas of
friction, tensions between Iran and Oman gradually abated after 1981.
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The movement toward more correct diplomatic relations culminated in 1987 with
a state visit of the Omani foreign minister to Iran. Because of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's
providing major financial support to Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War began, relations grew
strained with Tehran.489 In addition, Iran accused them of providing logistical assistance
for Iraqi bombing raids on Iranian oil installations. For their part, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait believed that Iran supported subversive activities among their Shi 'a minorities.
They also resented Iranian attacks on their shipping. Saudi Arabia annually confronted
embarrassing incidents during the pilgrimage season when Iranians tried to stage political
demonstrations.
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Since Khomeini's death in 1989, Oman's relations with Iran have
been the strongest of any of the GCC countries. Omani officials have spoken out often
against the US policy of isolating Iran, saying that dialogue was preferable. Foreign
Minister Yusuf bin 'Alawi went so far as to state that Iran's isolation jeopardized Gulf
security.
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Cooperation continues between the navies of the two countries.492
1. Omani Security Perceptions
Oman's openness to Iranian gestures is rooted in Muscat's own security concerns,
both internal and external. Both before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Oman has
found Iran to be a willing neighbor to assist in offsetting Oman's security needs. For
instance, kindled by Nasser's rabid Arab nationalism which was igniting the entire
Middle East in the 1960s, a rebellion broke out in 1964 in Dhofar—one of the most
backward and exploited area of Oman.493 Although begun as a tribal separatist
movement against a reactionary ruler, the rebellion was backed by leftist elements in the
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Soviet Union's client-state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).494
Its original aim was the overthrow of Said ibn Taimur, but, by 1967, under the name of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf—changed to the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in 1974—it adopted much wider
goals.
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Supported by the Soviet Union through the PDRY, it hoped to spread revolution
throughout the conservative regimes of the Arabian Peninsula.496 Unfortunately, the
reprisals of Said ibn Taimur's against the Dhofari people did not break them but instead
drove them into the rebel camp. In 1970, as the Dhofari guerrilla attacks expanded, Said
ibn Taimur's son, Qaboos ibn Said Al Said, replaced his father in a coup carried out with
the assistance of British officers. Then Qaboos ibn Said, a Sandhurst graduate and
veteran of British army service, began a program to modernize the country and to
develop the armed forces. In addition to British troops and advisers, the new sultan was
assisted with troops sent by the Shah of Iran.497 An Iranian brigade, along with artillery
and helicopters, arrived in Dhofar in 1973. After the arrival of the Iranians, the combined
forces consolidated their positions on the coastal plain and moved against the guerrillas'
mountain stronghold and, by stages; the Omanis and Iranians gradually subdued the
guerrilla forces, pressing their remnants closer and closer to the PDRY border. Oman's
sultan finally declared victory over the rebels in December 1975.498
Another example is that of territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A
particularly long and acrimonious disagreement involved claims over the Al Buraymi
Oasis, disputed since the 19th century among tribes from Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi
(eventually becoming part of the UAE), and Oman, erupted in the 1950s.499 Although the
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tribes residing in the several settlements of the oasis were from Oman and Abu Dhabi,
followers of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi religious movement had periodically occupied and
exacted tribute from the area. Oil prospecting began on behalf of Saudi oil interests, and
in 1952 the Saudis sent a small constabulary force to assert control of the oasis. When
arbitration efforts broke down in 1955, the British dispatched the Trucial Oman Scouts to
expel the Saudi contingent.500 After a new round of negotiations, Saudi Arabia finally
recognized the claims of Abu Dhabi and Oman to the oasis. In return for this concession,
Abu Dhabi agreed to grant Saudi Arabia a land corridor to the gulf and a share of a
disputed oil field; however, other disagreements over boundaries and water rights
remain.
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Today, Oman's perceptions of the strategic problems in the gulf diverge
somewhat from those of the other Arab Gulf States. Geographically, it faces outward to
the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, and only a few kilometers of its territory—the
western coast of the Musandam Peninsula—border the Persian Gulf. 502 Nevertheless,
sharing the guardianship of the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, Oman's position makes it of
key importance to the security of the entire gulf. As an example of its independent
thought, Oman has shown a willingness to enter into strategic cooperation with nations
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Therefore, despite Iran's label as a "rogue" and "pariah" state, Oman has shown a
willingness to play the GCC-contrarian by keeping diplomatic avenues open with Tehran.
In part, because of past good relations and part, for Oman to balance against what it
perceives as its potential national security threats—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Yemen. 504 As I have shown here, Oman has had past territorial disputes all of these
countries, which continue quietly as, unresolved at different levels. Meanwhile, Iran
shows nothing but a willingness to develop a closer friendship with Muscat—much to the
chagrin of Washington defense and foreign policy makers.
2. Iran and Oman: The Evolving Relationship
Iran's pragmatic policies of the 1990s have sought to cultivate and evolve its
relations with Oman. Oman is a vital nation to Iranian security planning. Iran is only the
northern gatekeeper to the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz. The southern gatekeeper is
Oman. With its long coastline on the southern edge of the Gulf of Oman approaches to
the strait and its territory on the southern "gate" of the Strait itself, Muscat is a very
necessary ally in Iran's national security strategy to ensure a force hostile to Iran does not
interdict the Strait of Hormuz. As has been mentioned before, this geostrategic
chokepoint is of the utmost importance to Iranian economic survival. Being on friendly
terms with Oman allows at the very least a regional nation, which would likely choose
neutrality in a conflict directed at Iran. Furthermore, it segways neatly with Iran's
evolving policy in the 1990s of regional engagement. This new policy appears to be
directed mainly toward elevating itself from the US-imposed regime of economic
sanctions, fostering good feelings amongst its Arab neighbors, and ultimately, forcing a
wedge between the US and our allies in the Gulf who might eventually deny hosting of
US military bases and the like to appease their disgruntled population.
To illustrate, Tehran has made much progress in realizing its goal of creating a
regional security framework by warming ties with Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. In




dispute between Iran and the UAE over the three small, disputed islands in the Strait of
Hormuz. This issue was the center of debate at the last GCC summit and threatened to
cause a rift in the GCC.505 Yet, members of the GCC (other than the UAE) have
solidified support for increased Iranian involvement in the region since the election of
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami due to the lack of a coherent US policy in the
region. Increased US distraction from the region has added to the desire of GCC
members to work together.506
Moreover, as it concerns Iran-Oman relations, starting in the early 1990s, Oman
and Iran signed a series of agreements that allowed Iran to emerge from the international
and regional isolation it had experienced in the 1980s. The first agreements were nothing
more than small agricultural and construction agreements, but they allowed the
nurturing of closer relationships which have created a level of concern to policy makers
in Washington.508
military exercises.
This included senior governmental talks in 1998 and later plans for
In 1998, Speaker of the Omani Shoura council Abdullah Bin Ali al-Qutbi met
with Chairman of the Iranian Shoura council Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri and members of the
accompanying delegation in Muscat on 27 April. It was a cordial gathering, which
stressed the good relations between the two Shoura councils and underlined the
importance of boosting these relations for the betterment of both countries. Nouri also
met with Oman's ministers of foreign affairs, defense, trade and industry, exchanging
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views on issues of mutual interests. 509 This was followed that same year with the
governments of Iran and Oman agreeing to cooperate in the military arena, especially the
exchange of military experts to supervise their maneuvers and the establishment of "a
friendship military committee" to "strengthen bilateral cooperation" in the area of
defense. Afterward, Iranian Defense Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani expressed hope
that Iranian—Omani military cooperation would become an example for other countries
in the region; a not so subtle hint to the other, less enthusiastic, GCC states.510
Additionally, in yet another example of the evolution of Iran-Oman relations, the official
Oman News Agency reported that Iranian President Khatami was invited Oman's Sultan
Qaboos to visit the Islamic Republic in January 2000.511
Even more ominous for US policy makers were the 1999 press accounts which
reported that the Iranian and Omani navies are working on plans for joint naval exercises
to be held in the Persian Gulf as part of a continuing campaign of politico-military
rapprochement between Tehran and its GCC counterparts. 512 Iran's relationship with
Oman has been a vital component in Iran's policy goals of securing the strategically
critical Strait of Hormuz—control of which remains a pillar of Iranian foreign and
military policy. In fact, "relations between the two navies received a boost last December
when Omani personnel were invited to be observers during Iranian exercises in the
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513 Oman, which lies approximately 100km to the south of Bandar Abbas,
sponsored reciprocal exchanges with Iran's naval headquarters.514
These examples of Iran-Oman initiatives demonstrate a steady pattern of openness
and cooperation which will likely pay dividends for Iran in the long-term regardless of its
motivation—be it true gestures of friendship or calculated policy strategy. Iran seeks to
exploit the erosion of US support in the region—a product of a failed policy concerning
Iraq and domestic Arab unrest—to begin to leverage itself out of its "pariah" status with
its Gulf neighbors and possibly see America, its largest regional threat, lose its future
geostrategic footing. Thus, we see these initiatives by Iran as neorealist pragmatism
(potentially) serving the long-term national security goals of the regime. Motivated by
the desire to offset American presence in the Gulf, Iran initiated its largely successful
charm offensive with its Arab neighbors. By aligning itself with US-allied GCC states,
using Oman as an entree, Tehran's overtures may gradually undermine the balance of
power in the region. Tehran maintains that international co-operation and participation in
military exercises will help overcome the 'inappropriate' perception that Iran is working
against regional peace and stability.
3. Review of Relations
In sum, Iran has been very perceptive in developing its relations with Oman to
this point. First, Oman helped Iran penetrate the facade of unity surrounding the GCC,
providing Tehran with more in-roads to the other members through which it hopes to
sway their support away from extra-regional partners like the United States. Second,
Iran-Oman relations have served to erode support for the UAE's continued diplomatic
battle concerning its lost islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs'. This is another policy
coup that serves Iran's vital national security interests. In fact, this was a source of
empathy for Oman who has its own unresolved border dispute with the UAE. Lastly,
Iran's use of large, joint military exercises, like its recent naval endeavors, could be used
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as a pretext for greater involvement both economically and militarily with other GCC
countries. "Considering the lack of a coherent US policy in the region, the exercises are
likely to help Iran build cooperation with Gulf neighbors."515 This could lead to the
achievement of another top Iranian policy goal—namely, the disintegration of the close
alliance currently enjoyed by the US and the Arab nations of the GCC. Analyzed in this
light, and within the context of neorealist state behavior theory, Tehran's sometimes
conflicting policy directions take on a strategic pattern.
E. IRAN & SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONS
The final case study I would like to present is that of the international relations of
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Iran are heirs to two very different religious
traditions, which have been in conflict for hundreds of years. This tension, however, is
not only religious—it is national as well. Both Persian Iran and Arab Saudi Arabia are
countries vying for hegemony in the Persian—or Arabian—Gulf. In fact, the very
argument over the name of that body of water has become emblematic of that rivalry.
Saudi Arabia also has a long list of grievances against Iran since the 1989 Islamic
revolution, mostly concerning subversion among Saudi Arabia's ShTa population in its
Eastern province. Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of the same in majority Shfa
Bahrain.
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Until about mid-1996, US policies of containing Iran dovetailed neatly with
Saudi goals and fears, garnering Saudi support. However, changes in both Saudi Arabia
and Iran—the same changes that forced the United States itself to reexamine its policy of
containing Iran—have brought a radical change in Saudi Arabia's Iranian policy, which
Riyadh is now calling a "detente" or "rapprochement." The roots of this change are
manifold.517
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Since at least the late 1950s, three consistent themes have dominated Saudi
foreign policy: regional security, Arab nationalism, and Islam. "These themes inevitably
became closely intertwined during the formulation of actual policies."518 For example,
the preoccupation with regional security issues, including concern for both regime
stability and the safety of petroleum exports, resulted in the kingdom's establishing a
close strategic alliance with the United States. Yet this relationship, which remained
strong in 1992, often had complicated Saudi efforts to maintain solidarity with other Arab
countries, primarily because many Arabs, especially during the 1960s and 1970s,
believed United States support for Israel was detrimental to their national interests. 519 The
close ties with the non-Muslim United States also contrasted with the strained relations
that existed between Saudi Arabia and certain predominantly Muslim countries that
challenged the kingdom's efforts to portray it as the principal champion of Islamic causes.
1. Iran and the Character of Saudi Arabian Diplomacy
Saudi policies present a markedly different kind of challenge to Iran than do the
policies of the more active and aggressive Iraq. First, Saudi Arabia is the largest state on
the Arab side of the Gulf—automatically conferring upon it a role of major rival. Since
maturing as a state following the accession of King 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud after World
War I, Saudi Arabia has increasingly followed a conservative and cautious foreign policy
of non-confrontation and accommodation while conducting inter-Arab and regional
politics.
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It withstood the challenge of revolutionary Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s and
of revolutionary Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s. It has managed to maintain its Arab
credentials successfully enough to stave off any serious revolutionary challenge, while
using its "checkbook diplomacy" to blunt other potential challengers such as Syria and
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Now shorn of the elan of the early Saudi state, Saudi policy over the last four
decades has become defensive in character. " Similar to the policies of other, smaller
Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has studiously avoided involvement in regional conflict
wherever possible. Conflicts anywhere in the Arab world create divisions, force all
parties to take sides, and result in making inevitable—and potentially dangerous
—
enemies. To avoid involvement in potentially risky conflicts, Riyadh has sought to play
the mediator in regional conflicts, gain legitimacy for its act of noninvolvement, and gain
possible credit for the peacemaking role. " The Saudis have often opted for the short-
term tactical accommodation, despite the long-term strategic cost. Riyadh has always
sought to maintain good ties wherever possible with radical states in the region that pose
potential threats. This has meant the adoption of more radical positions on Arab
"motherhood" issues such as Palestine and the PLO; here Saudi Arabia has not moved
against the Arab consensus and often has only moved when the main radical opponents,
particularly Syria, acquiesce.
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Riyadh will have recourse against more powerful neighbors only in extremis and
in self-defense and when other options are exhausted. On one hand, it will even less
willingly invoke US defensive support unless the nature of the challenge is so great as to
outweigh the "delegitimizing" character of reliance upon foreign—and especially US
strength. On the other hand, with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 the security
threat to Riyadh became so imminent as to outweigh the Saudi 's reservations, accepting
the US security embrace—regardless of the cost. Remember, in response to Iraqi's
aggression against Kuwait, but more to protect the valuable Persian Gulf oilfields of
Saudi Arabia, the US put together an impressive international coalition, and
accomplished no more and no less than it had promised: to remove Saddam from Kuwait.
In addition, the US was not shy about calling in the cards. In the next five years or so,
Saudi Arabia followed the US lead: It bought billions of dollars of US arms, supported
522
Ibid., 108.




the Madrid conference and the Oslo agreement, and even partly ended the boycott of
Israel.
52
This was difficult because the Kingdom's natural preference is to follow—not
set—an Arab consensus on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Saudi Arabia also gave dual
containment a chance and followed US policy on Iraq and Iran. On the other hand,
Riyadh did not hesitate long in denying US forces' use of Saudi Arabian air bases to
stage planned massive air strikes against Iraq in retaliation for Saddam Huessen's
expulsion of the UN monitoring team in 1996. There are two reasons to avoid military
conflict, regardless of a state's assessment of its own strength. First, it requires
strengthening the armed forces, which could potentially turn against the regime itself.
Secondly, a defeat, however small, carries danger due to its negative impact upon the
image of the ruling family. Saudi policy moves slowly and does not get out in front of
any issue. Temporize and let issues resolve themselves where possible has been the
Saudi formula.527
2. Historical Iranian-Saudi Relations
Iran and Saudi Arabia have little history of long-term mutual hostilities; the two
states rarely encountered each other until the modern era. Iran has generally held Arabs
in contempt as "uncivilized" and "lizard eaters." " This is a prejudice that extends back
at least as far as the Arab conquest of Iran when largely Bedouin Arab armies from the
Arabian peninsula were the spearhead of the invasion. The term "Arab" strongly implies
"Bedouin" in common Persian parlance. 529 The aggressive role Saudi Wahhabi forces
played along the Gulf coast for a number of years in both the early 19th and early 20th
centuries when Wahhabi power temporarily threatened smaller Gulf rulers. 530 Iran, like
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character of Wahhabi Islam—and Persians were even more aware of its strong, anti-
Shi'ite character from its raids into the Shi'ite Holy Places of southern Iraq when in 1802
Wahhabis desecrated the holy Shi'ite shire of Qarbala. 531 However, it was the modem
Arab challenges to Iran of Egypt's Nasser, starting in the 1950s, that directed Iran's
attention to Saudi Arabia as a significant player in the Arab equation. ~ For Nasser also
threatened the Saudis, and concern for the spread of Arab radicalism in the Gulf became
of mutual concern for both Riyadh and Tehran. The 1958 overthrow of the monarchy in
Iraq brought the threat of radical Arab nationalism to the doorstep of both the Shah and
the Saudis.533
While sharing this common concern, there was little love lost between the two
states. It is impossible to view Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia independently of the
over all "cold war' between Iran and the Arabs. Saudi Arabia was a member of the Arab
League, which, under strong Egyptian influence, had launched an aggressive diplomatic
and propaganda assault against "Iranian imperialism" in the Gulf.534 Likewise, Saudi
Arabia and Iran are heirs to two very different religious traditions, which have been in
conflict for hundreds of years. 535
3. The Dark Decade in Relations
During the 1980s, Iran-Saudi relations reached their lowest nadir. First,
Khomeini's fiery rhetoric and direct verbal bashings on the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia's
role as the "Custodian of the Two Holy Places" attacked and threatened the very heart of
the Saudi monarchy. Khomeini sermons during this time regularly proclaimed that there
is no monarchy in Islam and that the concepts of monarchy and Islam contradicted each
531
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That coupled with the overthrow of a brother monarchy in Tehran was ill-
received in Riyadh. Then the Iran-Iraq War began. In a chance to indirectly retaliate
against Khomeini and his revolutionaries, Saudi Arabia threw its financial support behind
Saddam Huessein's forces—much to the ire of Iran. Seeing Saudi Arabia in the enemy's
camp, Iran's fundamentalist militants had no compunction in their next action, which
would bring relations to their lowest point in the 20th century.537
Saudi Arabia's postwar concerns about Iraq led to a level of rapprochement with
Iran during 1991. Historically, relations with non-Arab Iran had been correct, although
the Saudis tended to distrust Iranian intentions and to resent the perceived arrogance of
the Shah. Nevertheless, the two countries had cooperated on regional security issues
despite their differences over specific policies such as oil production quotas. The Iranian
Islamic Revolution of 1979 disrupted this shared interest in regional political stability.
From a Saudi perspective, the rhetoric of some Iranian revolutionary leaders, who called
for the overthrow of all monarchies as being un-Islamic, presented a serious subversive
threat to the regimes in the area. Political disturbances in the kingdom during 1979 and
1980, including the violent occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Sunni religious
extremists and riots among Saudi Shi'a in the Eastern Province, reinforced the perception
that Iran was exploiting, even inciting, discontent as part of a concerted policy to export
its revolution.
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Consequently, the Saudi government was pleased when Iraq invaded
Iran in September 1980. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia remained officially neutral
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The thorniest issue in Saudi-Iranian relations during the 1980s was not Riyadh's
discreet support of Baghdad but the annual Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca that took place
in the twelfth month of the Muslim lunar calendar. Contention over the participation in
Hajj rituals of Iranian pilgrims, who numbered about 150,000 in this period and
comprised the largest single national group among the approximately 2 million Muslims
who attended the yearly Hajj rites, symbolized the increasing animosity between Saudi
Arabia and Iran. 542 Tehran insisted that its pilgrims had a religious right and obligation to
engage in political demonstrations during the Hajj. Riyadh, however, believed that the
behavior of the Iranian pilgrims violated the spiritual significance of the Hajj and sought
to confine demonstrators to isolated areas where their chanting would cause the least
interference with other pilgrims. Because the Saudis esteemed their role as protectors of
the Muslim holy sites in the Hijaz, the Iranian conduct presented a major dilemma: to
permit unhindered demonstrations would detract from the essential religious nature of the
Hajj; to prevent the demonstrations by force would sully the government's international
reputation as guardian of Islam's most sacred shrines. 543 Tensions increased yearly
without a satisfactory resolution until the summer of 1987, when efforts by Saudi security
forces to suppress an unauthorized demonstration in front of Mecca's Grand Mosque led
to the deaths of more than 400 pilgrims, at least two-thirds of whom were Iranians. This
tragedy stunned the Saudis and galvanized their resolve to ban all activities not directly
associated with the Hajj rituals. 544 In Tehran, angry mobs retaliated by ransacking the
Saudi embassy; they detained and beat several diplomats, including one Saudi official
who subsequently died from his injuries. These incidents severed the frayed threads that
still connected Saudi Arabia and Iran; in early 1988, Riyadh cut its diplomatic relations
with Tehran, in effect closing the primary channel by which Iranian pilgrims obtained
Saudi visas required for the Hajj. 545








In 1988, Saudi Arabia declared at the annual meeting of the Foreign Ministers of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that it would assign a quota to each
country based on the principle of one thousand pilgrims for each million of its Muslim
population. The proposal was accepted with one dissenting voice — that of Iran. After
that, Iran stopped sending pilgrims in protest. The Saudis on their part made doubly sure
that the Iranians did not reach Mecca by abruptly breaking off diplomatic relations with
Iran in April 1988.
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Although Iran began to indicate its interest in normalizing relations with Saudi
Arabia as early as 1989, officials in Saudi Arabia remained suspicious of Tehran's
motives and did not reciprocate its overtures for almost two years. The Persian Gulf War,
however, significantly altered Saudi perceptions of Iran. 547 The unexpected emergence of
Iraq as a mortal enemy refocused Saudi security concerns and paved the way for a less
hostile attitude toward Iran. For example, Riyadh welcomed Tehran's consistent demands
for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and interpreted Iran's strict adherence to neutrality
during the conflict as a positive development. Despite their lingering doubts about
Tehran's aims vis-a-vis the Shi' a population of southern Iraq, the Saudis recognized after
the war that they and the Iranians shared an interest in containing Iraq and agreed to
discuss the prospects of restoring diplomatic relations.
4. 1990-1991 Gulf War: A Fresh Beginning for Iran
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait sent shivers down the spines of the Iranians, and
the subsequent US determination to punish Saddam Hussein thrilled their hearts. The
evolving Iranian policy on the issue marked a radical departure from its earlier Islamic
revolutionary ideology on many points. 548 In sharp contrast with its consistent position of
546
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keeping the Gulf out of bounds for foreign military presence, Rafsanjani came close to
accepting it as unavoidable under the circumstances. "We have no objection to them
obstructing aggression; anybody may help in any way; however, it would have been
549
better if the regional countries had done so."
When Saddam sought to woo the Iranians by his peace offer, the GCC rushed in
to outbid him. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah, visited Tehran on 22 August
1990 and met his counterpart, Velayeti, with a message for Rafsanjani. He expressed his
regrets for the "past mistakes" of Kuwaiti support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, which
the Iranians accepted.
550
In the following month, there was constant one-way traffic of
high-level GCC dignitaries paying visits to Tehran. The culmination came on 29
September 1990, when the Foreign Ministers of the GCC countries met Velayeti in the
Iranian office at UN Headquarters in New York. On 19 November 1990, Fawzi al-Jasii
presented his credentials in Tehran as the new Kuwaiti Ambassador.
The GCC Summit met at Doha, Qatar, from 22 to 25 December 1990 and, in an
unusual move, invited the Iranian Ambassador to Qatar, Nasrollah Mirzaiee Nasir, to
attend one of its sessions. The Summit communique contained a special section on
"Relations with Iran" in which the GCC welcomed the Iranian desire to improve its
relations with all GCC countries and stressed its own desire to establish relations with
Iran on the basis of "good neighborliness, noninterference in domestic affairs and respect
for sovereignty, independence, and peaceful coexistence deriving from the bonds of
religion and heritage that link the countries of the region". Further, it underlined the
importance of serious and realistic action to settle all outstanding differences between
Iran and the GCC.551 The Doha Summit marked the high point of Iran's reconciliation
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and their mutual suspicions of the roles they aspired to play in the regional power game,
were irreconcilable. In any case, Iran simply stayed out of the war. It kept up its search
for a rapprochement with individual GCC states in the aftermath of the war.
5. Post-Gulf War Relations
In 1992, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself issued afatwa552 that the performance
of any ritual by the Shi'is, which created discord among the Muslims or weakened Islam,
was haram (evil). Ayatollah Reyshahri, his representative, led pilgrims from Iran with
a message of "friendship, unity, and brotherhood under the banner of monotheism."554
Thus, after many years, the Hajj season passed off in an atmosphere of cordiality rather
than tight security. Appointed as the new Iranian Ambassador to Riyadh in June 1992,
Gholam Ali Nadjafabadi presented his credentials saying, "The Islamic world has two
wings, and it is not possible to fly without its two wings of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Both have their weight and place in the Islamic
world."555 The statement marked a 180-degree turn in the official Iranian attitude to
Saudi Arabia and went a long way in facilitating the process of reconciliation between the
two.
First, Saudi Arabia, in effect, has a new king. 'Abdallah bin 'Abd al-Aziz, crown
prince and half-brother of King Fahd, has been running the Kingdom's day-to-day affairs
since November 1995. The new leader seems intent on making his mark and shifting the
direction of the Kingdom's foreign policy. 55( As predicted, 'Abdallah has decided to
embark on an independent path whereby Saudi Arabia puts a priority on regional
52
In Islamic religious law afatwa is a religious opinion, formal legal opinion or a verdict on a specific
subject
>3 Tehran Times, 26 May 1992 (DR). The Shi'is kiss the holy shrine in Medina and say their prayers








relationships. Moreover, this move toward Iran comes at a time, paradoxically, when the
Saudis—apparently— believe Iran was directly or indirectly responsible for the June
1996 Khobar Tower bombing which killed 19 US soldiers.55 The Saudis never accused
Iran publicly but leaked the accusation widely. In late March 1998, Saudi Minister of
Interior Na'if bin 'Abd al-'Aziz suddenly announced the investigation had been closed
but released no findings. The US considers the investigation still open, claiming it was
558
not informed of this development.
Despite the findings of the Saudi security's investigation into the bombing, which
found "no evidence" connecting Iran to the event (evidence and witnesses that the US
investigators were denied access too), recent revelations by an Iranian defector may
prove otherwise. Iranian Ahmad Behbahani, told major media outlets that "he was an
Iranian intelligence official responsible for coordinating overseas assassinations and
terrorism operations for more than a decade before his defection to Turkey four months
ago."
5
Additionally, he reportedly chose to speak with reporters instead of government
officials for fear that all concerned governments might seek to "eliminate him" to avoid
the necessary responses Washington would be forced to make in retaliation;560 responses
which would torpedo the climate warming relations for Iran between both Saudi Arabia
and the US. If true, all this leads to one conclusion: Riyadh is holding back the full
details of the investigation to prevent a US reprisal against Iran. 5 l Interior Minister
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cautiously. The Sunni Saudi opposition has insisted that the regime has imprisoned Sunni Saudis for the
operation. Moreover, information leaked on the Iranian connection is from Saudi sources who have an
interest in pointing at Iranian involvement to draw attention away from the more threatening problem of the
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Na'if s public refusal to confirm the Iranian connection speaks volumes concerning Saudi
Arabia's dilemma. This action not only reflects Saudi wishes to turn over a new leaf with
Iran, but also a determination to put its own regional concerns above those of its main
military backer. Riyadh believes US resolve is eroding with respect to Iran and grows
increasingly wary of talk in Washington about reassessing the dual containment policy.
Moreover, if there was a public statement about an Iranian connection, the US would
most likely feel compelled to retaliate. Saudi Arabia worried that Washington might
undertake military operations strong enough to enrage Iran, but not enough to cause any
lasting change.
6. Iran's "Charm Offensive": A Swift Shift in Tenor
a. The Year 1997
In March 1997, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayeti visited Saudi
Arabia to invite its leaders to the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) held in Tehran at the end of that year. Iran for its part was interested in exploiting
Saudi fears to ensure Riyadh's stamp of approval for the planned. Meeting with King
Fahd and other top Saudi officials, Iranian Foreign Minster Velayati delivered a speech,
which was uncharacteristically gracious. The Saudi press responded quite
enthusiastically to this visit. One newspaper wrote:
The two countries have so many things in common, and shared
security interests are such that the two countries would do well to
overcome the crisis of confidence bedeviling their relations. The
facts that favor an existential partnership between the Kingdom and
Iran are many. They go beyond such things as common border and
they share Islamic faith.
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Furthermore, this paper concluded that the two countries are in the same boat,
both in times of war and peace, and it would serve them well to take "direct
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responsibility"—rather than delegate it to the United States—for security arrangements in
the Gulf.
564 Such statements are finding a ready audience among a Saudi populace that
has grown weary of America's seemingly "never-ending war" on Iraq from Saudi
Arabian territory.
After Mohammed Khatami's election as Iran's president in May 1997, these
warming relations went into high-gear. The year, 1997, witnessed a flurry of visits
between the two countries. First, demonstrating Riyadh's desire for better relations with
the new Tehran administration, Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdullah (for all intents and
purposes the current day-to-day ruler of Saudi Arabia since 1995) visited Tehran in June
ostensibly to confirm the Saudi participation at the OIC summit. 5 Also, in late June
1997, the two countries—traditionally at loggerheads over oil policy—spearheaded an
effort to convince OPEC countries to stop violating oil production quotas. One of the
biggest promoters of this dialogue, Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, revealed that he
had even met with the Kingdom's top cleric and arbiter of Wahhabism, General Mufti
Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin Baz, and other members of the Saudi Council of Senior 'ulama.5 6
This is especially significant since Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi Islam has often been the most
strident critic of Iran's Shi'i Islam.
In September 1997, direct flights resumed between Tehran and Jeddah—the first
such scheduled flights in 18 years. The strongest single statement of the positive
reassessment of its relations with Tehran came in December 1997, with the attendance of
a high-level Saudi delegation at the Iranian-chaired OIC summit. The delegation was
headed by 'Abdallah, who even offered publicly to mediate between the US and Iran. "It
is not hard for our Iranian brothers or for a friendly country like Iran or for a friendly
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'Abdallah met with Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and with Khatami
for two rounds of talks. The deputy commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard
(SANG) and 'Abdallah's second in command, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Tuwayjiri
assessed that "Iran and the Arabs [were] heading for more cooperation and coordination
which will allow them take their natural place in the world and to serve the Islamic
nation."
568
b. The Years 1998-1999
The year 1998 began with a dreaded portend as Iraq assembled its troops
in a veiled-threat against Kuwait. The US began a major work up to a potential of
massive air strikes from bases in the Middle East; however, a distinct lack of Saudi
support for US efforts to pressure Baghdad marked the February 1998 crisis. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright's visit to drum up support for a military strike was met by a
stone wall in Saudi Arabia. She left without getting 'Abdallah's approval for the US to
use Saudi airbases. Similarly, when Secretary of Defense William Cohen followed to
press the issue, he still could not get approval for their use. In explaining the Kingdom's
position, Defense Minister Sultan bin 'Abd al-Aziz said that US efforts were seen as
"insensitive to local concerns, bullying, and embarrassing."569 In addition, Saudi press
pleaded with the US to take out Saddam himself, instead of waging a war on the entire
country. One newspaper wrote that "he is not an impossible target," citing the fact that
the US had captured Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega in 1990. 570 This weakening of
support for US policy has provided enough chinks in the armor to allow Tehran to
leverage itself increasingly into Saudi rapprochement. Likewise, for the Saudis, their
goals had shifted toward a desire to "get along in the neighborhood."571 The feeling was
that if Washington could not definitely get rid of Saddam himself in this proposed strike,
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then Saudi Arabia did not want to enable it in any way. Moreover, Saudi Arabia was
dealing with a continuous negative undercurrent to continue American military presence
in the country and the other significant "threat"—Iran—had actually come a long way in
proving itself as non-threatening to Saudi Arabia itself. Taking all this into account
—
especially Washington's "pin-prick" scheme to harass the Iraqis, Saudi Arabia began
contemplating a potential shift in its local arrangements—with Iran as an important
partner—at least in the short term. For Iran, their goal of finding a counterbalance to Iraq
and making one more step toward forcing US forces from the Gulf region, was a big leap
forward.
During this period, Rafsanjani, as a former Iranian President, paid an official visit
to Saudi Arabia and, in a diplomatic boon, met with visiting Bahraini ruler, Sheikh
Salman al-Khalifa. In view of Bahraini accusations of Iranian involvement in its
domestic disturbances, the meeting signified a thaw in Iran-Bahrain relations. " More
mutual visits followed, including the March 1998 visit of an Iranian warship, which
docked at Jeddah. During the last Hajj, Fahd's son, Faysal, who heads Saudi Arabia's
sports commission, invited the entire Iranian soccer team to make the pilgrimage at his
expense in appreciation for their qualifying for the World Cup tournament.573
Then, on 27 May 1998, Iranian and Arabian Foreign Ministers signed a wide-
reaching bilateral agreement promoting cooperation in the fields of trade and business,
economy, joint investment, science, technology, culture, tourism, and sports. 574 Other
areas slated for bilateral cooperation include industries, mining, air and sea transportation
links, and environmental protection. During Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince
Saud al-Faisal's two-day visit to Iran, both he and Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal
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Kharrazi expressed their countries' commitment to continued and expanded cooperation
in economic and political matters. Prince Saud reportedly told Kharrazi that Saudi King
Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah "are decisive to upgrade ties with Iran,"576 and that
they are "eagerly awaiting a visit to Saudi Arabia by Khatami to further boost bilateral
ties."
5 7
Kharrazi reportedly responded that close and friendly Iranian-Saudi relations
were "sincere and serious," and that Iran stands ready to "upgrade bilateral relations to
the highest level." 7 Following his meeting with visiting Saudi Defense Minister Prince
Sultan bin Abd al Aziz al Saud, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said that there are
no longer any outstanding differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia.579 This possible
reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran has serious political, military, and
economic ramifications for the region. Khatami said that the two countries now have a
relationship based on friendship and cooperation. "The recent contacts between the two
sides have resolved all problems and there is currently no hurdle for the two states to
expanding their ties in all fields."581 Even Khamene'i himself has praised the
improvement in relations and expressed hope that they would develop even more.
Khatami's comments could signal a major shift in the relationship between the two states,
with possible economic, political, and military implications for the whole Middle East
region.
Beyond the benefits Iran might hope to realize in oil production and pricing, and
in reestablishing connections with the West, there are other geopolitical advantages as
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forces, tensions have once again risen along the Iran-Iraq border. Meanwhile, Saudi
Arabia has reportedly captured a number of Iraqi infiltrators, and Iraq claims to be
preparing for a major US or US-led attack or invasion.
Following the failure of the US to take action against Iraq in February 1998,58
Iran launched an initiative aimed at building a NATO-style Arab-Persian regional
military alliance, which was of interest to many Arab nations. At the time, the Voice of
the Islamic Republic of Iran declared, "If the regional countries had enjoyed a
constructive consensus about controlling the Iraqi regime's irrational behavior, surely
today they would have been immune from America's tension-inducing presence in the
COa
region." Again, the Saudi press gushed that Saudi Arabia and Iran were like two
wings, without whose cooperation a bird cannot fly. Rafsanjani met with Saudi
businessmen and implored them to open the country to Iranian labor. The two countries
agreed to set up a joint commission to study bilateral relations. Foreign Minister Sa'ud
al Faysal termed the visit "a new chapter in cooperation." A particularly revealing
incident occurred during Rafsanjani' s visit. While at Friday prayers in the Prophet's
Mosque in Medina, the imam of the mosque subjected Rafsanjani to a vitriolic diatribe
against Shi'ism, the kind of statement Wahhabi preachers often make. Several top Shi'i
clerics in Iran issued fatwas forbidding Iranians from attending prayer led by this
particular imam at the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. However, the head of Iran's Hajj
delegation, Ayatollah Reyshari, who was a representative of Khatami, said that this was
not proper, and to do so—to boycott this imam—would give Iran and Shi 'is a bad name.
Appreciatively, the Saudis fired the imam. Rafsanjani later categorically denied that
Saudi Arabia was against Shi'ism, an accusation frequently made by Iranian political and
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Iran, which currently heads the OIC, has also been attempting to
increase the activity and effectiveness of that group in solving international disputes in
hopes that this newfound cooperation with the Saudis might be the begin the
COO
formalization of a coordinated Iraq policy.
With the US losing credibility in the region due to its weak and vacillating
policies on Iraq and Israel, commenting, "Iran is now busily spinning its own web, trying
to replace the United States as Saudi Arabia's guarantor." In a 29 July 1998, Iran's
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Reza Nouri, demonstrated just how far
Iranian-Saudi relations had come in six months by granting an interview with in the
London-based newspaper Al-Hayat. Nouri told the newspaper that "Iran's missile
capabilities are at the disposal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."590 He continued
We believe that Iran's power is the kingdom's power, and the
kingdom's power is Iran's power. Our relations with Saudi Arabia
have reached a historical stage where we are complementing one
another, and if we have a missile or non-missile capability, it is at
the kingdom's disposal. 591
Saudi Arabia has yet to respond publicly to Nouri's comments. " Nouri rejected
concerns raised in the US and European press that Iran's new Shahab-3 missile threatens
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Saudi Arabia, saying, "They are not aware of the status of relations between us and the
kingdom, which have entered a new stage." Kuwait, also rapidly growing close to Iran,
has already announced that it does not consider Iran's new missile to be a threat to the
593
region.
c. The Year 2000
The evolution in Iranian-Saudi relations continued through 1999 into the
new millennium. Iranian policy makers have remained vigilant in their policy maneuvers
to end their isolation, encourage economic growth, and balance against potential
territorial threats. A more recent example of Iranian finesse in penetrating U.S.
containment can be found in Tehran's tangential support to the recent Saudi Arabian
crackdown on a minority religious sect, the Ismaili, 94 as well as the border dispute with
Yemen the event has precipitated.595 Tehran was quick to tender its services, enhanced
by its recent upgrade in relations with Saudi Arabia, by offering itself as a peace-broker
in the Saudi-Yemeni dispute. 59 The Saudi security services may have cracked down on
the Ismailis in anticipation of Yemen-backed infiltrators in the Saudi-Yemen border
dispute. Saudi Arabian military forces in late-January 2000 reportedly occupied the
strategic Jahfan Mountain along the border with Yemen. 597 Saudi Arabia's occupation of
this mountain has further soured relations between Riyadh and Sanaa. Yemen has a
593 STRATFOR. "US Search for Rapprochement with Iran Becomes Public,"Internet.
5 4 The Ismaili sect is an offshoot of Shi'a Islam, the split having occurred hundreds of years ago over
recognition of the Seventh Imam. Today, the Ismaili sect is relatively small and is not supported by the
larger Shi'ite community. Sunni Muslims are the majority in Saudi Arabia; Shi'ites make up only 7-
lOpercent. There is no official number of Ismailis in Saudi Arabia, but Saudi diplomats say there are tens of
thousands of Ismailis, mostly living in the mountainous regions of the southwest, according to AFP.
95 STRATFOR. "Saudi Government Moves Toward Unstable Ground with Crackdown," (25 April
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significant Shi'ite population, many of whom belong to the Ismaili sect, located across
and along the border with Saudi Arabia. 598
Reminiscent of the Saudi-Qatar dispute in 1997, this new Saudi border crisis
provides Iran another opportunity to play the role of "honest" peace-broker and further
penetrate the US containment cordon, ingratiating itself to its Arab neighbors. While Iran
and Yemen signed cooperation agreements in several fields on 19 April 2000, Iran and
Saudi Arabia have been moving closer to signing a bilateral security agreement. As
stated previously, Riyadh appears to be warming to the idea of bettering its regional ties
with states like Iran to balance against future Iraqi aggression given apparent US
impotence in this regard.
7. Structural Imperatives in Iran-Saudi Relations
Today, at the dawn of the 21 st century, the relationship between Iran and Saudi
Arabia has become a key consideration for both of these nations—and the world at large.
Over the past 20 years, suppressed rivalry and distrust on several levels have
characterized relations between these two states. Beyond the strong influence U.S.
relations plays upon, the ability to transcend past this mutual distrust depends mainly on
how capable Iran and Saudi Arabia are of altering their entrenched biases for one another.
These asymmetries and differing priorities will set the parameters for cooperation in the
Persian Gulf.599 Iran-Saudi relations are constrained by a number of structural factors
limiting significant security cooperation, exacerbated by the creation of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in 1979. 00 Events since then have aggravated the threat from Iran and
have increased mistrust. This situation may change if Iran transforms itself, but is
unlikely to change enough for meaningful cooperation in security affairs. Instead, a
balance of power among the three principal Gulf States seems inevitable, and the stability
598
Ibid. As an aside, the Saudi Arabian repression has more ominous implications. Saudi Arabia is
seeing population growth at both extremes of its economic spectrum. Riyadh may have succeeded in
isolating this crackdown of an outcast sect, but any future resort to strong-arm measures risks fueling
popular discontent.




of this balance will largely depend on the nature of domestic transformations within
them.
The structural factors influencing Iran-Saudi relations include geopolitical
differences, such as disparities in demography and geography, and consequent differing
perspectives on regional issues. Questions about their respective influence in and
leadership of Gulf affairs, oil issues and the role of outside powers compose the
traditional "national interest" agenda. National, cultural, ethnic and sectarian divisions in
the region, such as between Persian and Arab, Shi'a and Sunni, also aggravate the
situation. The natural constituency and the relative weakness of the Arab Gulf states tend
to "Arabize" bilateral disputes, thus magnifying issues and polarizing the region. For
Iran, a dispute with any Arab neighbor risks becoming a dispute with all its Arab
neighbors, infusing the situation with dramatic symbolism redolent of historical
animosities. In addition to these structural factors are the particular challenges posed by
the 1979 Iranian revolution. As the only Shi'i state, its religious leaders claimed a broad
Islamic sanction for their revolution. During this period, Iran, in offering itself as a
model for others and proclaiming a mission to extend true Islam to other states, painted
itself as a direct threat to the Muslim Gulf states. The Iranian government's claim to
speak for a putative universal Islamic authority has been a clear challenge to the Saudi
government, which sees its legitimacy as, tied to its role of protector of the Holy Places
of Mecca and Medina.
8. Review of Relations
In sum, currently Iran has been able to evolve its relations with the most wealthy
and de facto leader of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, from a point of confrontation in the 1980s
to the current positive state. Tehran has accomplished this in spite of the religious,
political, and ideological differences between the two. Iran accomplished this because of
its neorealist policy making. Tehran, in ten short years, has been able to increase its
potential economic and security standing by increasingly wooing Riyadh away from the
West (i.e., the US) and laying the groundwork for a potential regional alliance to offset
Iraq, neutralize American presence, and lift the yoke of US economic sanctions.
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Moreover, it is a policy that is working, according to Martin Indyk, US Ambassador to
Israel and Middle East expert who points out:
(T)he attempt to isolate Iran through unilateral trade sanctions has
backfired since none of Iran's trading partners have been willing to
abide by such heavy-handed tactics, and even close US allies such
as Canada and the European Union have denounced the extra-
territorial aspects of the sanctions as a violation of international
trade law (Likewise) the prohibition of business contacts with
Iran has effectively locked American companies out of thriving and
lucrative markets across the region, which are then simply left open
to their European, Chinese, and Japanese competitors.60
F. SUMMARY
Iranian national security and foreign relations policy with respects to the Persian
Gulf States examined here proves Waltz's posit that neorealism is the true shaper of a
state's policy. Iranian policy decisions and actions with regard to the UAE, Bahrain,
Oman and Saudi Arabia demonstrate consistency when examined from the perspective of
Tehran. Some opponents might suggest that Iranian decisions seem irrational to its
economic well-being by illustrating the annexation of the disputed islands of Abu Musa
and the Tunbs'. But what is the significant threat? The evidence provided here suggests
that threats to Iranian territorial integrity, its life-line to the world via the Strait of
Hormuz, and the extra-regional threat posed by US military presence are the key
determinants of its policy decisions. In this light, the sacrifice of its economy seems well
worth the price for balancing against this threat.
601
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The disintegration of the USSR and the appearance in its stead of a number of
newly independent states in world politics has offered Iran a unique chance to break out
of its isolation. The establishment of relations with the post-Soviet republics came at a
time when the Islamic republic had entered a new stage of its evolution, with gradual
retreat from rigid, and unacceptable, principles calling for an export of the Islamic
revolution; at the same time its foreign policy was acquiring a pragmatic content.602
Moreover, it seems that the change in the overall geopolitical situation has encouraged a
rapid spread of pragmatism. At first, Iranian leaders had been thinking in terms of
religious and cultural penetration, but soon they realized that however important the
revival of the Muslim tradition might be, development of infrastructure, capital
investment, and financial aid mattered much more for their new partners. In particular,
Iran concluded about thirty basic agreements (26 of them on economic matters) with the
Central Asian states and Azerbaijan.
A. THE CASE STUDIES
1. Iran and Azerbaijan
The mounting wave of ethnic nationalism in the former Soviet Union had the
potential of causing instability in Iran itself. In this respect, Azerbaijan arouses the
greatest concern, since its Azeri population numbers about 6 million, while in Iran the
number is two to three times as high. There were clear indications of Iranian concern
over the prospect of Azerbaijani leaders' rising claims to Iranian Azerbaijan and the
assistance rendered by Turkey in this regard when, as early as the spring of 1992, a large
number were forced from top governmental posts. However, the Iranian-Azeris
themselves were worried by possible destabilization, and they stressed their interest in






result in undesirable consequences.604 Further, Iranian policy towards Azerbaijan in the
early 1990s prompted by several factors. First, a flow of Azeri refugees driven into Iran
in 1993 as a result of increased Armenian-Azerbaijani hostilities increased Iranian
concerns and contributed to further advancement of its relations with the new leadership
of Azerbaijan. Second, Iranian rivalries with Turkey figured strongly in Tehran's policy
605
responses.
2. Iran and Turkey
As this case study has demonstrated Iran's national security policies and foreign
relations imperatives have always been anchored in the neorealist concerns of territorial
integrity, regime survival, economic prosperity, and balancing power in favorable ways
to meet these goals. Iranian and Turkish relations have never been close, especially after
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. However, each country was pragmatic in is approach to
dealing with the other.
In Central Asia, Iran reined in its bankrupt strategy of exporting the Islamic
revolution in favor of building economic ties with the countries of this region. This has
the dual need of helping Iran breakout of its economic isolation and also to counter the
threat presented by Turkey and Pan-Turanism, which could seal Iranian isolation if
allowed to nurture and flourish. This is an area where Ankara and Tehran have found
competitive interests.
Finally, there was the "Kurdish Question." When it believed the regional balance
of power was at stake, Iran backed Kurdish factional elements to counter both its war-
enemy Iraq and what Tehran perceived as Turkish interest in Iraq's northern oilfields.
Later, when the potential of a Kurdish state reared its head, Tehran was quick to shift its
policy in Ankara's favor to ensure Kurdish nationalism went unrealized. This policy shift






its "charm offensive" in recent years as it attempts to overcome the side-effects of two
decades of economic sanctions in one form or another and to begin the marginilaztion of
U.S. military acceptance in the region. The Iranian's applied this policy approach to its
relations with Turkey, especially in the cases of the new republics of Central Asia,
Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, as well as the Kurdish factions in each country. Within
each, Iran has identified potential dangers and opportunities and constructed its policies
to match these issues to its primary goals.
3. Iran and Israel
This paper has argued that the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown a common
thread of pragmatic, neorealistic propensity in formulating its policy when it believes that
its vital national security imperatives are in jeopardy. These interests: to preserve Iran's
territorial integrity; to avoid international isolation; to promote foreign trade, investment
and commercial avenues for the technology transfers required for sustainable
development; and of paramount import; and the removal of US presence and hegemonic
influence in the Persian Gulf.
From the earliest years of the Islamic Republic of Iran, during the thick of the
Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini and his revolutionaries showed that they could set aside their
principles and ideology and deal with the likes of Israel and the US. Likewise, by
accepting the cease-fire agreement with Iraq, Tehran again demonstrated the capacity for
their neorealist base to their policy decisions. Moreover, this pragmatism has continued
to this day concerning the Arab-Israeli peace process; however, not in the way Western
analysts might expect. Given the harsh economic yoke placed upon Iran, the pragmatic
decision maker in the West might expect Tehran to give up its visceral opposition to the
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. However, although some of the rhetoric had toned by
mid-2000, the current eruption of violence between Israel and the Palestinians has
changed the climate throughout the region. Tehran has remained somewhat muted in its
606
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official response to the recent Israeli-PLO impasse, although the sermons from the
religious clergy have been more vilifying of Israel.
What I believe I have shown is the fact that Iran clearly feels threatened by the
hegemonic influence of the United States, and that Tehran equates countries like Turkey
and Israel as client agents of the US. In this light, some of Iran's actions make sense.
Iran opposes the peace because it will put greater disequilibria into the balance of power
between it and its regional neighbors. The Arab states are likely to focus more attention
on Iran if they accept peace with Israel; Turkey's recent treaty with Israel certainly
throws it into the Western camp in Tehran's eyes; and the enemy Iran fears the most—the
US—further consolidates its influence over the region.
4. Iran and The Persian Gulf States
Finally, an examination of Iranian relations vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf states of the
UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia was provided. Each analysis within this case
study illustrates Iranian national security and foreign relations policy as sometimes
contradictory but always directed toward alleviating the tensions wrought upon its own
critical security needs and perceptions. These Persian Gulf states have been suspicious of
Iranian intentions in the Persian Gulf. Iran's annexation of Abu Musa and the Tunbs
signaled to both Arab and Western observers alike that Iran's true goals were to gain
regional hegemony in the Gulf. Iran's occupation and continued intransigence to allow
the International Court of Justice to review the situation are at odds with Tehran's stated
foreign policy goals of rapprochement with its Arab neighbors, and in recent years even
with the US. As was discussed previously in this paper, some historical experts cite that
Iranian claims appear much stronger then those of the UAE. With Iran's continued label
as an international "rogue state" it is perhaps the case that Tehran does not feel it would
receive a just review of its claims and a ruling against it might be the very impetus it feels
the US would need to forcible take the territory from Iran on behalf of the UAE.
Iran has serious national security concerns throughout the region of the Persian
Gulf and has sought, in recent years, to improve upon its relations with its Arab
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neighbors to alleviate the tensions placed upon its ultimate national security concerns
with threats to the foundations of Iranian sovereignty and the Islamic revolution. Iran's
decisionmaking in this regard is anchored in neorealist behavior. Tehran perceives as
true threats those that strike at the very fabric of the Iranian Islamic state, dealing with
them swiftly through pragmatic, realpolitik. It is through this prism which Iran's policies
and dealings with its GCC neighbors must be understood.
Moreover, despite Tehran's denials, occupation of the Gulf islands nurtures Iran's
longing for hegemony in the Persian Gulf Region—which fits neatly with its desires to
ensure the unquestionable achievement of its foreign policy imperatives. Abu Musa, the
Greater Tunb, and the Lesser Tunb serve a strategic purpose toward Iran's neorealist-
based interests. Their location relative to the Strait of Hormuz provides Iran superb
strategic position adjacent to shipping lanes and any inland targets on the western Persian
Gulf. Additionally, Iran presents a better defense posture to aggressors with forward-
deployed forces on these islands. It is for this reason that this territorial dispute has an
impact on, and the attention of, the international community. Therefore, Iran continues to
occupy and build-up "defensive" forces on these strategic islands. However, it is
important to understand these territorial disputes over Bahrain and the three islands in the
context of the evolution of Iranian-Arab relations and neorealism. The Pahlavi regime
enjoyed close cooperation with the Gulf monarchies. The two sides advocated a
conservative and pro-Western policy. The Iranian participation in defeating the leftist
rebellion in Dhofar, Oman (from mid-1960s to mid-1970s) is an illustration of this close
cooperation and common interests between two sides.607 However, given the Arab
suspicion in Iran's intentions, there was no formal security alliance in the Gulf.
The same type of behavior is also observed when analyzing Tehran's dealings
with Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Naturally, the process of improving relations
between Iran and its Arab neighbors has not hindered Tehran's efforts to enhance its
Bahgat, 120. A leftist movement called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman launched a
guerrilla war against Al Said, the ruling family in Oman. This revolt was backed by another leftist's
regime that came to power in Aden, South Yemen in 1969. The revolt was finally crushed in the mid-
1970s with the aid of Iranian, Saudi, Jordanian, and British troops.
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defense capability. This is Iran's pragmatism. Unlike Iraq, the Islamic Republic has
been under less scrutiny by the international community to modernize its armed forces
for most of the 1990s.
The Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power and the rhetoric of exporting the
revolution deepened the gap between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Not surprisingly, for
most of the 1980s the Arab monarchies supported Iraq in its war against Iran. The end of
the fighting and Rafasanjani's rise to power opened a new chapter in the Gulf politics.
Tehran's neutrality during the 1990-91 Gulf War crisis earned it goodwill among the six
Gulf states. Taking advantage of this new political environment, Rafasanjani engaged in
a series of confidence-building exercises with the Gulf rulers with many describing
Tehran's new regional policy as "Rafsanjani's pragmatic peace."608 According to this
strategy, the Islamic Republic's behavior toward its neighbors is guided more by
economic interests and less by religious dogma since the early 1990s.
B. IRAN TODAY AND TOMORROW
Today, Khatami's regional orientation is a continuation of a trend in political
engagement with Iran's regional neighbors. Khatami made improving relations with
Iran's neighbors as a cornerstone in his foreign policy. In the closing years of the 20th
century, several signs pointed toward a potential rapprochement in Arab-Iran relations.
These include the decision to raise diplomatic relations between Iran and Bahrain to the
ambassadorial level for the first time in nearly twenty years and the high-level Arab
turnout in the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) summit held in Tehran in
December 1997.609 Another significant step was the well-publicized visit by Iran's
former President Rafsanjani to Saudi Arabia in early 1998 and the signing of several
agreements for economic cooperation between the two nations. Similar, but slower, steps
to improve relations with Iraq have accompanied this process of building confidence
608 Ramazani (June 1998), 47.
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between Iran and the Gulf monarchies. During the Islamic summit the Iraqi Vice
President, Tana Yasin Ramadan, was the most senior official to visit Iran since the
revolution. A significant exchange of prisoners of war between the two countries
followed this 1998 agreement, permitting Iranian pilgrims to resume direct travel to Shi'i
shrines in Iraq for the first time since 1980. 10
C. SOME CLOSING THOUGHTS
Ambassador Sheehan's official testimony before the Senate in 1999 is quite
correct in charging that some support continues to make its way from Iran to several
terrorist groups.
611 However, it is also true that there has been a marked decline in that
support from what is was during the 1980s. It seemingly runs counter to the logic of state
neorealism predictions given the economic hardship Iran endures for this continued
support, except in those cases where Iran feels a greater need to gain a balance of power
by using these unconventional tools—as is the case with Hezbollah and Israel.
The Iranian leadership, led by the religious 'ulama, has become desperate over US
power and intentions both directly and through its alliances in the region. As a weak and
isolated state Iran feels a greater need to gain a balance of power by using the
unconventional tools of terrorism in the case with Hezbollah and Israel to stymie the
peace process. 612
These case studies of Iranian relations clearly demonstrate that the country's
leadership formulates policy and makes decisions based on neorealist theory.
Neorealism, and the need for a weaken state to balance power in the region more
accurately explains state behavior in vital issues of foreign policy and national security
for Iran. Neorealists, by definition, are only concerned with issues that effect the security
BBC News On-line, "Progress for Iranian Pilgrims," (8 July 1998) on the internet at
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of a nation : "The survival motive is taken as the ground of action where the security of
the state is not assured, rather than as a realistic description of the impulse that lies
behind every act of state."614 Even under the more conservative tutelage of the Ayatollah
Khomeini himself, Iran behaved as neorealists predicted: allying with secular Syria to
balance against Israel and dealing with his ideological enemies—the US, Israel, and the
Soviet Union—to counter Iraqi aggression in the Iran-Iraq War. This behavior was
reinforced again this decade with Iran's support of Christian Armenians against Muslim
Azeri Islamists, and its lowering of rhetoric and support for Islamists in Lebanon.
Turmoil, conflict, and the threat of aggression almost completely surround Iran:
War and civil war in Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, military coups in Pakistan, sedition
groups in Iraq attacking and maiming Iranian leaders, angry rhetoric from Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, and the UAE; most disturbing of all to Tehran, the continual reminder that Iran
is not the master of the Persian Gulf with the forward deployed forces of the United
States ever in view. In this environment, Iran has continually demonstrated its propensity
as a state that follows the course of neorealist-realpolitik and that ideology makes little
difference when national security is at stake. This inner-face of Iranian foreign policy
imperatives—neorealist and pragmatic—is the one which US decision makers and
analysts must keep in their fore-thoughts when dealing with the country, avoiding the
trappings of media rhetoric or the journalistic hue-and-cry of the monolithic Iranian terror
network615 which threatens the West. It is neorealism, and the need for a weaken state to
balance power in the region which more accurately explains state behavior in vital issues
of foreign policy and national security for Iran.
A sage statesman once said that states have no permanent friends or foes, just
national interest. The obvious conclusion that where there is an interest, there is the
possibility of conflict must be ever kept in ones mind. By balancing the interest of one
13
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power against another, a smaller state can not only survive but also thrive if the
conditions are suitable.
616
In the case of Iranian national security policy and relations
with Israel, history has shown that the impact of revolutionary Islamic ideology on
foreign policy pales in comparison to the appreciation afforded neorealist-realpolitik.
Furthermore, in closing, as long as Iranian perception continues to view as threatening
US regional intentions and the balance of power in the Middle East, we can expect
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